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INTRODUCTION
South Central Los Angeles, California
"This is for Rodney King[!]"' And thus, at 4:15 p.m. on April 29, 1992,2 one
of the deadliest urban riots in the nation's history began.3 The riot continued to rage
for six days, engulfing South Central Los Angeles in a deluge of violence, looting,
and arson.4 By the time the mayhem subsided, at least forty-two people had
perished, 5 more than 700 businesses were burned, and over one billion dollars in
property was lost.6 Caught unprepared, the city was unable to respond to the
1. This statement was allegedly uttered by a young black man as he and four
companions struck David Lee in the head with a bottle of malt liquor and hurled additional
bottles at the glass door of the Pay-less Liquor and Deli at Florence and Dalton Avenues.
Lou CANNON, OFFICIAL NEGLIGENCE: How RODNEY KING AND THE RIOTS CHANGED LOS
ANGELES AND THE LAPD 281 (1997). Lee, son of the owner of the store, had blocked the
exit when the youths had attempted to leave the store without paying for the alcohol. Id.
2. The Webster Commission assigns a time of 4:15 p.m. to the looting of the Lee's
liquor store. See WILLIAM H. WEBSTER & HUBERT WILLIAMS, THE CITY IN CRISIS: A REPORT
BY THE SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS ON THE CIVIL DISORDER
IN Los ANGELES 11 (1992) [hereinafter THE WEBSTER REPORT]. Another riot researcher
places the event at 4:17 p.m. CANNON, supra note 1, at 281. Judge William H. Webster and
Chief Hubert Williams served as special advisor and deputy special advisor, respectively, to
the Board of Police Commissioners. The Webster Commission was charged with
ascertaining "the nature of the L.A. Police Department's response to the recent civil
disorders, as well as its level of preparation." THE WEBSTER REPORT, supra, at preface.
3. The Webster Report cites this event, occurring at approximately 4:15 p.m. on April
29, 1992, as the first incident of the South Central riot. See THE WEBSTER REPORT, supra
note 2, at 11. Indeed, it is the first confrontation that resulted in damage and injury. CANNON,
supra note 1, at 281. The first recorded emergency call, however, came at 3:43 p.m., when a
young man unsuccessfully targeted a passing pickup truck with a brick. Id.
4. THE WEBSTER REPORT, supra note 2, at 23. The 1992 Los Angeles riot is widely
considered to be the most serious occurrence of race-related crowd violence in twentieth
century American urban history. Kathleen J. Tiemey, Property Damage and Violence: A
Collective Behavior Analysis, in THE Los ANGELES RIOTS: LESSONS FOR THE URBAN FUTURE
149 (Mark Baldassare ed., 1994).
5. THE WEBSTER REPORT, supra note 2, at 23. Of the forty-two known deaths, at least
thirty-six were "disorder-related." Id. at 27. Other studies place the body count at over fifty.
E.g., PAUL ONG & SUZANNE HEE, LoSSES IN THE LoS ANGELES CIVIL UNREST APRIL 29-MAY
1, 1992: LIST OF THE DAMAGED PROPERTIES AND THE L.A. RIoT/REBELLION AND KOREAN
MERCHANTS 7 (1993).
6. THE WEBSTER REPORT, supra note 2, at 23. Korean merchants suffered over half of
the damages from the civil unrest-losses well out of proportion to their numbers in the
general population. ONG & HEE, supra note 5, at 7, 9. Ong and Hee base their findings on
records compiled by the California State Insurance Commissioner's office, which list the
businesses damaged or destroyed by type and by ethnicity of the owner. See id. at 9. Korean
merchants accounted for approximately three-quarters of the listings. Id. The records,
however, do not include the uninsured businesses that were damaged or destroyed and thus
understate the actual amount of riot damage. Id. In addition, Koreans comprised about three-
quarters of those who applied for Disaster Unemployment Assistance, which provides
support to persons who lose their livelihoods in a disaster but do not qualify for regular
unemployment benefits. Id. at 10. Small Business Administration and Federal Emergency
Management Agency data also indicate that approximately sixty percent of riot-related
applicants were Asian, with Koreans comprising the largest subgroup. Id. Nevertheless, no
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lawlessness.7 As stated by a prominent member of the Los Angeles City Council,
"It was the Pearl Harbor of the LAPD. ' '
Crown Heights, New York
"Death to Jews!" and "Heil Hiler!" shouted hundreds of African American
youths running through the streets of Crown Heights and smashing windows from
August 19-22, 1991.9 A group of youths surrounded Yankel Rosenbaum, a twenty-
nine-year-old scholar from Australia, and stabbed him in the chest.'0 Terror
governed for a period of four days, as roving bands of rioters moved through the
Crown Heights Hasidic Jewish community robbing, assaulting, and terrorizing
civilians and police officers; vandalizing and burning property; looting businesses;
and generally wreaking havoc." At least thirty-eight civilians and an estimated 152
police officers were injured, twenty-seven police vehicles were damaged or
destroyed, and at least six businesses suffered significant losses from burglary and
complete list of all the stores in Los Angeles County suffering riot losses exists; likewise, no
comprehensive source lists by ethnicity all businesses in the riot-affected areas. Id.
7. THE WEBSTER REPORT, supra note 2, at 11. The riot broke out shortly after the
verdicts were announced in the Rodney King case. On March 3, 1991, Rodney King, a black
man, was savagely beaten by three white police officers, while a sergeant and other law
enforcement officers watched. The beating was captured on videotape by a bystander and
broadcast worldwide by the media. INDEP. COMM'N ON THE L.A. POLICE DEP'T, REP. OF THE
INDEP. COMM'N ON THE L.A. POLICE DEP'T 5-7 (1991). No one had expected that a jury, after
viewing the videotape, would find the officers innocent of using excessive force against
King. This lack of anticipation by city officials left the city vulnerable to the violence that
ensued. THE WEBSTER REPORT, supra note 2, at 11; see also infra Part IV.
8. Lou Cannon, When Thin Blue Line Retreated, LA. Riot Went Out of Control, WASH.
POST, May 10, 1992, at Al (quoting Zev Yaroslavsky).
9. 1 RICHARD H. GIRGENTI, A REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR ON THE DISTURBANCES IN
CROWN HEIGHTS: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CITY'S PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE TO CIVIL
DISORDER 129 (1993) [hereinafter GIRGENTI REPORT]. Crown Heights is a community in
central Brooklyn. Id. at 40. For an in-depth discussion of the impact of the Crown Heights
riot in the context of the history of Hasidim in the United States, see JEROME R. MINTZ,
HASIDIC PEOPLE: A PLACE IN THE NEW WORLD 328-47 (1992).
10. Estate of Rosenbaum v. City of New York, 975 F. Supp. 206, 210 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
He died shortly afterwards. Id. Lemrick Nelson, a sixteen-year-old during the riots, was
charged with his murder. In 1992, Nelson was acquitted of second-degree murder charges in
the Rosenbaum case. Melissa Radler, Attacker Cleared in Crown Heights 1991 Killing,
JERUSALEM POST, May 16, 2003, at 6A. This past spring, on May 14, 2003, Nelson was
found guilty of violating Rosenbaum's civil rights during the riots. Id. At this civil trial,
Nelson admitted, for the first time, that he had stabbed Rosenbaum. Id.
11. GIRGENTI REPORT, supra note 9, at 135-36. The roving gangs identified Jewish
homes by the mezuzahs tacked on the right doorposts. MNsrz, supra note 9, at 334. The
Lubavitcher Hasidim are ultra-orthodox Jews belonging to the Hasidic community known as
Chabad Lubavitch. Id. at 44. Hasidim share a common history, customs, and language. Id. at
1. The men traditionally wear full beards and peyes (earlocks), black coats, and hats, id. at
24; ties are rarely worn, id. at 24, 31. Women cover their heads with kerchiefs, wigs, or
turbans and wear clothing with long sleeves and high necks and opaque, heavy-gauged
stockings. See id. at 30. Although many Lubavitcher Hasidim follow more contemporary
styles of dress than do other Hasidim, they are still easily recognizable. Id. at 45. Moreover,
most of the whites living in Crown Heights are Lubavitchers. GIRGENTI REPORT, supra note
9, at 41.
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arson. 12 Several businesses incurred losses in the hundreds of thousands of
dollars.13 Although limited to a geographical area covering roughly one square
mile, the 1991 disturbances in Crown Heights exhibited an intensity and violence
rarely seen even in New York City.
14
The devastating losses from these riots illustrate the tragic consequences of
mob violence. 15 Even more appalling is that inadequate police preparation and
planning were responsible for these tremendous costs. For example, with respect to
the Rodney King riots, despite warnings from law enforcement officers and
community leaders, Los Angeles government officials failed to implement any
planning efforts or coordination to address the building racial tensions or to prepare
county, state, and federal law enforcement authorities for the impending riots.
16
Regarding the 1991 riot in Crown Heights, even though a city riot plan existed
prior to the disorder, official indecision in countering the unrest and lack of
compliance with the riot plan led to several days of violence and destruction.
17
Since these outbreaks, United States cities have fallen victim to additional,
large-scale riot violence. For instance, disturbances surrounding the 1999 World
Trade Organization conference in Seattle, Washington injured numerous
demonstrators, bystanders, and police and resulted in an estimated three million
dollars in property damage, seventeen million dollars in business loss, and civil
rights lawsuits. 18 Similarly, in April 2001, Cincinnati's predominantly African
American, Over-the-Rhine neighborhood exploded into three days of violence in
response to the shooting of a black teenager by a white police officer. 19
Terrifying eruptions on a smaller scale have also occurred. Examples include
an attack in Atlanta, Georgia by demonstrators protesting the verdicts in the
Rodney King case on four Korean American business owners with stones, bricks,
and bottles20 and assaults that followed the 2000 New York City Puerto Rican Day
12. GIRGENTI REPORT, supra note 9, at 130.
13. Id. at 131.
14. In particular, the aggression exhibited in the 1991 disorder was directed by one
segment of the community (the African Americans) at another segment of the community
(the Hasidic Jews). Id. at 135-36.
15. Last spring, the United States marked the ten-year anniversary of the Rodney King
Riots in South Central Los Angeles. This summer, a dozen years separate New Yorkers from
the civil unrest that took over Crown Heights.
16. See infra Part IV.C.
17. See infra notes 274-85 and accompanying text; Part IV.D.
18. THE SEATTLE POLICE DEP'T, WTO AFrER ACTnON REP. 47-49 (2000).
19. Mayor Scales Back Curfew After Calm Night in Cincinnati, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 16,
2001, at A17. Calm was restored when the mayor instituted a dusk-to-dawn curfew. Id.
20. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, Sang S. Park et al. at 8, Park v. City of Atlanta, 120
F.3d 1157 (11th Cir. 1997) (No. 96-8512). "Kill the Koreans!" and "Koreans get out!" the
crowd chanted, along with other racial epithets, as they attacked Hi Soon Park, Sang S. Park,
Kwang Jun No, and Jin Soon No. Park v. City of Atlanta, 120 F.3d 1157, 1162 (1lth Cir.
1997); Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, Sang S. Park et al. at 8, 12, Park v. City of Atlanta,
120 F.3d 1157 (1 lth Cir. 1997) (No. 96-8512). This confrontation occurred on May 1, 1992,
two days after the verdict of acquittal was delivered against police officers involved in the
Rodney King beating. Park, 120 F.3d at 1159. The victims were the owners of two
businesses located in a predominately African American community and in the immediate
vicinity of Clark Atlanta University, Spelman College, Morehouse College, and Morris
Brown College, four historically African American universities and colleges. Brief for
Defendants-Appellees, Sang S. Park et al. at 3, Park v. City of Atlanta, 120 F.3d 1157 (11th
Cir. 1997) (No. 96-8512). This area is commonly known as the Atlanta University Center.
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Parade, during which roving mobs of men attacked and sexually assaulted at least
fifty-seven women while police officers refused to intervene.2 1
At both the local and national level the fragile social fabric of our nation's
inner cities continues to fray, providing an environment conducive to social
explosions akin to that which occurred in Los Angeles on April 29, 1992. Behind
every economic crisis lies the promise of another uprising in another American city
that barely holds itself together despite often extreme divisions based on race, class,
and educational opportunity. To protect our inner city residents from the
devastation of mob violence, we must recognize the State as "an independent entity
that can affect the broad course of social change. 22 By acknowledging the State's
role in the creation and development of riots, we can instigate positive change. In
short, we must seek to bring in the State.
Part I of this Article discusses the common law underpinnings of the
governmental duty to protect citizens from mob violence. Under the English
common law, local governments were responsible for providing riot protection for
their denizens. In keeping with the English tradition, early state laws in the United
States also provided for communal riot responsibility, and when the states ratified
the Fourteenth Amendment, state obligations in the riot context were well
established. These statutes, however, were not inducted into the American common
Id. Many of the demonstrators and riot participants were students. Id. at 4-19. On the day
prior to the violence, student marchers protesting the verdicts in the Rodney King case
attacked the stores, breaking the plate glass windows of both businesses. The vandalism
escalated into a riot, causing substantial property damage and a number of injuries. Id. at 3;
Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, Sang S. Park et al. at 4, Park v. City of Atlanta, 120 F.3d
1157 (1 1th Cir. 1997) (No. 96-8512). The following day, the demonstrators reassembled and
violence flared. Id. The rioters gained access to the Parks' and Nos' stores and proceeded to
attack and loot the businesses. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, Sang S. Park et al. at 7, Park v.
City of Atlanta, 120 F.3d 1157 (11th Cir. 1997) (No. 96-8512); Brief for Defendants-
Appellees, Sang S. Park et al. at 10, Park v. City of Atlanta, 120 F.3d 1157 (1 lth Cir. 1997)
(No. 96-8512). All the while, the Parks and Nos were cloistered above the businesses in a
small apartment, watching the destruction of their livelihoods unfold on live television and
frantically calling 911 for help. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, Sang S. Park et al. at 5, 7,
Park v. City of Atlanta, 120 F.3d 1157 (lth Cir. 1997) (No. 96-8512). When the mob
discovered the apartment, the owners fled onto the roof, bracing the steel trapdoor to the
rooftop with a two-by-four wood beam and their bodies. Id. at 7. From below, the mob
pelted the victims with stones, rocks, bricks, and bottles, until they were eventually rescued
by a S.W.A.T. team. Park, 120 F.3d at 1159.
21. New York Press Comment on the Police's Failure to Stop Attacks on Women in
Central Park After the Puerto Rican Day Parade, THE INDEPENDENT (London), June 15,
2000, at F2 (excerpting articles from the New York Times, the New York Daily News, the
New York Post, and Newsday citing overwhelming evidence that dozens of city cops did
nothing as male marauders sexually assaulted women in Central Park); Rivera Live: Attacks
Against 10 Women in New York's Central Park and the Lack of Police Response, CNBC
NEWS TRANSCRIPTS, June 14, 2000 (reporting on victim's allegations that she sought help
three times from nearby police officers who failed to respond). See David Barstow & C.J.
Chivers, A Volatile Mixture Exploded Into Rampage in Central Park, N.Y. TIMES, June 17,
2000, at Al (describing events surrounding the attacks). Lawlessness reigned in Central Park
as female victims were "soaked with water, dragged to the ground, stripped, groped and
manhandled, as they desperately tried to resist by biting, scratching and screaming." Rivera
Live: Attacks Against 10 Women in New York's Central Park and the Lack of Police
Response, supra.
22. Bert Useem, State and Collective Disorders: The Los Angeles Riot/Protest of April,
1992, 76 SOCIAL FORCES 357, 358 (1997).
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law.23 Today, few states have retained their riot responsibility statutes, leaving most
victims of mob violence without relief or recompense.
Part II discusses the current law defining the scope of governmental liability in
the riot context when individuals or their property are injured by mob violence.
When victims of private violence seek to litigate injury claims in federal court, they
generally allege a violation of their Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.
For this reason, this Part begins with a brief history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,
which Congress crafted to rectify state violations of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Section I of the Act, now codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983,24 holds accountable local
governments and state and local officials who deprive individuals of their federal
rights. The United States Supreme Court, however, has severely limited the use of
§ 1983 in indirect harm cases25-,cases in which individuals are harmed by private
actors--by narrowing the scope of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Specifically, the Court, in DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Department of Social Services,26 held that government generally has no duty under
the Fourteenth Amendment to protect individuals from privately inflicted harms.27
The Supreme Court's opinion in DeShaney incited a slew of scholarly
criticism. This commentary is highly impassioned and provides a barrage of legal,
23. Accordingly, riot responsibility statutes remain the prerogative of state legislatures
and exist only by virtue of legislative munificence.
24. Civil Rights Act of 1871, Pub. L. No. 96-170, 93 Stat. 1284 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (2000)).
25. Professor Julie Shapiro identifies these cases as "indirect harm" cases in Snake Pits
and Unseen Actors: Constitutional Liability for Indirect Harm, 62 U. CIN. L. REv. 883-84
(1994).
26. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
27. The Court determined that the constitutional drafters phrased the Due Process
Clause as a negative limitation on the State's power to act, not as a guarantee of minimal
levels of protection. Id. at 195.
28. See, e.g., Akhil R. Amar, Remember the Thirteenth, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 403
(1993); Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REv. 2271
(1990); Jack M. Beermann, Administrative Failure and Local Democracy: The Politics of
DeShaney, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1078; Theodore Y. Blumoff, Some Moral Implications of
Finding No State Action, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 95 (1994); Christine M. Dine, Protecting
Those Who Cannot Protect Themselves: State Liability for Violation of Foster Children's
Right to Safety, 38 CAL. W. L. REv. 507 (2002); Thomas A. Eaton & Michael Wells,
Governmental Inaction as a Constitutional Tort: DeShaney and Its Aftermath, 66 WASH. L.
REV. 107 (1991); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Ripple Effects of Slaughter-House: A Critique of
a Negative Rights View of the Constitution, 43 VAND. L. REv. 409 (1990); Steven J.
Heyman, The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J. 507 (1991); Mary K. Kearney, DeShaney's Legacy in Foster
Care and Public School Settings, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 275 (2002); Mark Levine, The Need for
the "Special Relationship" Doctrine in the Child Protection Context, 56 BROOK. L. REv.
329 (1990); Alan R. Madry, State Action and the Obligation of the States to Prevent Private
Harms: The Rehnquist Transformation and the Betrayal of Fundamental Commitments, 65
S. CAL. L. REv. 781 (1992); Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change:
Law, Language, and Family Violence, 43 VAND. L. REv. 1665 (1990); Laura Oren,
DeShaney's Unfinished Business: The Foster Child's Due Process Right to Safety, 69 N.C.
L. REv. 113 (1990); Laura Oren, The State's Failure to Protect Children and Substantive
Due Process: DeShaney in Context, 68 N.C. L. REv. 659 (1990); Louis Michael Seidman,
The State Action Paradox, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 379 (1993); Amy Sinden, In Search of
Affirmative Duties Towards Children Under a Post-DeShaney Constitution, 139 U. PA. L.
REv. 227 (1990); Aviam Soifer, Moral Ambition, Formalism, and the "Free World" of
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political, historical, and moral attacks on the Court's restrictive reading of the
Constitution. Despite the obviously troubling aspects of the majority opinion in
DeShaney, the purpose of this Article is not to add to existing academic invective.
Instead, this Article seeks to work within the constraints of the currently prevailing
law to establish state responsibility to prevent riot violence.
Notwithstanding the Court's limited reading of state due process obligations,
the State has a duty to protect individuals from private danger when the State
created the danger that caused the individuals' injuries. 29 Specifically,
constitutional tort liability lies when the State renders an individual more
vulnerable to private danger or places the individual in a worse position than she
would have been had the State not acted at all. In these situations, the State,
although not the immediate cause of the harm, has arguably created or increased
the potential for harm by its actions.
Part III builds upon the theory of state-created danger to suggest that state
actions that create or increase riot danger could lead to governmental liability
pursuant to this doctrine of recovery. This Part takes an interdisciplinary approach
to analyzing the problem of mob violence and merges sociological studies with the
existing legal framework of the state-created danger doctrine. Principles developed
from sociological studies affirm that state action directly impacts not only the
gravity of mob violence, but also the opportunities for mobs to form. The
conclusions from these studies can provide pertinent information for the trier of
fact for the purpose of determining the extent of the State's role in creating or
increasing dangers to citizens from mob violence in a particular riot.30 To illustrate
this point, this Part focuses on the 1992 riot in South Central Los Angeles,
California and the 1991 disturbances in Crown Heights, New York and applies
sociological principles in an analysis of these riots to show that social controls
initiated by local officials contributed to the ferocity and scale of both riots.
Part III also articulates some limits to the application of the state-created
danger theory in the riot context. In particular, this Part suggests that state liability
be confined to redressing deficiencies in official planning and preparation to
confront and combat civil unrest. As such, the asserted constitutional claim
concentrates on state action taken after resources have been allocated and before
officials are confronted with a raging riot. Sociological evidence once again
bolsters this argument by establishing that official actions taken during a riot often
reflect poor planning and preparation, which, in turn, directly impact the size and
direction of the mayhem.
Finally, this Article revisits the earlier Parts and concludes that the State bears
a governmental duty to protect individuals from riot violence pursuant to the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This Part underscores the urgent
need for official riot planning and preparation for urban upheavals. The social,
political, and economic conditions affecting the 1992 riot in Los Angeles and the
DeShaney, 57 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1513 (1989); David A. Strauss, Due Process,
Government Inaction, and Private Wrongs, 1989 Sup. CT. REv. 53; Laurence H. Tribe, The
Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn from Modern Physics, 103
HARV. L. REv. 1 (1989).
29. See infra notes 244-45, 253-55 and accompanying text; Parts I.C. and D.
30. Experts commonly testify to this so-called "social framework" evidence in both
federal and state litigation. See generally JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL
SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (4th ed. 1998).
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1991 disturbance in Crown Heights are present in other large U.S. cities and will
almost certainly lead to repeat episodes of urban mob violence in the future.
31
I. OBLIGATIONS TO MEET THE MOB32 : THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF THE DUTY
TO PROTECT FROM MOB VIOLENCE
A. Communal Liability Under English Common Law
The duty to provide riot protection is not without historical precedent.
American riot statutes are based on a policy that is coeval with the laws of England,
and one that has been constantly endorsed and acted on in that country. In England,
the traditional rule provided for governmental financial liability for property losses
resulting from mob violence. The archetypical statute, the English Riot Act of
1714, provided a scheme of compensation from public funds for certain injuries
resulting from riot violence? 4 The measure imposed liability on local government
and provided for compensation for property damage caused by riots.35
1. Hue and Cry Communal Responsibility
The Riot Act finds its roots in the Anglo-American legal tradition as far back
as the tenth century. Prior to the Norman Conquest, the Saxons conserved the peace
by means of "a well-understood principle of social obligation, or collective
security. ' '36 By the tenth century, this system had become a compulsory one-
31. Tierney, supra note 4, at 169-70.
32. Throughout this article, the word "mob" is not used as a strictly legal term. Rather,
it is intended to describe "a riotous assemblage disturbing the public peace and order" or "a
determined and lawless group bent on taking the law into its own hands in disregard of the
orderly processes of administering justice." Maus v. City of Salina, 114 P.2d 808, 809 (Kan.
1941). See also infra note 311.
33. See generally A.H. BODKIN & L.W. KERSHAW, WISE ON RIOTS AND
UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLIES (4th ed. 1907).
34. English Riot Act, 1714, 1 Geo., c. 5 (Eng.). Serious concerns for the breakdown of
social order led to the imposition of communal liability. See infra Part I.A.3. Despite
numerous amendments, the principal provisions of this statute are still in force. See infra
notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
35. English Riot Act, 1714, 1 Geo., c. 5 (Eng.). The act created a right of action against
any two or more inhabitants of a hundred (or city or town) for riot damages to property. A
successful plaintiff could collect judgment by requiring a justice of the peace to levy a tax
against all inhabitants of the hundred. Id. § 6. In 1827, Parliament adopted a more
comprehensive riot statute. An Act for Consolidating and Amending the Laws in England
Relative to Remedies Against the Hundreds, 1827, 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 31 (Eng.). The 1827,
statute retained the principle of communal liability but provided that an action for riot
damages should be brought against the constable. Id. §§ 2, 4, 12. Any judgment was to be
paid by the county treasurer and reimbursed to the treasury via a precise tax on the hundred.
Id. §§ 6-7. The Riot (Damages) Act of 1886 completed the shift to taxation as the sole means
of making payment for riot damages. Riot (Damages) Act, 1886, 49 & 50 Vict., c. 38, §§ 2,
5 (Eng.). The primary provisions of the 1886 act remain in force today. See infra notes 69-75
and accompanying text.
36. T.A. CRITCHLEY, A HISTORY OF POLICE IN ENGLAND AND WALES 2 (2d ed. 1972).
The earliest conception of communal responsibility is evident in sections 23 and 24 of the
Code of Hammurabi:
If the brigand be not captured, the man who has been robbed, shall, in
the presence of the god, make an itemized statement of his loss, and the
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requiring every adult male to enroll in a "tything" (or "tithing"), or group of
families.3 Groups of tythings were organized into "hundreds."38 The hundreds
were rural units, subdivisions of counties or shires. 39 A tything was headed by a
tythingman; a hundred was headed by a hundred man or royal reeve.4 0 Each tything
was responsible for maintaining order among its members.4 ' If a member of a
tything committed a crime, "the others had to produce him for trial; if they failed to
do so they could be fined or called upon to make compensation.,
4 2
Both Canute4 3 and the Normans retained this system of collective security. In
particular, Canute issued an ordinance requiring all persons to raise a "hue and cry"
upon discovering a thief:
[I]f anyone comes upon a thief and of his own accord lets him escape
without raising the hue and cry, he shall make compensation... or clear
himself... [by stating] that he did not know him to be guilty of any
crime. And if anyone hears the hue and cry and neglects it, he shall pay
the fine for insubordination to the king ....
city and the governor, in whose province and jurisdiction the robbery
was committed, shall compensate him for whatever was lost.
Hammurabi, available at http://www.humanistictexts.org/hammurabi.htm (adapted from
THE CODE OF HAMMURABI: KING OF BABYLON, (Robert F. Harper trans., Univ. of Chicago
Press 1904)). See also 1 G.R. DRIVER & JOHN C. MILES, THE BABYLONIAN LAWS 110 (1952)
(interpreting Code of Hammurabi's communal responsibility provision); MARTHA T. ROTH,
LAW COLLECTIONS FROM MESOPOTAMIA AND ASIA MINOR 85 (1995) (translating Laws of
Hammurabi U 21-24).
37. See J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 7-8 (3d ed. 1990);
CRITCHLEY, supra note 36, at 3.
38. CRrrcHLEY, supra note 36, at 2. A tything was originally comprised of about ten
men. Id. The hundred, comprised of ten groups of ten families, was a subdivision of a county
or shire, governed by a high constable. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 741 (6th ed. 1990).
39. See BAKER, supra note 37, at 8-9. In towns, hundreds were known as boroughs; in
London, they were wards. Id.
40. CRITCHLEY, supra note 36, at 2.
41. 1 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 14 (7th ed. 1966).
42. CRrrCHLEY, supra note 36, at 2.
43. Canute became King of England in 1016. He ascended the throne in Denmark in
1018 and in Norway in 1028. Some experts cite the laws of Canute as the first evidence of
communal liability in England. 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC MAITLAND, THE
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW: BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD 146 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1952)
(2d ed. 1898). Other scholars argue that Canute's laws were derived from earlier rulers. E.g.,
Dorothy Whitelock, Wulfstan and the Laws of Cnut, in HISTORY, LAW AND LITERATURE IN
10TH-I ITH CENTURY ENGLAND 432-52 (Dorothy Whitelock ed. 1981); JOHN R. GREEN, THE
CONQUEST OF ENGLAND 406-07 (1883) (arguing that Danish law did not significantly change
the legal system that existed prior to the Danish Conquest). See also supra notes 36-42 and
accompanying text.
44. 2 Canute, c. 29 (1027), reprinted in A. J. ROBERTSON, THE LAWS OF THE KINGS OF
ENGLAND FROM EDMUND TO HENRY I 175-219 (A. J. Robertson ed., A. J. Robertson trans.,
1925). A subsequent provision of the same ordinance required the hundreds to bring to
justice any person who killed an agent of the king. 1 JOHN REEVES, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH
LAW 17 (E. Brooke ed., 1787). "This irregular provision it was thought would engage every
one in the prevention and prosecution of such secret offenses." Id. Edward III later abolished
the law. Nonetheless, the hundred remained responsible for bringing murderers to trial. 1
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 41, at 11 n. 12. For a more thorough discussion of the reign of
Canute, see GREEN, supra note 43, at 402-59.
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The Normans maintained the principle of communal responsibility and
introduced the "frankpledge" system, pursuant to which each adult male member of
a tything was responsible for the good conduct of the others. 45 Accordingly,
responsibility for individual transgressions belonged to the community:
Every man who wishes to be accounted as free shall be in a pledge, so
that the pledge hold him and produce him before the court if he offend.
And if anyone of such people escape, let the pledges see that they pay
the sum claimed by the plaintiff, and prove that they were privy to no
fraud committed by him that has escaped.4
The frankpledge system established "compulsory, collective bail, fixed for
individuals, not after their arrest for crime but as a safeguard in anticipation of it.
'A7
2. The Statute of Winchester4 8
In 1285, hue and cry communal responsibility emerged on the law books in the
form of the Second Statute of Winchester. Steeped in tradition, the statute imposed
civil liability on local governments for damages from criminal disorders. 49 Under
the statute, the inhabitants of "the hundred" in which a robbery or other felony was
committed had the duty to raise a "hue and cry" to pursue the felons.5 ° If the
inhabitants failed to apprehend the offenders, the individual residents of the
hundred were liable for damages resulting from the commission of the crime:
And if the Country will not answer [for the Bodies of such manner of
Offenders,] the Pain shall be such, that every Country, that is to wit, the
People dwelling in the Country, shall be answerable for the Robberies
done, and also the Damages; so that the whole Hundred where the
Robbery shall be done, with the Franchises being within the Precinct of
the same Hundred, shall be answerable for the Robberies done.
5
'
45. The Normans also introduced the position of the "constable," which eventually
evolved into what has been described as "the direct lineal descendant of the ancient
tythingman." CRrrcHLEY, supra note 36, at 1-2. The constable was known as "a local man
with a touch of regal authority about him." Id. at 2.
46. 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 41, at 14 (quoting Will. 1, c. 84, § 8 (Eng.)).
47. WILLIAm ALFRED MORRIS, THE FRANKPLEDGE SYsTEM 2 (1910). William I
developed the frankpledge system for the purpose of protecting his followers. Murder
victims were presumed to be Norman. 1 HoLDSWORTH, supra note 41, at 15.
48. Statute of Winchester, 1285, 13 Edw., c. 2 (Eng.).
49. Id. c. 1, 2. See 25 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 359 (2d ed. 1937). This statute
was later re-enacted as 28 Edw. 3, c. 11 (1354) (Eng.).
50. Statute of Winchester, 1285, 13 Edw., c. 1, 4 (Eng.) ("Cries shall be solemnly made
in all Counties, Hundreds, Markets, Fairs, and all other Places where great Resort of People
is, so that none shall excuse himself by Ignorance .... "). For this purpose, every man
between fifteen and sixty years of age was required to keep specified armaments on hand, to
be determined by each person's relative wealth. Id. c. 6. See generally 4 WILUAM S.
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 521 (1924). See generally Darlington v. Mayor
of New York, 31 N.Y. 164, 173-74, 187-88 (1865) (discussing the liability of "the
hundred"); 3 JOHN REEVES, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 712-17 (W.F. Finlason ed.,
1869).
51. Statute of Winchester, 1285, 13 Edw., c. 2 (Eng.). Under the statute, the hundred
had forty days to seize the perpetrators. Id. Although the statute made all inhabitants equally
responsible for compensating crime victims for damages, the practice was "to levy the
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The rationale for compensation was that the people of the locale had failed to
protect the public. 52 As one court explained:
It is plain that the intent of the Legislature in this Act, and others of the
like nature, was to make the inhabitants of hundreds vigilant for their
own sakes, by making it their interest to prevent the commission of
offences, and where that could not be done, to exert themselves to bring
the offenders to justice. 53
The failure of the inhabitants to maintain or restore order to their community
resulted in strict vicarious liability for any and all individuals. 54 The law made no
exceptions for those unable, due to their ignorance of the ongoing offense or their
inability to prevent its occurrence or apprehend the perpetrator, to fulfill its
damages from the most solvent inhabitants of the hundred, who had no means of recouping
themselves from their fellow-inhabitants." 4 HoLDswoRTH, supra note 50, at 521. In 1585,
Parliament redressed this imbalance by creating a right of contribution for those from whom
the victim had exacted payment. 27 Eliz., c. 13, § 1 (1585) (Eng.). Later, in 1735, victim
suits were statutorily required to be brought against the high constable. If the plaintiff
obtained judgment against the hundred, a tax was assessed on all inhabitants to pay the
judgment. 8 Geo. 2, c. 16, § 4 (1735) (Eng.). The 1735 statute also provided for taxation
measures to pay for the constable's costs of defending against victim suits and for any
reward offered for the capture of a felon. Id. §§ 7, 9.
The reasons for allowing this right of contribution and for spreading the loss are multi-
fold. In particular, victims, presuming to recover their losses from another, were "many
tymes negligent and careles" in aiding attempts to apprehend and convict their assailants, 27
Eliz., c. 13, § 1 (1585) (Eng.), and the inequities inherent to the system of compensation
provided "great incoragement and [embolding]" to offenders, who very often escaped with
impunity, along with their ill-gotten gains. Id. (alteration in original). The new method for
assessing damages taxed all inhabitants, including any victims and offenders, with losses. Id.
§ 3. In addition, changes to the law placed a greater onus on the victim to raise the hue and
cry, to bring suits for loss within a year of the offense, and to endeavor to identify his or her
attacker. Id. §§ 7, 9. Moreover, not only did the financial responsibility for injury unfairly
burden a single or few inhabitants, but Parliament discerned that the residents of nearby
hundreds, to which felons often fled, were less diligent in their response to the hue and cry
because they were "not chargeable for any portion of the Goodes robbed." Id. § 1. To
remedy this, Parliament amended the law and allowed inhabitants of adjacent hundreds to be
liable for half the damages if their hundred was negligent in lending assistance. Id. § 5.
52. The preamble to the statute makes clear the Crown's concern that local people be
responsible for local acts and for maintaining order:
Foreasmuch as from Day to Day, Robberies, Mur[d]ers, Burnings, and
Theft, be more often used than they have been heretofore, and Felons
cannot be attained by the Oath of Jurors, which had rather suffer
Strangers to be robbed, and so pass without pain, than to indite the
Offenders, of whom great part be People of the same Country, or at the
least, if the Offenders be of another Country, the Receivers be of places
near ....
Statute of Winchester, 1285, 13 Edw., c. 2 (Eng.).
53. Clark v. Inhabitants of the Hundred of Blything, 107 Eng. Rep. 378-79 (K.B. 1823).
In Clark, the plaintiff was allowed "to recover from the hundred satisfaction and amends for
certain stacks of hay and corn which had been wil[l]fully burnt, in the hundred of B., by
some person unknown." Id. at 378. What is even more interesting is that the loss was
insured. See id. Thus, the right to recovery was not solely for the purpose of compensating
the victim, but also for the purpose of punishing the hundred.
54. See supra notes 36-47 and accompanying text.
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directive.55 Professor R.F.V. Heuston provides a concise summary of the
foundations for communal liability: 'The principle... is a very ancient one, going
back at least to the days of the tithing. It is one of the means whereby the common
law secures the fulfil[l]ment of the duty to preserve the peace which is laid upon
every citizen., 56 Thus, the purpose of the statute was to hold individuals
accountable for acts that threatened the safety of others by requiring them to
provide redress to victims of injurious acts.57
In 1722, Parliament extended communal responsibility under the act, obliging
hundreds to prosecute bands who had "entered into confederacies .. .in great
numbers, armed with swords, fire-arms, and other offensive weapons several of
them with their faces blacked, or in disguise[]" and .who had attacked those who
had "endeavored to bring them to justice, to the great terror of his majesty's
peaceable subjects." 58 The amended statute bore a strong resemblance to the Riot
Act of 1714. 9 Although these bands were formed for the primary purpose of
poaching game from the king's forests, 6° they presented a threat to sovereign rule.
The modified act called for locals to put down those who defied royal authority and
held liable communities who failed to bring violators to justice.
Referral to these long-tried English laws shows at a glance how this subject
has been viewed by the English Parliament and on what principles and precedents
the laws were framed and enacted. Although the hue and cry statutes were repealed
in 1827,61 they demonstrate that the responsibility to provide police protection was
a communal one.
3. The English Riot Act of 171462
The Second Statute of Winchester thus reaffirmed the existing system of
communal law enforcement and responsibility and served as a springboard for the
55. See generally 13 Edw., c. 1, § 1 (1285).
56. John Marston, Riot in the Riot (Damages) Act 1886, 84 LAW SOCIETY's GUARDIAN
GAZETTE, June 17, 1987, at 1797 (quoting Professor Heuston).
57. Indeed, the court in Pellew v. Inhabitants of the Hundred of Wonford, laid emphasis
on the remedial function of the act. 109 Eng. Rep. 50 (K.B. 1829). In allowing a holder of a
future interest in property to recover for its destruction from arson, the court urged that the
statute should be read to conform with "the object with which it was made, viz. to give a
remedy to a party injured." Id. at 54. So much was the emphasis on providing a remedy to
the victim that the court allowed recovery despite the fact that the plaintiff had not identified
the person he suspected of having set the fires. Id. at 53-54. The Pellew court's focus on
compensation was in sync with the House of Lords' interpretation of the purpose of the act.
In Merrick v. Hundred of Osselstone, Chief Justice Lee stated that the statute was not a penal
statute, but a remedial one. 95 Eng. Rep. 323, 325 (K.B. 1737). This wholesale classification
of the statute, however, met some resistance on the court, which held the case over for
consideration before accepting the position of the Chief Justice on the last day of the term.
Id. Considering that communal liability was a consequence of the monarchy's desire to
protect its servants and agents, the statutes likely possessed both penal and remedial
attributes. See also infra note 63.
58. 9 Geo., c. 22, § 1 (1722). The Act underwent a series of changes following its initial
enactment. See, e.g., supra note 51.
59. See 1 Geo., c. 5 (1714).
60. 9 Geo., c. 22, § 1 (1722).
61.7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 27 (1827).
62. 1 Geo., c. 5 (1714).
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Riot Act of 1714. Challenges in opposition to sovereign rule raised royal alarms
and resulted in augmentation of existing communal responsibility and liability:
[O]f late many rebellious riots and tumults have been in divers parts of
this kingdom, to the disturbance of the publick peace, and the
endangering of his Majesty's person and government, and the same are
yet continued and fomented by persons disaffected to his Majesty,
presuming so to do, for that the punishments provided by the laws now
in being are not adequate to such heinous offenses; and by such rioters
his Majesty and his administration have been most maliciously and
falsely traduced, with an intent to raise divisions, and to alienate the
affections of the people from his Majesty .... 63
The act gave standing to individuals who suffered property dama e at the hands of
a mob to bring suit against the hundred in which the riot occurred.
Unlike the hue and cry statutes that provided the genesis for the Riot Act,
however, the Riot Act departed from its source codes by assessing absolute
communal liability. Under the Riot Act, the hundred was responsible for property
damages caused by rioters regardless of whether the offending miscreants were
apprehended.65 Thus, whereas the duties of yesteryear left off when criminals were
brought to justice, the Riot Act taxed localities for allowing the disorder to occur.
The new act made hundreds responsible for thwarting the formation of riots and for
preventing their spread.
The justification for this strict communal liability requiring the prevention of
disorder may lie in the special nature of riots and civil unrest. Such disturbances
endanger social stability and, thus, present a distinct threat to sovereign power.
This reasoning is evident in Lord Mansfield's opinion in Ratcliffe v. Eden:66
[T]hese riots are not only injurious to individuals, but dangerous to the
state . . . . To encourage people to resist persons thus riotously
assembled ... by way of inducement to the inhabitants to be active in
suppressing such riots, which it is their duty to do; and which being thus
made their interest too, they are more likely to execute. This is the great
principle of the law, that the inhabitants shall be in the nature of sureties
for one another. It is a very ancient principle . . . whereby the whole
neighbourhood or tithing of freemen were mutually pledges for each
other's good behaviour.
63. Id. § 1. The Act was generally a penal statute, making it a felony to engage in riots
and other civil disobedience. Under the Act, twelve or more individuals riotously assembled
were deemed felons and subject to the death penalty. Id. Faced with an impending riot,
officials would first read aloud a proclamation calling for the crowd to disperse. If the mob
failed to disband within an hour, officials could use lethal force in their attempts to arrest
members of the crowd. Id. § 3. Hence, the likely origin of the oft-heard phrase, "to read the
Riot Act." See The Riot (Damages) Act, 1886, 49 & 50 Vict., c. 38 (Eng.).
64. 1 Geo., c. 5 § 6 (1714). Compensation for losses was borne by the community. See
supra note 51.
65. See I Geo., c. 5 (1714).
66. 98 Eng. Rep. 1200 (K.B. 1776) (charging the hundred with responsibility for the
destruction of the furniture and house of a slave trader who attempted to suppress a mob of
sailors and who subsequently fell victim to their discontent).
67. Id. at 1202.
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Moreover, communal liability in the event of civil disorder bears a certain logic: a
mob represents shared disapproval or rejection of authority. As such, the
community "cannot be considered as free from blame. 68
4. The English Riot Act of 188669
After a course of nearly three hundred years, the object of the original Riot Act
not only remains unimpaired, but in 1886, Parliament enhanced both its remedy
and efficacy.70 The present English statute is the Riot (Damages) Act of 1886.
Section 2(1) of the 1886 Act provides:
Where a house, shop, or building in any police district has been injured
or destroyed, or the property therein has been injured, stolen, or
destroyed, by any persons riotously and tumultuously assembled
together, ... compensation ... shall be paid out of the police rate of
such district to any person who has sustained loss by such injury,
stealing, or destruction .... 72
As set forth above, the statute provides for compensation to be made from the
local police fund for damage to real or personal property sustained in a riot.73 Like
its sixteenth century forerunner, the act affixes liability even when police
authorities have acted in good faith to quell disorder.74 The act also allows for
68. Maison v. Sainsbury, 99 Eng. Rep. 538, 540 (K.B. 1782) (allowing suit for recovery
for riot damages despite fact that plaintiff had insured the damaged property).
69. 49 & 50 Vict., c. 38 (1886). The 1886 Act replaced earlier laws codifying the
common law liability of the hundred. See generally A.H. BODKIN ET AL., THE LAW RELATING
TO RIOTS AND UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLIES TOGETHER WITH A VIEW OF THE DUTIES, POWERS AND
LIABILITmS OF MAGISTRATES, CONSTABLES, THE MILITARY, AND PRIVATE CITIZENS IN THE
SUPPRESSION THEREOF (3d ed. 1907).
70. See 49 & 50 Vict., c. 38, §§ 3-5 (delineating processes for awarding and paying of
compensation and rights of claimants).
71. 49 & 50 Vict., c. 38 (1886).
72. Id. § 2(1). The Act does not compensate for personal injuries. See id. The
Association of Police Authorities is currently lobbying for the repeal of the Act. Their
position is that the Act is archaic, given the growth in private insurance, and that holding
authorities liable for damages regardless of negligence or default is inappropriate. Media
Release, APA Welcomes Home Affairs Committee Endorsement of Local Policing (May 7,
2002), at http://www.apa.police.uk/news.views papers/2002/003-2002.html (last visited
June 11, 2003). Parliament has also recently discussed the possibility of amending the 1886
Act to exclude coverage for riot damages to removal and accommodation centers. 637 PARL.
DEB., H.L. (5th Cir.) (2002) (166, cols. 661-65), available at http://www.parliament.the-
stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld199900/ldhansrd/pdvn/lds02/text/207 09-24.htm (last visited
June 11, 2003) (discussing amendment proposed by Baroness Anelay of St. Johns) (on file
with author) [hereinafter U.K. Parliament website].
73. Police authorities are required to create and keep a police fund, from which
expenditures are paid and into which receipts are made. Police Act 1996, c. 16, § 14 (Eng.).
Grants from the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury toward expenses incurred are
also paid into the police fund. Civil Defence Act 1948, 12 & 13 Geo. 6, c. 5, § 3 (Eng.);
Interpretation Act 1978, c. 30, sched. 1 (Eng.).
74. U.K. Parliament website, supra note 72, at col. 664.
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certain insurance claims to be refunded to insurance companies at the expense of
the local police unit.
75
B. Communal Liability for Riot Damages in State Laws
Derived from its English predecessors, the American riot statutes shed insight
on nineteenth century legal thought and make clear that governmental duties.. .... 76
included the responsibility to prevent and punish mob violence. Many states
provided a legal remedy for the blameless victims of police failure to prevent or
suppress riots and riot destruction."
Communal riot responsibility found its way into state statutes as early as
1835. Although not introduced into the American common law, these laws
75. 49 & 50 Vict., c. 38, § 2(2) (1886); U.K Parliament website, supra note 72, at col.
663. See also 25 HALsBURY's LAWS OF ENGLAND 291-92, 335 (4th ed. 1994). The improved
act also encompasses other cases that lie within the general principles undergirding the 1714
Act. See, e.g., 49 & 50 Vict., c. 38, § 6 (extending Act to damage or destruction of farming
or mining equipment); id. § 7 (extending Act to damage or destruction of churches and
public institutions).
76. See infra notes 99-128 and accompanying text.
77. See infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
78. See 1835 Md. Laws 1372 (originally enacted in 1835). The legislative history of the
Act includes a "revealing statement" as to the reasons underlying the Act by the chairman of
the Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Delegates:
[I1n the judgment of your committee, it is expedient at once to set an
example by, and carry out in perspective (sic) legislation, provisions
that will connect the interest of any tax-payer at least with the support
of the laws, and demonstrate to the disorderly and malicious, that those
whom they would make victims of lawless wrath, are under the broad
shield of indemnity, from which their blows may glance with injury to
themselves, or their friends.
City of Baltimore v. Blibaum, 374 A.2d 1152, 1154 (Md. 1977) (quoting William D.
Merrick's statements in the Report of and Testimony Taken Before the Joint Committee of
the Senate and House of Delegates, at 6 (1836)). The statute owes its inception to the
Baltimore "Bank Riots" of August 1835, occasioned by the Bank of Maryland going into
receivership. A national economic disaster troubled this era of United States history,
precipitated by President Jackson's opposition to renewing the charter of the Federal Bank
of the United States. City of Baltimore v. Silver, 283 A.2d 788, 791 n.4 (Md. 1971). For a
detailed account of the mob action that lead to the passage of Article 82, see James H.
Fitzgerald Brewer, The Democratization of Maryland, 1800-1837, in THE OLD LINE STATE
62 (Morris L. Radoffed., 1971).
79. See, e.g., Roy v. Hampton, 226 A.2d 870, 871 (N.H. 1967) (noting that, at common
law, there is no municipal liability for damage to personal property caused by mobs absent
statute abrogating governmental immunity); Hathaway v. City of Everett, 91 N.E. 296, 296
(Mass. 1910) (denying recovery because of plaintiffs failure to plead statute); Long v. City
of Neenah, 107 N.W. 10, 11 (Wis. 1906) ("It is well settled that at common law a municipal
corporation is not liable for damage done by mobs within its limits either to persons or
property."); City of Chicago v. Chicago League Ball Club, 63 N.E. 695, 697 (111. 1902)
(holding defendant city was not liable to the ball club for compensation for use of or damage
to its property by state militia called in to suppress riot because no statute created
indebtedness or liability); Wallace v. Town of Norman, 60 P. 108, 111 (Okla. 1900) ("Public
or municipal corporations are under no common-law liability to pay for the property of
individuals destroyed by mobs or riotous assemblages, but in such case the legislature may
constitutionally give a remedy, and regulate the mode of assessing the damages."); Prather v.
City of Lexington, 52 Ky. (13 B. Mon.) 559, 561-62 (1852) (stating that public or municipal
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imposed liability on cities and counties for property damages, 80 and sometimes for
personal injuries, 81 occasioned by mob violence. By 1890, at least seventeen states
had statutes that spread the loss from destructive mob violence throughout the
locality in which the riot took place. 82 By 1936, at least twenty-four states had
enacted mob violence statutes.83
Most of these statutes were fashioned after the 1836 Pennsylvania Riot Act.
84
Pennsylvania's law empowered individuals to bring suit against the county in
which the riot took place to recover damages for riot destruction. 85 To recover,
plaintiffs had to have given notice to a conservator of the peace or police officer, if
sufficient time had been available to do so.8 6 An officer with notice of the property
destruction was required "to take all legal means to protect the property so
attacked., 87 Any officer failing to fulfill this duty became civilly liable to the owner
for the property damage.88 While the owner could recover his or her losses from the
corporations are under no common-law liability to pay for property or individuals destroyed
by mobs or riotous assemblages and denying liability for mob violence in absence of statute
creating liability).
80. 1867 Ca. Stat. 418; 1891-92 Ky. Acts 1383-86; 1855 La. Acts 206; 1871 Me. Laws
207. See Legislation, Communal Liability for Mob Violence, 49 HARv. L. REV. 1362, 1362
n.5 (1936).
81. Some statutes included personal injury within their recovery ambits. See, e.g.,
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-108 (1958); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 25-3 (1965); KAN. STAT.
ANN. ch. 80, §§ 1-2 (1967); Wis. STAT. § 66.09(1) (1961).
82. See 1835 Md. Laws 137; 1839 Mass. Acts 54; 1841 Pa. Laws 415; 1854 N.H. Laws
1519; 1855 La. Acts 206; 1855 N.Y. Laws 428; 1856 Ky. Acts 594; 1858 Mo. Laws 25;
1862 Kan. Sess. Laws 77; 1863 Wis. Laws 211; 1864 N.J. Laws 237; 1867 Cal. Stat. 418;
1871 Ala. Acts 74; 1871 Me. Laws 207; 1871 S.C. Acts 561; 1875 Ark. Acts 12; 1887 Il.
Laws 573.
83. CAL. POL. CODE §§ 4452-56 (Deering 1931); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 514 (1930); ILL.
REV. STAT. 38, §§ 512-14 (Smith-Hurd 1935); KAN. REV. STAT. §§ 201-02 (1923); Ky.
STAT. § 8 (Carroll 1930); LA. GEN. STAT. § 5369 (Dart 1932); ME. REV. STAT. 130, § 20
(1930); MD. CODE ANN. Art. 82, §§ 1-3 (1924); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 269, § 8 (1932);
MINN. STAT. §§ 10036-38 (1927); Mo. REV. STAT. § 8672 (1919); MONT. REV. CODE § 5086
(1935); NEB. COMP. STAT. §§ 602-06 (1929); N.H. PuB. LAWS 42, §§ 41-42 (1926); N.J.
REV. STAT. 979, §§ 5-9 (1877); N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAWS 685, § 21 (1892); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
3945 (1939); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 6280-88 (Baldwin 1934); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§
3921-25, tit. 18, §§ 339-40 (Purdon 1936); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6055 (1923); S.C. CODE §§
1384-89, 3041 (1932); UTAH REV. STAT. ANN. 104, § 2(26) (1933); W. VA. CODE ANN. §
6038 (Michie 1932); Wis. STAT. § 66.07 (1931). By 1977 only fifteen states fixed liability
for riot losses on local governments. City of Baltimore v. Blibaum, 374 A.2d 1152, 1154
(Md. 1977).
84. The 1836 statute was repealed in 1839, but the section relating to compensation for
destruction of buildings by a mob was restored by the act of April 7, 1840. In re
Pennsylvania Hall, 5 Pa. 204, 210 (1847). Maryland, however, was the first state to adopt a
riot act. The Maryland statute differed from the English Riot Act because it required
negligence on the part of local authorities before liability attached. See infra note 98. In
contrast, most of the American riot acts provided for absolute liability on the part of local
officers. See id.
85. 1841 PA. LAWS 418 (based on 1836 statute).
86. Id.
87. Id. § 8.
88. Id.
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county, the county, in turn, could seek redress from the rioters or against any
officer who failed in his duty to suppress the riot.
8 9
On the whole, state legislatures enacted American riot statutes in response to
"such activities as lynchings, labor confrontations, civil disturbances, and
demonstrations involving religious feelings." 9 Correspondingly, the increase in the
number of communal liability statutes to address riot damages accompanied the
expansion of industry in the United States.91 Indeed, industrialists not infrequently
92
enjoyed the benefits of the mob violence statutes. Furthermore, at least one courtplaces the rise of communal liability for riots and the rise of capitalism in lockstep:
Happily for the past welfare of our people, it is only of recent date that
such laws have seemed to the legislature to be necessary .... As the
State has increased in population, however, and become more densely
inhabited, the competition for wealth on the one hand and the struggle
for existence upon the other have been sharpened and intensified,
sometimes bringing capital and labor into serious conflict, while strikes
of great magnitude have, in the past few years, been not only frequent,
but such as to seriously threaten the peace and good order of society. On
several occasions these strikes have resulted in mobs and riots, and the
destruction of much valuable property.
93
Related to the growth of industry and, accordingly, the revival of communal
liability, was the development of densely populated urban centers. 94 Increases in
area population often led to an increase "in the materials and elements out of which
spring riots and disorders."
95
Like the English Riot Act and other English predecessors, American riot
statutes required local governments not only to punish rioters, but to prevent riots
from arising. Accordingly, most of these American statutes held local governments,
and thus local residents via taxation,96 strictly liable for riot damages.97 No
89. Id. §§ 7-11.
90. Abraham v. City of Woburn, 408 N.E.2d 664, 668 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980) (citing
Koska v. Kansas City, 255 P. 57, 58-59 (Kan. 1927)); see Legislation, supra note 80 at 1364;
Annotation, Municipal Liability for Property Damage Under Mob Violence Statutes, 26
A.L.R.3d 1198, 1206 n.4 (1969). In A. & B. Auto Stores of Jones St., Inc. v. City of Newark,
the New Jersey Supreme Court observed that the state legislature was prompted to enact
New Jersey's riot statute by circumstances surrounding "the draft riots of New York in 1863,
when an entire army corps was withdrawn from the front, where it was sorely needed, to
hold in check the rebellious elements of that city." 279 A.2d 693, 696 (N.J. 1971) (internal
quotations omitted).
91. See Russell Glazer, Comment, The Sherman Amendment: Congressional Rejection
of Communal Liability for Civil Rights Violations, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1371, 1387 (1992).
92. See Legislation, supra note 80, at 1368 (questioning the use of mob violence
statutes by large corporations in light of the superior ability of large corporations to absorb
riot losses when compared to that of individual citizens).
93. Spring Valley Coal Co. v. City of Spring Valley, 65 111. App. 571,577-78 (111. App.
Ct. 1895).
94. In 1820, a mere four percent of Americans lived in cities. By 1860, over sixteen
percent lived in urban areas. AVERY 0. CRAVEN, RECONSTRUCTION: THE ENDING OF THE
CIVIL WAR 5 (1969).
95. County of Allegheny v. Gibson's Son & Co., 90 Pa. 397, 411 (1879).
96. English common law developed at a time when community liability was ascribed to
the hundred. As the hundreds were not corporations, suits under the riot act were typically
brought against the high constable. If the plaintiff was successful, the sheriff would draw his
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allowances were made for inability or lack of neglect on the part of the city or
county.
9 8
In passing these statutes, legislatures reaffirmed the principles underlying the
English tradition of communal liability for riot violence: deterrence of residents
from participation in riots; 99 incentive to residents and local law enforcement
warrant on the county treasurer for the amount of recovery. The monies were ultimately
collected via local taxation in the hundred found to be liable. See supra note 35.
When mob violence statutes rose to prominence in the United States, local government
units-municipalities or counties-were often distinct from the general populace, with
separate treasuries and often extensive police powers. Glazer, supra note 91, at 1390.
Nonetheless, although governmental bodies rather than individual residents were charged
with responsibility to suppress mobs, the loss was passed to the community through taxation.
See, e.g., Goldman v. Forcier, 27 A.2d 340, 342 (R.I. 1942) ("[The statute's] primary object
is to make the citizens of the municipalities law-conscious through apprehension of the
penalty that they collectively would have to pay by way of compensation, through the
municipality, to an individual whose property was destroyed or injured during a riot.");
Blakeman v. City of Wichita, 144 P. 816, 817-18 (Kan. 1914) ("One of the purposes of the
statute was to quicken the public conscience and stimulate a sentiment in favor of law and
order by making each citizen and taxpayer responsible for a proportionate share of the loss
resulting from mob violence and thus making each a champion of peace and good order.");
County of Allegheny, 90 Pa. at 418 ("The principle upon which this legislation rested was
that every political subdivision of the state should be responsible for the public peace and the
preservation of private property; and that this end could be best subserved by making each
individual member of the community surety for the good behavior of his neighbor and for
that of each stranger temporarily sojourning among them."); Darlington v. Mayor of New
York, 31 N.Y. 164, 186 (1865) (noting that legislature has general authority to require "an
expenditure for general or local purposes.., in any contingency").
97. Many states, however, made available various defenses to the local government. For
example, some statutes prohibited recovery if the plaintiff was contributorially negligent.
Note, Municipal Liability for Riot Damage, 81 HARv. L. REv. 653, 653 (1968) (listing
Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, and Wisconsin as states requiring plaintiffs to be free from fault).
98. See, e.g., Palmer v. Concord, 48 N.H. 211, 218 (1868) ("The liability imposed by
the statute is irrespective of any inability or neglect on the part of the city."); Slaton v. City
of Chicago, 130 N.E.2d 205, 210 (Ill. App. Ct. 1955) ("finding that the negligence or
inefficiency of local authorities is not the sole basis of the municipality's liability under the
statute") (citing Kennedy v. City of Chicago, 91 N.E.2d 138, 142 (Ill. App. Ct. 1950)). But
see, e.g., City of Baltimore v. Blibaum, 374 A.2d 1152, 1158 & n.4 (Md. 1977) (disallowing
indemnity when civil authorities and citizens have "used all reasonable diligence" to prevent
or suppress riotous assemblages) (emphasis omitted) (citing Note, Riot Insurance, 77 YALE
L.J. 541, 553 (1968)).
99. See, e.g., Slaton v. City of Chicago, 130 N.E.2d 205, 210 (Ill. App. Ct. 1955) ("One
of the objects of the statute is to impose sanctions against the citizens of the community
when they participate in or allow the condition to arise that we find in the instant case.");
Spring Valley Coal Co. v. City of Spring Valley, 65 Ill. App. 571, 579 (Ill. App. Ct. 1895)
(noting the "frequent apathy displayed by ordinarily good citizens at the destructive work of
riotous mobs" as a consideration inducing the legislature to enact a mob violence statute);
Fauvia v. City of New Orleans, 20 La. Ann. 410, 411 (La. 1868) (praising the wisdom of the
mob violence statute, which "concerns the whole community to prevent the wanton
destruction of private property by mobs"); see also Ratcliffe v. Eden, 98 Eng. Rep. 1200
(K.B. 1776) (Mansfield, J.); see also supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text; Legislation,
Liability of the Municipality for Mob Violence, 6 FORDHAM L. REv. 270, 273 (1937) (noting
that mob violence statutes "may compel the innocent to pay for the acts of the guilty").
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officials to prevent or suppress unrest;1' ° and belief in collective financial
responsibility as an evenhanded measure for spreading costs throughout a locality
instead of burdening chance victims of mob violence.' ' As in the English tradition,
mobs and riots represented risks to society of the highest order 10 2 because they
"seriously threaten[ed] the peace and good order of society."'1 3 Moreover, large
urban riots could be "of a character so serious as to shake the social fabric to its
foundations." 10 4 As such, statutes imposing communal liability on counties and
cities for destruction caused by mobs were "essential to the order and good
government of the cities affected by [them]." 105
100. See, e.g., Roy v. Hampton, 226 A.2d 870, 872 (N.H. 1967) (holding that notice
was not a prerequisite to recovery under the riot responsibility statute); Febock v. Jefferson
County, 262 N.W. 588, 591 (Wis. 1935) ("The cause of action against the county . . .is
predicated on its failure to provide proper police protection."); Underhill v. Manchester, 45
N.H. 214, 221 (1864) ("The object of the statute... is, to prevent and suppress riots. The
course taken is, first and chiefly, punitive, in making the loss of property destroyed by mobs,
a charge upon the town treasuries, thereby joining the personal interest of tax payers with the
official duty of the local authorities, and arraying both against rioters, with a new motive to
discover, discourage, overawe, and overpower all riotous proceedings and tendencies;
secondly, remunerative, in encouraging every one to oppose mobs by giving indemnity for
property destroyed in consequence of efforts to preserve order."); see also Legislation, supra
note 80. Pursuant to some statutes, officials could be personally liable for neglect of their
duties to quell a riot. See, e.g., MONT. REV. CODE § 94-5314 (1947); N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW
§71 (McKinney 1965); Wis. STAT. § 66.091(4) (1961).
101. See, e.g., A. & B. Auto Stores of Jones Street, Inc. v. City of Newark, 279 A.2d
693, 698 (N.J. 1971) (noting the justness of spreading riot losses among the citizens of a
municipality or county); Slaton v. City of Chicago, 130 N.E.2d 205, 211 (Ill. 1955) ("We are
of the opinion that it was the legislative intent in enacting the law to impose a penalty upon
the community in the form of additional taxes when its members participate in or allow [a
mob] to arise."); Yalenezian v. City of Boston, 131 N.E. 220, 221 (Mass. 1921) (stating the
communal liability reflects "the principle of making all members of a territorial or municipal
division sureties for each other in criminal matters"); Darlington, 31 N.Y. at 187 ("The
policy on which the act is framed, may be supposed to be, to make good, at the public
expense, the losses of those who may be so unfortunate, as without their own fault to be
injured in their property by acts of lawless violence of a particular kind which it is the
general duty of the government to prevent; and further, and principally we may suppose, to
make it the interest of every person liable to contribute to the public expenses to discourage
lawlessness and violence, and maintain the empire of the laws established to preserve public
quiet and social order."). The particularly pernicious character of riots likely also explains
legislative refusal to extend governmental liability to include all damages naturally flowing
from other crimes and torts. See, e.g., A. & B. Auto Stores of Jones St., Inc. v. City of
Newark, 248 A.2d 258, 269 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1968) (noting that American statutes
never sought to encompass the broad reach of the original Statute of Winchester).
102. E.g., Hailey v. City of Newark, 36 A.2d 210, 212 (N.J. Ct. Com. P1. 1944) ("[T]he
statutory intent is, to impose such responsibility on a municipality, in cases where its law
enforcement has become so inefficient, that the populace, or a portion of them, have felt,
rightly or wrongly, that they were compelled to take the law into their own hands, for the
purpose of maintaining law and order.").
103. Spring Valley Coal Co., 65 111. App. at 578 (referring to "strikes of great
magnitude" that had occurred between capital and labor in the years preceding the instant
case).
104. County of Allegheny v. Gibson's Son & Co., 90 Pa. 397, 413 (1879) (discussing
riots that had occurred and that would occur in large cities).
105. Id. at 410; see also Butte Miners' Union v. City of Butte, 194 P. 149, 150 (Mont.
1920) ("The purpose of our statute, and those of similar import, is to create municipal
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Furthermore, because they were aimed at stimulating the exertions of the
indifferent and law-abiding alike, they "directly operate[ed] on and affect[ed]
public opinion," which "tend[ed] strongly to the upholding of the empire of the
law. ,, 106
C. Riot Protection and the Fourteenth Amendment
By 1868, when the states ratified the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, 0 7 state obligation to take reasonable measures for the
prevention of riot violence was evident and well-established. At this point in
history, at least twelve states had enacted riot laws similar to the English riot act.
10 8
As illustrated by these statutes, the duty to provide riot protection included not only
punishment of mob violence, but prevention of mob violence."
°9
1. Judicial Endorsement of State Riot Statutes
Courts, in particular, recognized that prevention of riots and the preservation of
social stability are basic governmental functions owed as due process of law. In
1847 in In re Pennsylvania Hall, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court set forth one of
the earliest judicial acknowledgments of this governmental duty." 0 In this case,
liability and tend to instill in the mind of every person liable to contribute to the public
expense a will to discourage violence and to stimulate effort to preserve public safety.").
106. City of Chicago v. Sturges, 222 U.S. 313, 324 (1911) (upholding the Illinois riot
liability statute against constitutional challenge). Cf. Note, Municipal Liability for Riot
Damage, 81 HARV. L. REv. 653, 654 (1968) (arguing that riot statutes do not have a
significant impact on individual behavior, but might discourage any tendency of local
governments to contain riots within poor areas without serious efforts to give aid to those in
riot zone).
107. A certificate of the Secretary of State dated July 28, 1868 declares the Fourteenth
Amendment to have been ratified by the legislatures of 28 of the 37 States. The states
adopting the amendment at this time, in the order of ratification, were Connecticut, New
Hampshire, Tennessee, New Jersey, Oregon, Vermont, Ohio, New York, Kansas, Illinois,
West Virginia, Michigan, Minnesota, Maine, Nevada, Indiana, Missouri, Rhode Island,
Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Iowa, Arkansas, Florida, North
Carolina, Louisiana, and South Carolina. Ratification was completed on July 9, 1868. The
amendment was subsequently ratified by Alabama, Georgia, Virginia, Mississippi, Texas,
Delaware, Maryland, California, and Kentucky. Emory School of Law Website,
Amendments to the Constitution, at http://www.law.emory.edu/FEDERAI/usconst/amend.
html (last visited Sept. 6, 2003) [hereinafter Amendments to the Constitution].
108. See 1862 Kan. Sess. Laws 77; 1856 Ky. Acts 594; 1867 Cal. Stat. 418; 1855 Mo.
Laws 25; 1864 N.J. Laws 237; 1863 Wis. Laws 211; 1855 La. Acts 206; 1855 N.Y. Laws
428; 1854 N.H. Laws 1519; 1841 Pa. Laws 415; 1839 Mass. Acts 54; 1835 Md. Laws 137.
109. See supra notes 99-106 and accompanying text. With the advent of modern police
forces during the nineteenth century, states became better positioned to afford greater
protections to residents by preventing crimes, including mob violence. See David A.
Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REv. 1165, 1205-11 (1999) (discussing early
American policing in the mid-1800s). This dual role, as protector and punisher, has always
belonged to the states. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 2, 251 (St. George Tucker ed., 1803 & photo. reprint 1969) (asserting that
"preventive justice is... preferable in all respects to punishing justice") (emphasis omitted)
(citing CESARE BECCARIA, CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS ch. 41 (Albany, W.C. Little 1872)
(1764)). See also generally Heyman, supra note 28.
110. 5 Pa. 204 (1847).
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members of the board and trustees of the Pennsylvania Hall Association sought
compensation under Pennsylvania's riot statute for damages sustained by the
Pennsylvania Hall building."' A mob had assailed the hall, first breaking windows
and then burning the structure." 2 Addressing the validity of the act,"13 the court
explained that the riot statute recognized that "tax-payers have a right to be
indemnified for losses occasioned by lawless outrage, whenever the public are
unable or unwilling to protect property."'"14 Although acknowledging that those
innocent of wrongdoing might be saddled with the debts of the lawless, the court
reasoned that this effect "necessarily results from the structure of society, and the
nature of all institutions."" 5 Moreover, the court reckoned: "That the legislature
had the right to pass such an act, cannot be denied, and it is elually clear that they
were bound to do so on every principle of equity and justice."'
A year prior to congressional approval of the Fourteenth Amendment," l7 the
Court of Appeals of New York conveyed a similar message in upholding New
York's riot law." 8 In the case at issue, the defendants, the mayor and other officials
of the City of New York, protested the legality of the Riot Compensation Act.
' 19
Finding the statute constitutional, the court observed:
The policy on which the act is framed, may be supposed to be, to make
good, at the public expense, the losses of those who may be so
unfortunate, as without their own fault to be injured in their property by
acts of lawless violence of a particular kind which it is the general duty
of the government to prevent; and further, and principally we may
suppose, to make it the interest of every person liable to contribute to
the public expenses to discourage lawlessness and violence, and
maintain the empire of the laws established to preserve public quiet and
social order. These ends are plainly within the purposes of civil
government, and, indeed, it is to attain them that governments are
instituted .. 120
Two decades subsequent, the United States Su, reme Court confirmed the due
process duty of states to combat riot violence.' 2' City of Chicago v. Sturges
111. Id. The hall was used for abolitionist meetings. Id. at 205 (noting that the building
"was dedicated and occupied for free discussion of liberty, slavery, &c"). Plaintiffs alleged
that, despite notice given to the mayor and sheriff, officials made no attempt at resisting the
mob. Id.
112. Id.
113. The exception made to the act went to the substitution of an inquest of six men to
make factual determinations out of court, as opposed to a jury of twelve to decide the matter
in court. Id. at 206.
114. Id. at 209.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 210.
117. The Fourteenth Amendment was proposed to the state legislatures by the Thirty-
ninth Congress, on June 13, 1866. Amendments to the Constitution, supra note 107.
118. Darlington v. Mayor of New York, 31 N.Y. 164 (1865).
119. Defendants argued, inter alia, that the act deprived them of their property without
due process of law. Id. at 164-65.
120. Id. at 187. Other New York courts also have found that the riot act was based on
the duty of protection belonging to government. See Ely v. Supervisors of Niagara County,
36 N.Y. 297, 300 (1867); Luke v. City of Brooklyn, 43 Barb. 54, 56-58 (N.Y. App. Div.
1864).
121. City of Chicago v. Sturges, 222 U.S. 313, 323 (1911).
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provided the Court with the opportunity to review the Illinois riot statute in the
context of a constitutional challenge by the city) 22 The Court remarked that the
first duty of government was to maintain social order by protecting the life, liberty,
and property of its citizens. 123 This duty lies at the foundation of the social
compact,124 pursuant to which individuals relinquish their natural law rights of self-
preservation and establish government "for the mutual Preservation of their Lives,
Liberties, and Estates.' 25 Turning to the riot law, the Court deemed it to be a
"valid exercise of the police power"'126 of the state and proclaimed:
[The Illinois Riot Act] rests upon the duty of the state to protect its
citizens in the enjoyment and possession of their acquisitions, and is but
a recognition of the obligation of the state to preserve social order and
the property of the citizen against the violence of a riot or a mob.'
27
Following the Sturges decision, other courts upheld as constitutional their own
state riot acts, recognizing the due process right of the citizenry to the prevention of
and protection from mob violence.128
2. Congressional Acknowledgement of the Duty to Protect From Riots
While considering the proposal to adopt the Fourteenth Amendment, the
United States Congress, too, was cognizant of the right to protection from mob
violence, as evidenced by its response to the Memphis riot of 1866.129 News of the
riot reached Washington on the eve of House approval of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 30 During the final debate on the amendment, Representative
Thaddeus Stevens, the Republican leader, proclaimed the disturbance an
122. The city argued that the act denied it due process of law because it imposed
liability regardless of the city's capability to prevent the violence or due diligence in use of
its power. Id. at 321.
123. Id. at 322.
124. Id.
125. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT bk. 2, § 123 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed., 1988) (1698) (emphasis omitted).
126. Sturges, 222 U.S. at 322.
127. Id. In its examination of the Illinois statute, the Court recited the history of the
development of the policy of communal liability, acknowledging its roots in the Anglo-
Saxon police system and following its progress from the 1714 riot act to the shores of the
United States. Id. at 323.
128. E.g., Hailey v. City of Newark, 36 A.2d 210, 211 (N.J. Ct. Com. P1. 1944) (noting
that Sturges held statutes such as this constitutional and recognized them as due process of
law from earliest Anglo-Saxon times); Abraham v. City of Woburn, 408 N.E.2d 664, 668
(Mass. App. Ct. 1980) (finding that the purpose of riot statutes was "to make good, at the
public expense" not the consequence of all crimes but losses from "acts of lawless violence
of a particular kind which it is the general duty of the government to prevent") (quoting
Yalenezian v. City of Boston, 131 N.E. 220, 221 (Mass. 1921), rev'd on other grounds, 421
N.E.2d 1206 (Mass. 1981)).
129. In addition, by 1865, reports of widespread violence in the South against blacks,
Unionists, and Northerners were common. See, e.g., S. ExEc. Doc. No. 39-2, at 3 (1865)
(containing accounts of these atrocities by Carl Schurz, who traveled throughout the South at
the behest of President Johnson to report on the effects of the Civil War on the Southern
people).
130. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2544 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Stevens).
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"atrocity"' 31 and appealed to the House for an investigation of the riot.'32 A fact-
finding committee was soon afterwards sent to Memphis.'
33
Overwhelmed by all that it had discovered, the House committee described the
riot as a "massacre"' 34 and quickly discredited false reports of the event as being a
"simple row" between discharged soldiers and police.' 35 The immediate cause of
the Memphis riot was a clash between white police officers and discharged black
soldiers on May 1, 1866.136 By evening of that day, mayhem was rampant. Bands
of armed whites sought out the conflict, shooting blacks wherever they were
found. 137 Innocent and helpless men, women, and children were shot down, "in
several instances from eight to ten bullets hitting them."'138 After three days of
rioting and destruction, at least forty-six blacks and two whites were killed,' 3 five
black women were raped,'14 and over two hundred homes, schools, and churches
were damaged, ransacked, or destroyed by arson.141
The committee also expressed dissatisfaction with the actions of local law
enforcement officials and private citizens during the riot. It noted that, although the
sheriff and chief of police attempted to protect riot victims and to control the mob,
their efforts were ineffective in suppressing the riot.142 Additionally, many citizens
"reprobated" the riot, but fear for their own safeties as well as the tremendous
131. Id.
132. Id. at 2572.
133. Id.
134. E.B. WASHBURNE, MEMPHIS RIOTS AND MASSACRES, H.R. REP. No. 101, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1866), available at http://memory.loc.gov/ammen/amhome.html (last
visited Sept. 6, 2003) ("The proportions of what is called the 'riot,' but in reality the
massacre, proved to be far more extended, and the circumstances surrounding it of much
greater significance, than the committee had any conception of before they entered upon
their investigation.").
135. Id.
136. The Memphis Riots, HARPER'S WEEKLY, May 26 1866, at 1, available at
http://blackhistory.harpweek.comf7]Ulustrations/Reconstruction/ScenesInMemphisBI.htm
(last visited Jan. 27, 2004). Although the altercation sparked the riot, many historians and
observers of the day described the fight as a pretext for violence. See, e.g., id.; WASHURNE,
supra note 134, at 5. Racial tensions in the city were high, particularly between the Irish
population in Memphis, who "embrace[d] nearly all the members of the city government,"
and the black population. Id. at 6, 23. During the Civil War, a regiment of black troops had
been stationed at Fort Pickering for a lengthy period, and the families of the soldiers had
settled and built homes nearby. Id. at 6. In addition, large numbers of blacks had moved to
the city once Union authorities occupied it. Id. The result was that, over a short period of
time, the black population in Memphis had quadrupled. The Memphis Riots, supra.
Considering the amount of racial animosity extant in the city, the fight between the soldiers
and police served as a mere catalyst for the violence that ensued. See WASHBURNE, supra
note 134, at 5-8.
137. The Memphis Riots, supra note 136.
138. Id.
139. WASHBURNE, supra note 134, at 35.
140. Id. at 36; The Memphis Riots, supra note 136.
141. See WASHBURNE, supra note 134, at 36; ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION:
AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at 261-62 (1988).
142. WASHBURNE, supra note 134, at 23-25. According to witnesses, the mayor,
although not a riot participant, appeared to be walking the streets "three-quarters drunk"
while the mob raged around him. Id. at 23.
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opposite sentiment rendered their resistance unsuccessful. 14 3 Worse still, the
committee determined from witness testimony that the "ringleader" of the "murder,
incendiarism, and butchery" was the judge of the recorder's court' 44 and that many
police officers had also assisted in leading the mob.
45
In its report, the committee criticized city officials for failing to quell the
disorder and expressed extreme discontent with the lack of measures taken to bring
the perpetrators to justice.146 Furthermore, the report made implicit reference not
only to the duty of civil authorities to refrain from partaking in mob violence, but
also to their duty to prevent it as "the chosen guardians of the public peace, the
sworn executors of the law for the protection of the lives, liberty, and property of
the people, and the reliance of the weak and defenseless in time of danger."'147 The
committee concluded that, due to the prevailing attitudes in Memphis, the city
officials would neither punish rioters nor accept responsibility for the property
damage and destruction. 14 8 Consequently, the committee stoutly averred its belief
that the federal government bore the duty "to arrest, try, and punish the offenders"
and "levy a tax upon the citizens of Memphis sufficient to cover the losses for all
property destroyed."'
149
House approval of the report "was virtually contemporaneous with Congress's
approval of the Fourteenth Amendment"' 0 and bears out the Framers'
understanding that the obligations of government include the duty to prevent and
protect against mob violence.' 5' The committee submitted its Report on Memphis
Riots and Massacres to the United States House of Representatives on July 18,
1866, just six weeks after congressional endorsement of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 52 and the House endorsed the report. 1
53
3. Congressional Rejection of a Federal Riot Statute
Considering the judicial and legislative pronouncements outlined above, the
principle of communal responsibility for prevention of mobs and riots would
appear armed cap-A-pie against criticism; nonetheless, federal efforts to adopt strict
communal liability for mob violence fizzled. The reasons for the abortive attempts,
143. Id. at 26. Afterwards, some citizens expressed their desire to hunt out the rioters
and recompense for the burnings. Id.
144. Id. at 23-24.
145. Id. at 25-26.
146. See id. at. 23-25, 27. In particular, the report reads, "That no effort should have
been made by the civil authorities to bring to justice the perpetrators of these stupendous and
multiplied outrages is a burning and lasting disgrace to the officers of the law, and a blot on
the American name." Id. at 27.
147. Id. at 34.
148. Id.
149. Id. The committee also ascertained that to safeguard blacks and white Unionists in
Memphis, federal troops would be needed "to uphold the authority of the government, and
protect the lives, liberty, and property of citizens of the United States." Id. at 27.
150. Heyman, supra note 28, at 570. Professor Heyman persuasively argues that the
duty to prevent and protect extends to all private violence, whether perpetrated singly or by
mobs. See generally id.
151. Prior to approval of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Joint Committee on
Reconstruction criticized the failure of civil authorities to "prevent or punish" offenses
against blacks. See H.R. REP. No. 39-30, at XVII (1866).
152. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3905 (1866).
153. Id. at 4159. The vote on the motion was 85-23. Id.
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which arose from congressional concern for state sovereignty, came to light during
the legislative debates surrounding the proposed Sherman Amendment to the Civil
Rights Act of 1871. 4
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1871 to enforce the provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 55 When Congress was debating the bill that ultimately
became the 1871 Act, Senator John Sherman of Ohio introduced a proposal to add
a section that would have allowed a right of recovery to individuals injured in
person or property "by private persons 'riotously and tumultuously assembled.""15 6
This recovery right ran against the private property of any inhabitant of the
municipality in which the damage occurred 157 and regardless of good faith efforts
made by local officials or the citizenry to combat the riot.158 The intended effect of
the proposal was virtually identical to that of the English Riot Act of 1714 and the
Statute of Winchester of 1285.159
The Senate passed the amendment, 160 but the House rejected it,' 6' as well as a
second proposal that shifted liability for riot damage to the local government. 62
154. See generally Glazer, supra note 91 (arguing that the Sherman Amendment failed
because Congress was unwilling to accept communal liability for civil rights violations).
155. See infra notes 191-99 and accompanying text. In particular, federal legislators
enacted the law in response to "the campaign of violence and deception in the South,
fomented by the Ku Klux Klan, which was denying decent citizens their civil and political
rights." Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985).
156. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 664 (1978)
(emphasis omitted) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 749 (1871)). The
amendment created a cause of action "if any house, tenement, cabin, shop, building, barn, or
granary shall be unlawfully or feloniously demolished, pulled down, burned, or destroyed,
wholly or in part, by any persons riotously and tumultuously assembled together" or "if any
person shall unlawfully and with force and violence be whipped, scourged, wounded, or
killed by any persons riotously and tumultuously assembled together" with an intent to
deprive citizens of their constitutional rights. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 663
(1871).
157. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 663 (1871). The bill provided that action could
be brought against the county, city, or parish in which the riot had occurred. Id.
158. Id. Senator Sherman believed that strict communal liability on the local electorate
was appropriate because "where the wrong is done by a tumultuous assemblage.., so as to
attract the attention of the whole community and spread fear and terror... every man round
about knows what is going on." Id. at 761 (statement of Sen. Sherman). In opposition to the
imposition of strict liability upon local governments, Senator Thurman queried: "Why make
the county, or town, or parish liable when it had no reason whatsoever to anticipate that any
such crime was about to be committed, and when it'had no knowledge of the commission of
the crime until after it was committed? What justice is there in that?" Id. at 771 (statement of
Sen. Thurman).
159. Id. at 705 (stating that the proposal was "copied from the law of England that has
been in force six hundred years") (statement of Sen. Sherman). For an overview of these
English laws, see supra Part I.A.2-3. The Riot Act allowed individual recovery from the
local government, whereas the Hue and Cry Statute allowed individual recovery from any
inhabitant of the hundred. Id. The Riot Act, however, did not permit claims for personal
injury. See supra notes 64, 72 and accompanying text.
160. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 707 (1871).
161. Id. at 725.
162. Id. at 800-01 (rejecting second proposal); id. at 749 ("[I]n every such case the
county, city, or parish in which any of the said offenses shall be committed shall be liable to
pay full compensation to the person or persons damnified by such offense, if living, or to his
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The prevailing view as to why the House rejected these proposals is found in the
statements of Representative Austin Blair of Michigan. 63 Blair argued that the
English government could oblige hundreds to act under the English Riot Act
because English hundreds were subdivisions of the national government.' 64 In
contrast, municipalities in the United States were "the creation of the States
alone."' 65 Accordingly, any attempt of the federal government to control an area
"subject to the control of another and distinct government" endangered state
sovereignty. 
166
In the end, the advocates of federally-mandated strict communal liability for
riot violence were defeated, 167 leaving state riot statutes to serve as the primary
vehicles for riot protection and recovery. Although Congress eventually passed a
second substitute to the Sherman Amendment, the alternate bill restricted liability
to individuals who had knowledge of the impending crime and the ability to
prevent it, and who had neglected or refused to aid or intervene.
68
widow or legal representative if dead."). The Senate passed the second proposal as well. Id.
at 779.
163. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 673 (1978)
(citing Rep.. Blair's statements as the most "complete statement" of the position against
Sherman's amendment). Representative Blair stated: "The proposition known as the
Sherman amendment ... is entirely new. It is altogether without a precedent in this country.
... That amendment claims the power in the General Government to go into the States of
this Union and lay such obligations as it may please upon the municipalities, which are the
creations of the States alone .... Id. (quoting Rep. Blair).
164. Id. at 675 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 795 (1871)).
165. Id. at 674 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 795 (1871)).
166. Id. at 676 (quoting Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. 113, 127 (1871)).
167. Senator Sherman was dissatisfied with the final version of his amendment and
refused to sign on to the conference report that provided the altered proposal. CONG. GLOBE,
42d Cong., 1st Sess., 804, 822 (1871) ("[I]n my judgment this section, although intended to
supply a remedy, will give these parties no remedy whatever. It is delusive; it is idle. It
would be far better to leave it out.").
168. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 831 (1871) (Senate); CONG. GLOBE, 42d
Cong., 1st Sess., 808 (1871) (House). This amendment is codified today at 42 U.S.C. § 1986
(1994):
Every person who, having knowledge that any of the wrongs conspired
to be done, and mentioned in section 1985 of this title, are about to be
committed, and having power to prevent or aid in preventing the
commission of the same, neglects or refuses so to do, if such wrongful
act be committed, shall be liable to the party injured, or his legal
representatives, for all damages caused by such wrongful act, which
such person by reasonable diligence could have prevented; and such
damages may be recovered in an action on the case; and any number of
persons guilty of such wrongful neglect or refusal may be joined as
defendants in the action; and if the death of any party be caused by any
such wrongful act and neglect, the legal representatives of the deceased
shall have such action therefor, and may recover not exceeding five
thousand dollars damages therein, for the benefit of the widow of the
deceased, if there be one, and if there be no widow, then for the benefit
of the next of kin of the deceased. But no action under the provisions of
this section shall be sustained which is not commenced within one year
after the cause of action has accrued.
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D. Riot Protection Today
Once commonplace, strict communal riot liability is a relic of the past. 169 At
present, only nine states appear to retain some type of riot liability statute that
allows riot victims to recover for property damage or physical injuries. 70
Moreover, even in states that allow recovery for riot damage, "the circumstances
that give rise to this liability are very limited,"' 7'1 and several states cap liability at
set amounts. 72 Alternatively, many plaintiffs have sought support in state tort law
to combat inadequate policing during riots. 73 A survey of case law, however,
169. Indeed, in Susman v. City of Los Angeles, 240 Cal. Rptr. 240 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969),
the California statute was instrumental in the dismissal of the plaintiff's claims against state
and local authorities for damage caused by the Watts riot. The complaint alleged that
government officials triggered the riot by negligently arresting a person for drunk driving
and that the city was negligent in its failure to control the mob.
Some commentators argue that federal or state compensation for riot injuries and
damages is preferable to municipal liability because the larger national or state tax base
would reduce the possibility that other important programs would be cut to fund riot costs.
Federal-or state-based compensation might also stem the migration of people and business
to the suburbs. See generally AMOS H. HAWLEY, THE CHANGING SHAPE OF METROPOLITAN
AMERICA (1956) (discussing the relocation of people and business from urban to suburban
areas); see also RAYMOND VERNON, THE CHANGING ECONOMIC FUNCTION OF THE CENTRAL
CITY 41-62 (1959) (same).
170. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-108 (1999); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.100 (Banks-
Baldwin 2003); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 269, § 8 (2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:48-1
(West 2000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3761.03 (West 2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-15-13
(2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-5-70 (Law Co-op 2002); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-6-12
(Michie 2003); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 893.81 (2003). Although Montana lists a time period for
the commencement of an action against a municipal corporation for damages or injuries to
property caused by a mob or riot, see MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-209 (2002), it does not
appear to have retained its mob violence statute that allowed for the action itself.
171. W. PAGE KEETON Er AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 131 (5th
ed. 1984); see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-108 (1999) (allowing liability only when local
government fails to exercise reasonable care or diligence in the prevention or suppression of
riot).
172. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 269, § 8 (2000) (allowing recovery for
property damage only and limiting recovery to three-fourths of value of property or amount
of injury to property); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:48-1 (West 2000) (allowing recovery for
property damage only and capping recovery for aggregated damages at $10,000); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3761.03 (West 2003) (allowing recovery for physical injury only and capping
recovery for permanent disability at $5000, for serious injury not amounting to permanent
disability at $1000, and for minor injury at $500); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-15-13 (2002)
(allowing recovery for property damage only and capping recovery at three-fourths of value
of property or three-fourths of amount of injury to property); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-6-12
(Michie 2003) (capping recovery at $5000).
173. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.28 (2003) (allowing suit against state for
negligent or wrongful act of employee acting within scope of office or employment); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 670.2 (1998) (subjecting municipalities to liability for their torts and those of
their officers and employees acting within scope of employment or duties); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 11-46-9(l)(c) (1999) (exempting governmental entities and employees from liability
from claim arising out of act or omission in the performance or execution of duties or
activities relating to police protection unless employee acted in reckless disregard of the
safety and well-being of any person not engaged in criminal activity at the time of injury);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5601 (2002) (allowing suit against state for negligent or wrongful
act of employee acting within scope of office or employment).
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reveals a nearly wholesale rejection of governmental tort liability based on a
general "failure to provide police protection."'
7 4
The general repeal of the strict communal liability riot statutes most deeply
impacts the urban poor living in riot-wreaked areas. 175 In addition to deterring
rioters and providing incentives to the police to prevent and suppress mob violence,
riot acts, 176 both English and American, provide redress for injuries when no other
manner of compensation may be available. 177 Compared to other sources of loss,
which typically occur more equally across socio-econonic lines, riot loss has a
disproportionate impact on the poor. This loss is "exacerbated by the general
inability of potential riot victims to protect themselves against the risk of such
loss.' 178 As riots have become more common and the damages resulting from them
have become more extensive, insurance companies have taken measures to exclude
from coverage damages caused by riot and civil commotion, especially in inner-
city areas. ' 9
How, then, to fill the void left by the disappearing state riot acts-laws that
states are "bound" to pass "on every principle of equity and justice"? 180 Although
federal legislators declined to adopt a law in the form of the English Riot Act, 81
the Civil Rights Act of 1871 may yet provide a solution. Specifically, § 1 of the
174. KEETON ET AL., supra note 171, § 131. See also Barbara E. Armacost, Affirmative
Duties, Systemic Harms, and the Due Process Clause, 94 MICH. L. REv. 982, 1000-01
(1996). While some courts ground rejection of liability in governmental immunity, see
KEETON ET AL., supra note 171, § 131; 2 STUART M. SPEISER Er AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF
TORTS § 6.11 (1990); Armacost, supra, at 997 n.78, other courts refuse to find any
governmental duty to provide police protection. For example, California's Torts Claims Act
provides: "Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for failure to establish a
police department or ... for failure to provide sufficient police protection service." CAL.
Gov'T CODE § 845 (West 1997). Thus far, this provision has been an insurmountable hurdle
to those seeking a remedy for inadequate police protection. See, e.g., Peterson v. San
Francisco Cmty. Coll. Dist., 685 P.2d 1193, 1202 (Cal. 1984); Gates v. Superior Court, 38
Cal. Rptr. 2d 489, 503-04 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). Courts that acknowledge a duty to protect
describe the duty as one owed only to the public at large, leaving individual plaintiffs
without legal basis for complaint. See, e.g., KEET'ON ET AL., supra note 171, § 131; 2 STUART
M. SPEISER ET AL., supra, § 6.11; Armacost, supra, at 997 n.78. In addition, although most
state constitutions contain equal protection and due process clauses, courts generally
interpret these provisions in accord with federal constitutional doctrine. See Developments in
the Law, The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1324, 1368
(1982). As a result, state guarantees of equal protection and due process warrant no greater
police protection than federal assurances. See also infra Part HI.
175. For discussions of the changing demographics in and economic difficulties faced
by U.S. cities, see Tierney, supra note 4, at 149-70, and David 0. Sears, Urban Rioting in
Los Angeles: A Comparison of 1965 with 1992, in THE LOS ANGELES RIOTS: LESSONS FOR
THE URBAN FUTURE 237-54 (Mark Baldassare ed., 1994).
176. See supra notes 99-106 and accompanying text.
177. Abraham v. City of Woburn, 408 N.E.2d 664, 668-69 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980), rev'd
by 421 N.E.2d 1206 (Mass. 1981); Marston, supra note 56, at 1797.
178. Note, Municipal Liability for Riot Damages, 81 HARV. L. REv. 653, 654-55
(1968); see U.K. PARLIAMENT website, supra note 72, at cols. 661-65 (remarks of Lord
Bassam of Brighton) (discussing proposed amendment to limit reach of Riot Act and the
need to "weigh the position of those who have insurance and those who do not").
179. Abraham, 408 N.E.2d at 668-69; Note, supra note 178, at 655; Note, Riot
Insurance, 77 YALE L.J. 541 (1968).
180. In re Pennsylvania Hall, 5 Pa. 204 (Pa. 1847).
181. See supra Part I.C.3.
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Act, which is currently codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983, enables individuals to obtain
damages and equitable relief from state and local officials who violate the
Constitution.'8 2 No version of the Sherman Amendment sought to alter § 1 of the
civil rights bill.18 3 In addition, opponents of the amendment distinguished between
a federally-imposed obligation on states to keep the peace and a federal imposition
of civil liability for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment-rejecting the former
and approving the latter.' 4 Consequently, § 1983 presents an alternate means for
enforcing the due process duty of states to protect citizens from riot violence and
can bridge the gap left by the near-blanket retraction of state riot statutes by state
legislatures.
II. SEEDS OF THE JOSHUA TREE: '8 5 THE DUTY TO PROTECT AND THE STATE-
CREATED DANGER DOCTRINE
A. The Fourteenth Amendment and § 1983
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution prohibits states from depriving "any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." 8 6 The clause was intended to safeguard individuals
from an abuse of power by government officials.' 8 7 By requiring the State to adhere
to appropriate procedures when depriving persons of life, liberty, or property, the
framers of the Due Process Clause sought to promote evenhanded
182. See infra Part H.A.
183. Debate over § 1983 was limited and the section was passed without amendment.
Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 665 (1978).
184. Id. at 679-80. Liability under the Fourteenth Amendment included responsibility
for failures to keep the peace under state laws. Id.; CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 794
(1871) ("I presume ... that where a State had imposed a duty [to keep the peace] upon [a]
municipality... an action would be allowed to be maintained against them in the courts of
the United States .... ) (statement of Rep. Poland).
185. The "Joshua" referred to here is Joshua DeShaney, the child-plaintiff in DeShaney
v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989), discussed infra notes 235-
47 and accompanying text, in which the Supreme Court placed a major limit on due process
claims for indirect harm.
186. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
Id. The drafters of this clause intended that it encompass the same assurances as that of the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1292
(1866) (referring to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which was to be
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment). It was to ensure "the protection of the laws,"
id., and guarantee the right "of all persons to be protected in life, liberty, and property." Id.
at 1089.
187. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (stating that the Due Process
Clause was "intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of
government") (quoting Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 527 (1884)). The Magna Carta
was the precursor to the Due Process Clause. Id. (citing Edwin S. Corwin, The Doctrine of
Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24 HARv. L. REv. 366, 368 (1911)).
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decisionmaking.188  Furthermore, by forbidding certain official actions,
notwithstanding fair methods of application or implementation,' 8 9 the Due Process
Clause prevents official authority from being "used for purposes of oppression."1
90
Following the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress enacted the
Civil Rights Act of 1871191 to provide a constitutional tort remedy for violations of
the Fourteenth Amendment.192 The Reconstruction period following the Civil War
was rife with hate crimes perpetrated against African Americans. 93 In particular,
southern whites waged a campaign of violence and terror against the newly-freed
slaves. These acts were often wrought not only by private actors, but also with the
188. Id. This guarantee of fair procedure is often referred to as "procedural due
process." See, e.g., id. at 337 (Stevens, J., concurring).
189. Id. at 331 (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952)).
190. Id. at 331-32 (quoting Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59
U.S. (18 How.) 272, 277 (1856)). In Murray's Lessee, the Court discussed the assurances of
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The due process clauses of both the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments were intended to secure similar guarantees. See supra note 186.
In his concurring opinion in Daniels, Justice Stevens articulated three types of constitutional
protection afforded by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. He
acknowledged the guarantees of substantive and procedural due process. In addition, he
stated that the clause "incorporates specific protections defined in the Bill of Rights."
Daniels, 474 U.S. at 337.
191. The Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000)). Just three years after the states ratified the Fourteenth
Amendment, President Grant exhorted Congress to pass the Civil Rights Act in a letter dated
March 23, 1871:
A condition of affairs now exists in some States of the Union rendering
life and property insecure and the carrying of the mails and the
collection of the revenue dangerous. The proof that such a condition of
affairs exists in some localities is now before the Senate. That the power
to correct these evils is beyond the control of State authorities I do not
doubt; that the power of the Executive of the United States, acting within
the limits of existing laws, is sufficient for present emergencies is not
clear. Therefore, I urgently recommend such legislation as in the
judgment of Congress shall effectually secure life, liberty, and property,
and the enforcement of law in all parts of the United States.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 244 (1871). During and just after Reconstruction,
Congress also enacted civil rights legislation now codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-82, 1984-85
and at 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-42. Nonetheless, as the Supreme Court has remarked, "[o]nly § 1 of
the Act of April 20, 1871, 17 Stat. 13, presently codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983, achieved
measurable success in later years." Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 247 n.9 (1967).
192. As stated by Senator Edmunds, Chairman of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary:
The first section is one that I believe nobody objects to, as defining the
rights secured by the Constitution of the United States when they are
assailed by any State law or under color of any State law, and it is
merely carrying out the principles of the civil rights bill, which has since
become a part of the Constitution.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 568 (1871). Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1983
pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, see CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., app.
68, 80, 83-85, which reads: "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this [amendment]." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
193. See NEIL R. McMILLAN, DARK JOURNEY: BLACK MISSISSIPPIANS IN THE AGE OF JIM
CRow 252 (1989). Groups such as the Ku Klux Klan terrorized African Americans in the
South. Id.
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support or assent of local officials. 194 The 1871 civil rights legislation was enacted
to combat white lawlessness and to protect the basic civil rights of freed slaves.'
95
Although appalled by the violence, 19 6 Congress was particularly concerned
about the apparent inability or indisposition of government officers to combat the
injustices. For example, Representative David P. Lowe of Kansas stated:
While murder is stalking abroad in disguise, while whippings and
lynchings and banishment have been visited upon unoffending
American citizens, the local administrations have been found
inadequate or unwilling to apply the proper corrective. Combinations,
darker than the night that hides them, conspiracies, wicked as the worst
of felons could devise, have gone unwhipped of justice. Immunity is
given to crime, and the records of public tribunals are searched in vain
for any evidence of effective redress. 1
97
Senator Thomas Ward Osborn of Florida framed the problem as thus:
That the State courts in the several States have been unable to enforce
the criminal laws of their respective States or to suppress the disorders
existing, and in fact that the preservation of life and property in many
sections of the country is beyond the power of the State government, is
a sufficient reason why Congress should, so far as they have authority
under the Constitution, enact the laws necessary for the protection of
citizens of the United States. The question of the constitutional
authority for the requisite legislation has been sufficiently discussed.1
98
Accordingly, the federal government passed the 1871 Act to provide a remedy
against state officials who were unable or unwilling to enforce the law.'
99
Section 1 of the 1871 Act, now embodied in § 1983,200 creates a cause of
action for anyone whose federal rights have been abridged by a person acting under
color of state law.20 1 By extending the statutory remedy to all people, the 1871
194. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 236, 244 (1871) (noting that local officials
offered no protection from the Klan).
195. The 1871 Act was a direct result of "the campaign of violence and deception in the
South, fomented by the Ku Klux Klan, which was denying decent citizens their civil and
political rights." Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985).
196. The legislative debate on the 1871 Act is full of references to a 600-page Senate
committee report, S. REP. No. 42-1 (1871), containing details of Klan attacks on innocent
citizens and the helplessness of state governments to address the injustice. See, e.g., CONG.
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., app. 166-67 (1871).
197. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 374 (1871).
198. Id. at 653.
199. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 175-76 (1961). The legislation had three main
purposes: to "override certain kinds of state laws"; to provide "a remedy where state law was
inadequate"; and "to provide a federal remedy where the state remedy, though adequate in
theory, was not available in practice." Id. at 173-74. See Michael T. Burke & Patricia A.
Burton, Defining the Contours of Municipal Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Monell
Through City of Canton v. Harris, 18 STETSON L. REv. 511, 513 (1989).
200. The statute was part of a larger statute that was popularly known as the Ku Klux
Klan Act. See generally, e.g., Monroe, 365 U.S. at 167.
201. Section 1983 remedies were relatively undeveloped until revived by the Supreme
Court in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). See Eugene Gressman, The Unhappy History
of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REv. 1323 (1952) (discussing the unwillingness of
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Congress "went beyond the mischief' that the civil rights enactment was intended
to immediately redress. 20 2 Congress intended for the statute to provide "a federal
right in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance
or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the claims of citizens to the
enjoyment of rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment might be denied by the state agencies. Today, the statute reads inpertinent part as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.204
Section 1983 is the basis for most suits against local governments and state and
local government officers for violations of U.S. law.205 An individual bringing a §
1983 claim must show that the defendant, while acting under color of state law,
committed the protested conduct and that the conduct deprived the individual of
federally-protected rights. 2°6 A § 1983 "person" includes not only state officials
and employees, 207 but also "bodies politic and corporate,, 20 8 which include
both federal and state judges in the South to stop racism and discrimination). Prior to the
Court's holding in Monroe, the statute had been construed solely to redress violations
authorized by state law. Monroe read the statute to address conduct by individuals clothed in
state authority, regardless of actual state approval. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183-85, overruled on
other grounds by Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
202. Monell, 436 U.S. at 683 (1978).
203. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 180. See also Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972)
(stating that the law interposes the federal courts between the States and the people, to serve
as guardians of federal rights and to protect the people from unconstitutional action under
color of state law). The federal courts, however, do not have exclusive jurisdiction over §
1983 claims. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1980).
204. Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
205. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICION 464 (4th ed. 2003).
206. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled on other grounds by
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). The Supreme Court has added other elements,
including defenses and immunities, as well as limitations to claims brought pursuant to §
1983. See, e.g., Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990) (stating that random, unauthorized
deprivation of liberty does not violate due process when adequate post-deprivation remedy is
available under state law); DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S.
189 (1989) (holding that government generally has no duty to protect individuals from
private harms); Daniels, 474 U.S. at 327 (1986) (holding that negligent conduct cannot
constitute a deprivation of due process); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986) (same);
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981) (holding that random, unauthorized deprivation of
property does not violate due process when adequate post-deprivation remedy is available
under state law); Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-95 (rejecting respondeat superior liability and
creating "policy or custom" requirement as way of limiting municipal liability); Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (holding judge's immunity absolute for official acts when
sued under § 1983); Schuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (recognizing qualified or good-
faith immunity for governor and aides when sued under § 1983).
207. Private actors who conspire with state officials may be considered state actors.
See, e.g., Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980) (holding that private individual acts
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municipalities, 209 counties, 21 0 and state agencies. 211 The term, however, does not
include the State itself.
212
B. The Devolution of the Duty to Protect from Private Danger
Although § 1983 liability clearly extends to governmental officials who
directly deprive individuals of their constitutional rights,2t 3 a more difficult issue
arises as to the scope of § 1983 with respect to harms caused by private actors or by
factors unrelated to the State. The Supreme Court first recognized a governmental
constitutional duty to protect individuals from private danger in the 1976 case of
214Estelle v. Gamble. In Estelle, the Court held that § 1983 reaches prison officials
who display "deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious illness or injury. 215
under color of state law if he or she is a "willful participant in joint action with the State");
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) (concluding that restaurant conspiring
with police to prevent blacks from being served could be liable under § 1983). Even federal
officials who act in concert with state officials are within reach of § 1983. See, e.g., Cabrera
v. Martin, 973 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1992) (allowing suit against federal officers engaged in
conspiracy with state officials to abridge federal rights); Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d
600, 623 (7th Cir. 1979), rev'd in part by 446 U.S. 754 (1980) (same).
208. Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431 (currently codified at 1 U.S.C. § 1
(2000)). This act was known as the Dictionary Act and was passed by Congress just months
before the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. Pursuant to the Dictionary Act, "the word
'person' may extend and be applied to bodies politic and corporate." Id.
209. Monell, 436 U.S. at 658 (citing the Dictionary Act and overruling the Monroe
Court's unanimous conclusion that municipalities were not "persons" within the meaning of
§ 1983). A municipality is liable under § 1983, however, only if the plaintiff shows that the
government officer acted pursuant to an official policy or custom. Id. at 690.
210. See, e.g., Huffman v. County of Los Angeles, 147 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 1998)
(allowing suit against county); Carlton v. Cleburne County, 93 F.3d 505 (8th Cir. 1996)
(allowing suit against county); Ross v. United States, 910 F.2d 1422, 1429 (7th Cir. 1990)
(allowing suit against county for actions of deputy).
211. See, e.g., Armijo v. Wagon Mound Pub. Sch., 159 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 1998)
(allowing suit against school); Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906-07 (3d
Cir. 1997) (addressing liability of school district in § 1983 suit); D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area
Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992) (allowing suit against school).
212. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64-66 (1989) (construing § 1983
to exclude suits against states).
213. See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (excessive force used by police
officers); Cooper v. Casey, 97 F.3d 914 (7th Cir. 1996) (beating of prisoner by prison
official); Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom. Employee-
Officer John, # 1765 Badge Number v. Johnson, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973) (excessive force used
by prison guard). But see supra note 206 (providing examples of limitations on § 1983
suits). For a thorough and interesting discussion of the concept of constitutional torts, see
Christina B. Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 5 (1980) and 'Christina B.
Whitman, Government Responsibility for Constitutional Torts, 85 MICH. L. REv. 225
(1986).
214. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
215. Id. at 105. For a critical discussion of the "deliberate indifference" standard, see
Gerald E. Frug, The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 715, 771-72 (1978)
(arguing that the standard provides no incentive for improving prison medical facilities) and
Eric Neisser, Is There a Doctor in the Joint? The Search for Constitutional Standards for
Prison Health Care, 63 VA. L. REv. 921, 922 (1977) (analyzing the standard within the
framework of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and policies underlying constitutional tort
law). For a history of prison reform litigation, see MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L.
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Under the Eighth Amendment,21 6 the State has an affirmative duty to tend to
the medical needs of prisoners; the failure to provide medical care can lead to
unnecessary pain and suffering; unnecessary pain and suffering is equivalent to
cruel and unusual punishment.217 Thus, the custodial relationship between the
individual and the State in the prison setting218 obliges the latter to provide some
protection against injuries stemming from untreated illness or disease.
A custodial relationship in other settings may also lead to the imposition of
affirmative duties on states to protect individuals from private harm. In Youngberg
v. Romeo,220 the Supreme Court recognized a right to protection under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for a profoundly retarded adult who
had been involuntarily committed to a state hospital.221 The plaintiff, Nicholas
Romeo, had been injured, by himself and by other residents, numerous times while
institutionalized.222 The Court held that the State had a duty to protect Romeo from
danger: "If it is cruel and unusual punishment to hold convicted criminals in unsafe
conditions, it must be unconstitutional to confine the involuntarily committed-
who may not be punished at all-in unsafe conditions. 223
Four years subsequent to Estelle, however, the Court rejected a § 1983 claim
brought under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for injuries
wrought by a private actor in a non-custodial setting. In Martinez v. California,224
the Court assumed that state officials recklessly released a parolee who, five
months following his release, murdered Mary Ellen Martinez, a fifteen-year-old
girl.225 The girl's family sued the officials who had paroled the killer, asserting that
the release of the parolee ultimately caused the harm that deprived the victim of her
RuBN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE: How THE COURTS REFORMED
AMERICA'S PRISONS (1998).
216. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
217. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103-05. This protection is not afforded to pretrial detainees.
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n. 16 (1979) (holding that Eighth Amendment protections
are triggered only after criminal prosecution and conviction). Nonetheless, courts have
construed the Fourteenth Amendment to provide similar guarantees to pretrial detainees.
See, e.g., Cooper v. Dyke, 814 F.2d 941, 949 n.6 (4th Cir. 1987) ("[The 'deliberate
indifference' standard is applicable to pretrial detainees under the fourteenth amendment.")
(quoting Whisenant v. Yuam, 739 F.2d 160, 163 n.4 (4th Cir. 1984)); Garcia v. Salt Lake
County, 768 F.2d 303, 307 (10th Cir. 1985) (assuming that the Fourteenth Amendment
provides the same guarantees to pretrial detainees that the Eighth Amendment does to
prisoners).
218. Eighth Amendment guarantees do not extend to schoolchildren subjected to
corporal punishment. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (distinguishing the
circumstances surrounding schoolchildren and prisoners).
219. Id. Estelle generated a number of holdings allowing prisoners to bring suit for
official deliberate indifference to threats to their safety. See, e.g., Elliot v. Cheshire County,
940 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1991) (recognizing duty to protect detainee from his own suicidal
tendencies of which jail personnel were aware or should have been aware); Davis v.
Zahradnick, 600 F.2d 458 (4th Cir. 1979) (recognizing duty of guard to protect from
assault).
220. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
221. Id. See also City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239 (1983) (finding city
responsible for providing medical care to suspect injured by police in apprehending him).
222. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 310.
223. Id. at 315-16.
224. 444 U.S. 277 (1980).
225. Id. at 279-80.
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life.226 The Court held that the state officer's actions did not amount to a violation
of due process "within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment., 227 In reaching
this conclusion, the Court reasoned that the victim's death was "too remote a
consequence of the parole officers' action to hold them responsible under the
federal civil rights law." 228 Nevertheless, the Court did not entirely spurn the idea
of § 1983 liability for private dangers. Specifically, it determined: "We need not
and do not decide that a parole officer could never be deemed to 'deprive' someone
of life by action taken in connection with the release of a prisoner on parole.
'22 9
After Martinez, the lower courts continued to develop the idea of § 1983
liability in non-custodial situations for harms created by the State but directly
caused by parties other than the State or its agents. A few courts expanded state-
created danger liability, moving in the direction of a general duty to protect,230 but
most courts recognized liability only if State agents took an active role in creating
or increasing the danger.231 In particular, the Seventh Circuit stated: "If the state
puts a man in a position of danger from private persons and then fails to protect
him, it will not be heard to say that its role was merely passive; it is as much an
active tortfeasor as if it had thrown him into a snake pit."232 Although the court
declined to assign to the State a general affirmative duty to protect,233 it
acknowledged that when the government creates or increases danger that ultimately
causes injury, then the government bears responsibility in protecting against that
injtry.234
226. Id. at 283-84.
227. Id. at 284-85.
228. Id. at 285. The Court identified factors in its decision including: that five months
had elapsed after the parolee's release and before the victim's murder, that the parole board
was not aware of any danger specific to the victim, and that the parolee was not an agent of
the board. Id.
229. Id.
230. See, e.g., Estate of Bailey by Oare v. County of York, 768 F.2d 503 (3d Cir. 1985)
(finding a general duty to protect when officials knew child was at risk of being abused). For
an intriguing discussion of "actionable inaction," see Lisa E. Heinzerling, Actionable
Inaction: Section 1983 Liability for Failure to Act, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 1048 (1986), in which
the author analogizes the right to protection to an entitlement to property. Heinzerling argues
that a right to protection arises once a service or benefit has been provided to the community
on a general basis. Id. at 1063. Any decision to withhold an existing service or benefit should
be governed by the Due Process Clause. Id. at 1063-72.
231. See, e.g., Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir. 1988) (finding no
active role when dispatcher provided poor advice during an emergency that led to death of
victim); Escamilla v. City of Santa Ana, 796 F.2d 266 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding no active role
when officers did not create or contribute to risk of harm in barroom shooting that killed
victim); White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979) (allowing § 1983 claim when
officers' actions in leaving children without adult protection in abandoned car after arresting
driver led to physical and emotional injuries). An analogous duty in tort is assigned to
private individuals whose conduct creates "an unreasonable risk of causing physical harm to
another." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 321 (1965). Similarly, § 322 of the
Restatement requires a person to aid another when that person acts to cause "such bodily
harm to another as to make him helpless and in danger of further harm." Id. at § 322.
232. Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982) (finding no due process
violation when state failed to protect citizen from criminals or madmen absent any
discrimination in providing protection against crime of violence).
233. The court distinguished between action and inaction, stressing that the former is
necessary to trigger liability. Id.
234. Id. The failure to fulfill this obligation is actionable under § 1983. Id.
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In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,235 the
Supreme Court instituted a major limit on due process claims by refusing to
recognize a general duty to protect from private danger. As stated by the Court,
"the facts of this case are undeniably tragic."236 Joshua DeShaney, the child
plaintiff, had been repeatedly beaten by his father with whom he lived.237 When
Joshua entered the hospital with multiple bruises and abrasions, a doctor called the
Winnebago County Department of Social Services to make them aware of the
abuse, and Social Services placed Joshua in the temporary custody of the hospital,
only to return him to his father after three days. 23 Thereafter, over the course of
fifteen months, the Department of Social Services continued to record the abuse,
but did not seek to intervene. 2 39 In the end, the father beat the four-year-old so
severely that he inflicted permanent brain damage. 240 Joshua and his mother
brought a § 1983 suit against the Department and county officials, alleging that the
defendants' failure to intervene to protect Joshua deprived him of his liberty
without due process of law.241 In addressing the plaintiffs' claim, the Court
declared that "[a]s a general matter ... a State's failure to protect an individual
against private violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process
Clause. 242 Instead, the majority described the Due Process Clause as a limit on
governmental action and not as an affirmative duty to protect citizens from private
harm.
24 3
235. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
236. Id. at 191.
237. Id. at 191-93.
238. Id. at 192. Winnebago County authorities were alerted to the possibility of this
abuse a year prior to the hospital visit, by Joshua's stepmother. Id.
239. Id. at 192-93.
240. Id. at 193. Due to the brain injuries, Joshua will likely spend the rest of his life
confined to an institution for the profoundly retarded. Id.
241. Id. at 191. The plaintiffs also argued that the relationship between Joshua and the
State was analogous to that which exists between prisoners or mental health patients and the
State. Id. at 197. This "special relationship," the plaintiffs contended, imposed an affirmative
obligation on the State to provide Joshua with adequate protective services. The Court,
however, rejected this argument and limited the State's duty to protect to individuals in state
custody against their will. Id. at 199-200. Referring to cases such as Estelle and Romeo, see
supra notes 214-23 and accompanying text, the Court concluded:
[Tihese cases afford petitioners no help. Taken together, they stand only
for the proposition that when the State takes a person into its custody
and holds him there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a
corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and
general well-being. The rationale for this principle is simple enough:
when the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an
individual's liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself, and at
the same time fails to provide for his basic human needs--e.g., food,
clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety-it transgresses the
substantive limits on state action set by the Eighth Amendment and the
Due Process Clause. The affirmative duty to protect arises not from the
State's knowledge of the individual's predicament or from its
expressions of intent to help him, but from the limitation which it has
imposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf.
Id. at 199-200 (citations omitted).
242. Id. at 197.
243. Id. at 195. The Court reasoned:
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Notwithstanding this limit on the Due Process Clause, the Court tacitly
acknowledged the state-created danger doctrine for redressing privately-inflicted
injuries. In particular, in ruling against the plaintiffs, the Court determined that
"[w]hile the State may have been aware of the dangers that Joshua faced in the free
world, it played no part in their creation, nor did it do anything to render him any
more vulnerable to them.",244 Because the State had taken no action that created or
increased the danger to Joshua, the defendants' knowledge of the father's violence
imposed no obligation on the State to intervene on Joshua's behalf.2 45 It follows,
then, that if state action had created or increased the danger to Joshua, then
governmental obligation would result.
Academic response to DeShaney was decidedly critical and targeted the
Court's attempt to draw a distinction between state action and inaction, restricting
liability to cases involving the former.246 The purpose of this Article, however, is
not to "pile on" or otherwise supplement these compelling strikes against "negative
liberties," but rather to work within the framework of DeShaney to establish a
governmental duty to prevent riot violence. To accomplish this, this Article posits
an interdisciplinary approach to analyzing state action by using sociological studies
to establish the State's role in riot formation and riot violence.
The DeShaney opinion left open at least two broad conceptual avenues for
establishing state substantive due process obligations to protect individuals from
The Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State's power to act, not as
a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security. It forbids
the State itself to deprive individuals of life, liberty, or property without
"due process of law," but its language cannot fairly be extended to
impose an affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that those
interests do not come to harm through other means .... Its purpose was
to protect the people from the State, not to ensure that the State
protected them from each other.
Id. at 195-96. This reasoning sparked two passionate dissents. Justice Brennan criticized
what he described as the majority's "fixation" on the principle of negative limitation, id. at
205, and concluded:
My disagreement with the Court arises from its failure to see that
inaction can be every bit as abusive of power as action, that oppression
can result when a State undertakes a vital duty and then ignores it.
Today's opinion construes the Due Process Clause to permit a State to
displace private sources of protection and then, at the critical moment,
to shrug its shoulders and turn away .... Because I cannot believe that
our Constitution is indifferent to such indifference, I respectfully
dissent.
Id. at 212 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmum disparaged the majority's "formalistic
reasoning" and argued that the Court's "attempts to draw a sharp and rigid line between
action and inaction" have "no place in the interpretation of the broad and stirring Clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
244. Id. at 201.
245. Id. at 194-97.
246. See supra note 28. An exception to the negative responses is Professor Armacost's
argument that DeShaney is "not an outlier in the judicial landscape" involving failure-to-
protect claims. Armacost, supra note 174, at 985. Despite acknowledging the Court's
action/inaction distinction as "normatively unappealing," Professor Armacost observes that,
"[i]n the tort context.., the overwhelming presumption against liability for failure to protect
has held fast." Id.
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known private dangers: (1) state custody and "special relationships"; 247 and (2)
state-created danger.248 Although the Supreme Court appears to limit the first
theory of recovery to situations in which the State has assumed custody of an
individual against his or her will, 249 the lower courts have expanded the concept of
state custody to include a variety of custodial and quasi-custodial circumstances,
25025including children in foster care, voluntarily committed mental health patients,25 '
247. The majority in DeShaney implicitly affirmed this avenue of liability. See supra
notes 244-45 and accompanying text. An exception to the requirement of custody or special
relationship is the affirmative duty placed on police officers to protect an individual whose
constitutional rights are being violated by other police officers. See, e.g., Hale v. Towney, 45
F.3d 914, 919 (5th Cir. 1995) ("[A]n officer who is present at the scene and does not take
reasonable measures to protect a suspect from another officer's use of excessive force may
be liable under section 1983."); Anderson v. Branen, 17 F.3d 552, 557 (2d Cir. 1994) ("It is
widely recognized that all law enforcement officials have an affirmative duty to intervene to
protect the constitutional rights of citizens from infringement by other law enforcement
officers in their presence."); McHenry v. Chadwick, 896 F.2d 184, 188 (6th Cir. 1990)
(finding § 1983 right to protection from officers when fellow officers physically assaulted
inmate); O'Neill v. Krzeminski, 839 F.2d 9, 11-12 (2d Cir. 1988) (finding § 1983 right to
protection from abuse by an officer after fellow officers witnessed initial blows); Byrd v.
Clark, 783 F.2d 1002, 1007 (11th Cir. 1986) ("If a police officer ... fails or refuses to
intervene when a constitutional violation ...takes place in his presence, the officer is
directly liable under Section 1983."); Webb v. Hiykel, 713 F.2d 405, 408 (8th Cir. 1983)
(finding § 1983 right to protection from an officer even when officer's superior officers were
source of force causing harm); Byrd v. Brishke, 466 F.2d 6, 11 (7th Cir. 1972) ("[O]ne who
is given the badge of authority of a police officer may not ignore the duty imposed by his
office and fail to stop other officers who punish a third person in his presence."); Masel v.
Barrett, 707 F. Supp. 4, 7 (D.D.C. 1989) (noting that all circuits recognize a special
relationship between a police officer and victim so as to afford a duty to protect the victim's
rights from constitutional violation by fellow officers); Cf. Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d
1271, 1290 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding no liability when police officers had no realistic
opportunity to intercede and prevent harm).
248. See supra notes 244-45 and accompanying text.
249. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200-01.
250. Abused, neglected, and dependent children in state custody are entitled to a
minimal level of due process protection in foster homes. See, e.g., Niccini v. Morra, 212
F.3d 798, 808 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc) (finding that the State has an affirmative duty to
protect children it places in state-regulated foster care); Norfleet v. Ark. Dep't of Human
Servs., 989 F.2d 289, 292-93 (8th Cir. 1993); Yvonne L. v. N.M. Dep't of Human Servs.,
959 F.2d 883, 891-93 (10th Cir. 1992); K.H. through Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 848-
49 (7th Cir. 1990); Meador v. Cabinet for Human Res., 902 F.2d 474, 475-76 (6th Cir.
1990); LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959, 991-92 (D.D.C. 1991), afid, 990 F.2d 1319
(D.D.C. 1993). In 1995, the Seventh Circuit extended these protections beyond the foster
home to the child's living environment. Camp v. Gregory, 67 F.3d 1286, 1294 (7th Cir.
1995) (extending duty to protect to known or suspected dangerous elements in environment
outside of foster home); see also Taahira W. v. Travis, 908 F. Supp. 533, 539-40 (N.D. Ill.
1995) (requiring State to protect child when foster parent is unable to protect child from
other foster children); Cf. White v. Chambliss, 112 F.3d 731, 737 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating
that the State is liable for placement of child in foster care only if it was deliberately
indifferent to the child's placement); Milburn v. Anne Arundel County Dep't of Soc. Servs.,
871 F.2d 474, 476 (4th Cir. 1989) (finding that the State has no duty to a child who was
voluntarily placed in foster care by his natural parents). For a thorough discussion of recent
cases on this topic, see Charles P. Golbert, The State's Substantive Due Process Obligations
Under the Fourteenth Amendment to Protect Its Citizens from Known Private Dangers After
DeShaney v. Winnebago County: Another Look at the "Cracks", 6 POLICE MISCONDUCT
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and individuals in "constructive custody.' ' 25 2 Most significant to this Article is the
second method of attaching liability under § 1983-the state-created danger theory.
Pursuant to this theory, state actors are liable when the state plays a role in creating
or increasing danger that eventually harms an individual.253
When analyzing a case under this doctrine, courts focus on state action and its
relationship to the victim and the ultimate harm, relying on the Supreme Court's
observations in DeShaney that the State played no part in the creation of the
dangers to Joshua, nor did it render him more vulnerable to these dangers,254 and
that the State's actions "placed [Joshua] in no worse position than that in which he
would have been had it not acted at all. 255
C. The State-Created Danger Doctrine in the Lower Courts
Following DeShaney, courts continued to develop the state-created danger
AND CivIL RIGHTS LAW REPORT pt. 1, at 13 (Mar.-Apr. 1999) and Charles P. Golbert & Marit
A. Rasmussen, The State's Constitutional Duty to Protect Its Citizens from Known Peril:
Post-DeShaney Developments Under the Substantive Due Process Guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 4 POUCE MISCONDucT AND CiviL. RIGHTS LAW REPORT 157 (Mar.-
Apr. 1995).
251. Courts allowing recovery in these situations find sufficient state action in the
process of voluntary commitment. See, e.g., Clark v. Donahue, 885 F. Supp. 1159, 1162
(S.D. Ind. 1995); Estate of Cassara v. Illinois, 853 F. Supp. 273, 279 (N.D. 111. 1994); United
States v. Pennsylvania, 832 F. Supp. 122, 124 (E.D. Pa. 1993); United States v. Tennessee,
798 F. Supp. 483, 487 (W.D. Tenn. 1992). Other courts, however, find no such state action
when mental health patients have voluntarily committed themselves. See, e.g., Brooks v.
Giuliani, 84 F.3d 1454, 1466 (2d Cir. 1996); Monahan v. Dorchester Counseling Ctr., Inc.,
961 F.2d 987, 994 (1st Cir. 1992); Fialkowski v. Greenwich Home for Children, Inc., 921
F.2d 459, 465 (3d Cir. 1991). For a thorough discussion of recent cases on this topic, see
Golbert, supra note 250, pt. 1, at 20; Golbert & Rasmussen, supra note 250, at 160.
252. See, e.g., Horton v. Flenory, 889 F.2d 454, 458 (3d Cir. 1989) (finding sufficient
state action in constructive custody of victim left by the police with a retired police officer
who beat him to death); Pagano v. Massapequa Pub. Sch., 714 F. Supp. 641, 643 (E.D.N.Y.
1989) (finding sufficient state action when student was harmed by other students at a public
school). But see, e.g., Shrum v. Kluck, 249 F.3d 773, 781 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that
public schools do not have a duty to protect schoolchildren from private violence); Doe v.
Hillsboro Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 1412, 1416 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (declining to find
the school liable when the school custodian raped a student on school grounds); J.O. v. Alton
Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. 11, 909 F.2d 267, 272-73 (7th Cir. 1990) (refusing to find custodial
relationship between public school officials and students); Burrow v. Postville Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193, 1209 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (criticizing Pagano); B.M.H. v. Sch. Bd.,
833 F. Supp. 560, 570 (E.D. Va. 1993) (same). For a thorough discussion of recent cases on
this topic, see Golbert, supra note 250, pt. 1, at 21; Golbert, supra note 250, pt. 2, at 25.
253. For example, in Currier v. Doran, 242 F.3d 905 (10th Cir. 2001), the court found a
social worker liable under the state-created danger theory when the social worker transferred
custody of the child from mother to father and the father subsequently killed the child. Id. at
909-10. Finding that the state actor had enhanced the victim's risk of injury, the court held
that the child would not have been exposed to the danger "but for the affirmative acts of the
state." Id. at 918. But see Terry B. v. Gilkey, 229 F.3d 680 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding no due
process duty to protect children transferred from psychiatric hospital by Department of
Human Services to aunt and uncle who abused them).
254. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201.
255. Id.
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256doctrine. Courts recognizing this theory of recovery have imposed substantive
due process obligations on the State to protect certain individuals when the State
"affirmatively places a particular individual in a position of danger the individual
would not otherwise have faced. 257
A common fact pattern that arises under the state-created danger doctrine
involves police interaction with motorists or their passengers when that interaction
creates or increases the dangers to the motorists or passengers. 258 For example, in
Wood v. Ostrander,259 the Ninth Circuit was faced with a case in which a police
officer arrested an intoxicated driver, impounded the car, and refused to provide
transportation for the female passenger.26?Left behind in a high-crime area at two-
thirty a.m. and approximately five miles from her home, the woman accepted a ride
from a stranger, who drove her to a remote area and raped her.261 In allowing the
plaintiff to proceed with her § 1983 claim against the police officer, the court found
that there existed "a triable issue of fact as to whether [the officer's] conduct
'affirmatively placed the plaintiff in a position of danger,' '2 62 and noted that
DeShaney excluded recovery only in situations in which the State "played no part"
263in creating the dangers faced by the individual. Another example is Reed v.
Gardner,264 in which a family suffered a tragic accident when a drunk driver
crossed the centerline and smashed head-on into their car.265 Earlier, police officers
had arrested the original driver of the car, leaving behind a drunk passenger who
266
caused the crash. In reviewing the case, the Seventh Circuit remarked that police
256. For a thorough discussion of recent lower court decisions on this subject, see
Golbert, supra note 250, pts 1-2, at 21 and Golbert & Rasmussen, supra note 250, at 162.
257. Gregory v. City of Rogers, 974 F.2d 1006, 1010 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc). Thus
far, the Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and District of
Columbia circuits have adopted the state-created danger theory. The First, Fourth, and Fifth
circuits have not recognized the theory. For a discussion of this circuit split, see David
Pruessner, The Forgotten Foundation of State-Created Danger Claims, 20 REv. LIG. 357
(2001). The D.C. Circuit recently adopted the state-created danger theory in Butera v.
District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637, 651 (D.C. Cir. 2001). It bears noting, however, that the
circuits recognizing the theory require "different levels of culpability and action by the
municipality or state actor with varying requirements placed on the plaintiff." Jeremy Daniel
Kemodle, Note, Policing the Police: Clarifying the Test for Holding the Government Liable
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the State-Created Danger Theory, 54 VAND. L. REV. 165, 169
(2001).
258. A minority of courts have declined to find due process violations in these
situations. See, e.g., Foy v. City of Berea, 58 F.3d 227, 232 (6th Cir. 1995) (refusing to find
liability when police officers instructed an obviously intoxicated driver to "get in your car
and get out of here" with result that the passenger was killed in an automobile accident);
Gregory, 974 F.2d 1006, 1009 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding no liability when a police officer
arrested a sober driver, leaving obviously intoxicated passengers with the car who
subsequently were involved in fatal car accident); Hilliard v. City & County of Denver, 930
F.2d 1516, 1520 (10th Cir. 1991) (declining to find liability when a police officer left the
victim stranded in a high crime area where she was robbed and sexually assaulted after the
police arrested her boyfriend for being an intoxicated driver and impounded his car).
259. 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989).
260. Id. at 586.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 589-90.
263. Id. at 590 (citing DeShaney).
264. 986 F.2d 1122 (7th Cir. 1993).
265. Id. at 1123.
266. Id.
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officers who remove sober drivers and leave behind drunk passengers with keys
may be said to create a danger to others on the road so as to trigger liability under
the state-created danger doctrine.267 Other fact patterns that fall within the state-
created danger theory include cases in which the State restrains employees or
agents from protecting an individual2 68 or cuts off potential private sources of
rescue.
26 9
D. The State-Created Danger Doctrine in the Riot Context
The state-created danger theory has appeared in the riot context when the State
has conspired with private actors who harm others and when the State has
condoned the violence that causes the harm. For example, in Dwares v. City of New
York, 270 a protestor demonstrating in support of the rights of others to engage in
flag burning was beaten by skinheads. 271 He sued police and city officials, alleging
that the police at the event violated his due process rights by failing to intervene
and protect him.2 72 Reversing the district court's dismissal of the suit, the Second
Circuit found that Dwares's allegations that the officers conspired with the
skinheads by agreeing not to interfere unless the attacks got "completely out of
control" stated a civil rights claim against the officers for violating his due process
rights.273 In particular, the court noted that, if the allegations were true, then police
were willing to allow attackers to beat up flag burners with relative impunity and
267. Id. at 1124-25. See also Munger v. Glasgow Police Dep't, 227 F.3d 1082, 1086
(9th Cir. 2000) (finding that the police could be liable for preventing an intoxicated bar
patron who was ejected from bar from reentering bar or leaving in his truck with result that
the individual died from hypothermia); Davis v. Brady, 143 F.3d 1021, 1026 (6th Cir. 1998)
(finding state-created danger exception applicable when police officers arrested plaintiff for
drunk and disorderly conduct, drove him outside city limits, and released him along busy,
dark highway with result that plaintiff was hit by car and sustained serious permanent
injuries); Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1209 (3d Cir. 1996) (permitting suit when police
officers left obviously intoxicated person alone to walk home); White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d
381, 388 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding that the plaintiffs' allegations that police left children
without adult protection in abandoned car after arresting the adult driver with result that
children were physically and emotionally injured established federal civil rights claim);
Mason v. Barker, 977 F. Supp. 941, 945 (E.D. Ark. 1997) (permitting suit when the police
officers directed an obviously inebriated person to drive); Hilliard v. Walker's Party Store,
Inc., 903 F. Supp. 1162, 1174 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (same); Russell v. Steck, 851 F. Supp. 859,
867 (N.D. Ohio 1994) (same).
268. See, e.g., Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir. 1990) (suggesting that
allegations that police chiefs directions to subordinates to withhold assistance based on
friendship with assailant would set forth due process claim).
269. See, e.g., Ross v. United States, 910 F.2d 1422, 1431 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding that
the county's alleged policy to prevent private citizens from attempting to rescue a person in
danger of drowning violated drowning victim's due process right to life and that deputy was
liable under § 1983 by ordering private citizens to cease their rescue efforts so that an
official rescue team could perform the rescue); Estate of Sinthasomphone v. City of
Milwaukee, 785 F. Supp. 1343, 1349 (E.D. Wis. 1992) (denying the defendants' motion to
dismiss complaint that alleged that officers actively prevented private citizens from helping
victim and refused requests to investigate further).
270. 985 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1993).
271. Id. at 96.
272. Id. at 96-97.
273. Id. at 97, 99.
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thus their actions "increased the likelihood that the 'skinheads' would assault
demonstrators... [and] made the demonstrators more vulnerable to assaults.
274
Riot victims charged the State with condoning riot violence in another New
York case, Estate of Rosenbaum v. City of New York.275 In this lawsuit, the court
addressed allegations, stemming from the 1991 Crown Heights riots, that police
and city officials had, by failing to arrest individuals for unlawful assembly and by
ignoring requests for assistance, emboldened rioters and increased the danger to the
276Crown Heights Hasidic Jewish community. The event setting off the riots was a
car accident that occurred in August 1991 when a station wagon escorting the late
Lubavicher Rebbe Menachem Schneerson277 collided with another vehicle, veered
out of control, and accidentally struck two African American children, a seven-
year-old and a nine-year-old, killing one and seriously injuring the other. 27' The
accident "sparked an immediate and violent reaction among certain members of the
African-American community, which quickly spread to the streets of Crown
Heights., 279 The passionate response appears to have been generated by a general
perception that the city bestowed preferential treatment on the Hasidic community
and by a false report that an ambulance owned by a private Jewish organization that
had arrived at the accident before the city ambulance had failed to aid the
grievously injured young victims, favoring the Hasidic driver and passengers who
were less in need of medical help.28 0 Scant hours after the accident, Yankel
Rosenbaum, a rabbinical student, was attacked by a group of young African
American men and stabbed to death.28 1 The following three days saw violent unrest
throughout the Crown Heights neighborhood. Both police and citizens endured
physical injuries from fists, gunshot fire, and thrown rocks, bottles, and bricks. In
addition to physical attacks, rioters destroyed property and looted businesses.28 2
During these three days, officials adopted a "policy of restraint," forgoing mass
arrests and aggressive crowd control tactics. Police officers were discouraged from
making arrests for "minor" crimes, such as unlawful assembly.28 3 Officers
allegedly stood by, taking no action to stop the physical assaults and ignoring pleas
284for help by individuals and the community-at-large.
The estate of Yankel Rosenbaum and numerous other victims of the rioting
and violence sued police and city officials, asserting a substantive due process
claim for relief under § 1983 based on the state-created danger theory. 21 Finding
that the plaintiffs had properly alleged a due process violation, the court stated:
274. Id. at 99.
275. 975 F. Supp. 206 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
276. Id. at 216.
277. The late Rebbe Schneerson was the religious leader of the Lubavitcher Hasidic
community. Id. at 210. In 1993, approximately 10,000 to 16,000 Lubavitchers resided in
Crown Heights, making up about ten percent of the Brooklyn community's population.
GIRGENTI REPORT, supra note 9, at 41.
278. Estate of Rosenbaum, 975 F. Supp. at 209.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 209-20.
281. id. at 209, 210. Rosenbaum was a visiting scholar from Australia. Id. at 209.
282. Id. at 208-11.
283. Id. at 210, 216.
284. Id. at 210-12.
285. Id. at 214. In addition to the § 1983 claim, the complaint contained claims under
42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986 as well as eight supplemental causes of action under state law.
Id. at 214.
[Vol. 79:177
BRINGING IN THE STATE
If plaintiffs contended simply that the City had failed to respond to
requests from the Hasidic community for additional police protection
during the Crown Heights disturbances, such a claim would arguably be
barred by DeShaney, decided two years before the disturbances took
place. However, the thrust of plaintiffs' argument is quite different:
plaintiffs allege that defendants, by the inappropriate implementation of
a policy of restraint, actually exacerbated the danger to the Hasidic
community and rendered the community more vulnerable to violence by
private actors.
286
The proliferation of state-created danger cases in the lower courts since
DeShaney demonstrates that this theory of recovery survived the Court's abolition
of a general governmental duty to protect individuals from private harms. Clearly,
"the DeShaney doctrine is not without some small cracks in its surface; hairline,
perhaps, but cracks nonetheless." 287 In Part IV below, this Article hopes to widen
some of these cracks by using social science studies to develop a theory of State
response to hostile outbursts that identifies the State's role in the formation and
escalation of riots and puts forward a framework for considering social science
studies in constitutional tort litigation against local governments and state and local
officers for failure to prevent and protect against mob violence.
I. BRINGING IN THE STATE: THE DUTY TO PROTECT FROM MOB VIOLENCE
A. The Legal Use of Social Science Studies in the Riot Context
Social science research made its debut in the American courtroom nearly a
century ago.288 Today, social science data is used in the law as a fact-finding tool
and as a tool for developing legal rules.2 89 As a fact-finding tool, research results
can be presented as factual evidence or "social facts" in a particular case.29 0 The
study results are specific to the case and do not generalize beyond the facts of the
286. Id. at 217. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied heavily on the reasoning
and holding in Dwares. See id. Despite this determination, however, the court granted the
defendants' motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, finding that the
right at issue was not clearly established at the time of the police and official actions, id. at
218-21, and if clearly established, that defendants' law enforcement strategy was objectively
reasonable, id. at 221-23.
287. Estate of Sinthasomphone v. City of Milwaukee, 785 F. Supp. 1343, 1348 (E.D.
Wis. 1992).
288. This first outing was in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
289. See, e.g., Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Facts: Scientific Methodology
as Legal Precedent, 76 CAL. L. REV. 877, 881 (1988). See generally MONAHAN & WALKER,
supra note 30. Professor Kenneth Culp Davis was the first to remark on the dual uses of
social science in the law. See Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the
Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 423-25 (1942). He identified as
"adjudicative" facts "concerning the immediate parties-what the parties did, what the
circumstances were, and what the background conditions were." Id. at 402. In contrast, he
coined the term "legislative facts" to describe social science research data used to create or
modify a rule of law. Id. Professors Walker and Monahan substitute the terms "social facts"
and "social authority" for Davis's adjudicative and legislative facts. See Walker & Monahan,
Social Facts, supra, at 881.
290. Walker & Monahan, supra note 289, at 881.
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dispute. 291 For example, in Processed Plastic v. Warner Communications,292 the
court allowed into evidence social science data demonstrating that the Processed
Plastic Company had violated the Lanham Trademark Act 293 by creating consumer
confusion.294 The study was a social science survey of children in which eighty-two
percent of the participants confused the two products in question.295 This study was
conducted to help determine the particular issues in dispute and directly involved
the parties and facts.
When used to create or modify rules of law, social science is presented much
like legal precedent.296 Like case law precedent or legislative policy, this
information or "social authority" is not specific to the facts in dispute, but is
"intended to describe or prescribe general principles that pertain to whole classes of
human behavior."29 7 For example, in United States v. Leon,298 the Court considered
social science research studying the effects of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule on the disposition of felony arrests. The Court used the data in its analysis of
whether to modify the rule so as to admit evidence seized by officers acting in good
faith reliance on a search warrant later found invalid. 299 The studies did not directly
291. Id. As with findings of fact, case-specific research data should be presented by the
parties. Most social facts are presented through expert testimony. John Monahan & Laurens
Walker, Judicial Use of Social Science Research, 15 LAW. & HUM. BEHAV. 571, 579 (1991).
The methodology of the research, however, would be subject to review as a legal question.
Michael J. Saks, Judicial Attention to the Way the World Works, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1011,
1025-26, 1029 (1990).
292. 675 F.2d 852 (7th Cir. 1982). Professors Walker and Monahan provide this and
other examples in Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of
Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REv. 559 (1987).
293. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1999).
294. Processed Plastic, 675 F.2d at 857. Warner Communications held a registered
copyright in the "Dukes of Hazzard" television series and had granted several toy
manufacturers licenses to manufacture and sell replicas of the "General Lee," a bright
orange-colored 1969 Dodge Charger that the show's producers considered to be one of the
"stars" of the series. Id. at 854. The Processed Plastic Company, which was not licensed by
Warner Communication, began producing a large plastic toy car that was modeled after the
"General Lee." Id. Warner Communication sought to enjoin the Processed Plastic Company
from manufacturing or distributing these toy cars and introduced the social science survey to
support its motion. Id. at 854-55.
295. Id. at 854-55. The survey results also showed that fifty-six percent of the children
believed that the Processed Plastic Company's car was sponsored by the "Dukes of
Hazzard" program. Id.
296. John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and
Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 490-91 (1986). Like legal
precedent, social authority should be submitted to the courts as written briefs or obtained via
independent judicial investigation. Id. at 495-98. See also Saks, supra note 291, at 1022-23
(discussing how judges may acquire social science knowledge using Monahan and Walker's
functional theory).
297. Richard L. Wiener, Social Analytic Jurisprudence and Tort Law: Social Cognition
Goes to Court, 37 ST. Louis U. L.J. 503, 549-50 (1993) (describing Monahan and Walker's
work).
298. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
299. Id. at 907 n.6. Professors Monahan and Walker provide this and other examples in
Walker & Monahan, supra note 292. The most notable use of social authority was in Brown
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), in which the Supreme Court referred to social
science studies that supported the district court's findings that segregated public education
had a detrimental effect upon African American children. Id. at 494 n. 11.
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involve the parties or facts of the Leon case. Instead, the Court used the data to
determine whether to create an exception to an existing rule of law.
300
A third use of social science is in "the creation of social frameworks" in which
"general research results are used to construct a frame of reference or background
context for deciding factual issues crucial to the resolution of a specific case."
30 1
Social framework research is similar to social authority in that the research is of a
general nature and was not conducted based on the facts of the immediate case. 3 02 It
resembles social fact in that it is used to help resolve factual issues contested by the
parties in the case at hand.3 °3 In their seminal article on social framework research,
Professors Walker and Monahan identify several examples of the use of social
framework in cases pertaining to eyewitness identification, evaluations of
dangerousness, preemptive strikes by battered women, and sexually abused
children. 304 For example, in trying to decide how much weight should be given to
particular eyewitness testimony, a court may allow admission of testimony
describing research on the reliability of eyewitnesses in general.30 5 In assessing the
dangerousness of a particular defendant convicted of murder, a court may allow
expert testimony demonstrating that murderers have the lowest rate of recidivism
of all offenders. 30 6 With respect to assertions of 'the battered woman syndrome'
raised in a self-defense claim, a court may admit social science reports on the state
of mind "of other women who ha[ve] been in similarly abusive relationships" to
help a jury understand that the defendant honestly believed that her life was in
danger.' ° 7 To aid in determining whether a defendant has sexually abused a specific
child, the prosecution may be allowed to present expert testimony on emotional and
psychological characteristics typically observed in sexually abused children for the
purpose of providing insight on the conduct and demeanor of the child
300. Leon, 468 U.S. at 907 n.6. In Leon, the Court cited six social science studies in its
finding that one "objectionable collateral consequence" of the exclusionary rule was "that
some guilty defendants may go free or receive reduced sentences as a result of favorable
plea bargains." Id. at 907.
301. Walker & Monahan, supra note 292, at 559 (emphasis in original).
302. Id. at 569.
303. Id. at 570. Recognizing the similarities between social framework research and
social fact research, many courts accept social science used as a social framework via expert
testimony before a jury or other fact finder. Id. at 583. Monahan and Walker, however, stress
that frameworks resemble social authority as much as they resemble social fact and suggest
that courts obtain empirical framework data in written briefs or through the court's own
research. Id. at 588-91. Pursuant to their theory, empirical context research should be used
by the parties "to propose and justify a set of jury instructions incorporating a social
framework," and by the court to properly instruct a jury. Id. at 588-89.
304. Id. at 564-67.
305. State v. Chapple, 660 P.2d 1208, 1224 (Ariz. 1983) (en banc). Citing Chapple,
other courts have approved the use of social framework research concerning the reliability of
eyewitness identification. See, e.g., United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985);
People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1984). But see State v. Poland, 698 P.2d 183, 194
(Ariz. 1985) (en banc) (upholding exclusion of expert testimony on eyewitness
identification).
306. State v. Davis, 477 A.2d 308, 311 (N.J. 1984) (per curiam).
307. State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 375-81 (N.J. 1984). Kelly is part of a trend towards
admitting expert testimony on 'battered woman syndrome.' See, e.g., Smith v. State, 277
S.E.2d 678 (Ga. 1981); State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892 (Me. 1981); State v. Baker, 424 A.2d
171 (N.H. 1980); State v. Allery, 682 P.2d 312 (Wash. 1984) (en banc).
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complainant. 30 8 The reason for introducing research in these kinds of situations is
to assist the jury or other fact finder in deciding the specific factual issues beinglitigated.3°
Most relevant to this Article is this third use of social science research as
framework evidence. A major task for trial lawyers representing riot victims in
indirect harm cases is to persuade judges and juries, under the constraints imposed
by DeShaney, that the State bears legal responsibility for injuries caused by mob
violence.310 Social science studies concerning the connection between state action
and riot development can be employed as a framework for deciding case-specific
facts in a § 1983 indirect harm suit. These studies are not used to make or modify
the state-created danger doctrine, nor do they prove what happened to the parties in
court. Rather, social framework evidence can help fact finders understand and
evaluate factual claims pertaining to the State's role in creating or increasing
dangers to private citizens in the context of a particular riot.
B. The State's Role in Riot Formation and Trajectory
Numerous scholars of collective disorder 31 have noted the relevance of law
enforcement activities to understanding the development of protests, riots, and
mobs.312 Without question, the State plays a definitive role in not only suppressing,
308. State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 608-11 (Minn. 1984). Other courts have also
allowed expert testimony on the characteristics of child sex offense victims. See, e.g., State
v. Kim, 645 P.2d 1330 (Haw. 1982); State v. Middleton, 657 P.2d 1215 (Or. 1983); State v.
Petrich, 683 P.2d 173 (Wash. 1984) (en banc).
309. Walker & Monahan, supra note 292, at 568.
310. See 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
311. Throughout this Article, terms such as "riot," "mob," "disorder," "mayhem,"
"disturbance," and "hostile outburst" are employed interchangeably to denote aggressive and
violent group behavior. Scientific studies, however, employ more formal terms. For
example, Professor Roger Brown classifies mobs as a type of crowd that can be subdivided
into aggressive (lynching, rioting, terrorizing) mobs, escape (panic) mobs, acquisitive
(looting) mobs, and expressive mobs. Roger W. Brown, Mass Phenomena, in 2 HANDBOOK
OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 840-65 (Gardner Lindzey ed., 1954). Pursuant to these
classifications, this Article focuses on the aggressive mob. Although the relevant mob
activity has included looting, the looting occurred as a consequence of the initial aggression
and is not the primary focus of this Article. The most general term for these types of group
behaviors is "collective behavior." Other terms used by social scientists include "mass
phenomena," "mass behavior," "collective dynamics," "collective outbursts," and "collective
movements." These terms embrace a wide variety of mass actions, including civil
disobedience. NEIL J. SMELSER, THEORY OF COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR 2-3 (1962).
312. See, e.g., Gary T. Marx, External Efforts to Damage or Facilitate Movements:
Some Patterns, Explanations, Outcomes, and Complications, in DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS (Mayer N. Zald & John D. McCarthy eds., 1979); John D. McCarthy & Clark
McPhail, The Institutionalization of Protest, in A MOVEMENT SOCIETY? CONTENTIOUS
POLITICS FOR A NEW CENTURY (David Meyer & Sidney Tarrow eds., 1997); Clark McPhail
et al., The Policing of Protest in the United States, 1960-1995, in POLICING PROTEST: THE
CONTROL OF MASS DEMONSTRATIONS IN WESTERN DEMOCRACIES (Donatella Della Porta &
Herbert Reiter eds., 1998); BARBARA SALERT & JOHN SPRAGUE, THE DYNAMICS OF RIOTS
(1980); Albert Bergesen, Race Riots of 1967: An Analysis of Police Violence in Detroit and
Newark, 12 J. BLACK STUDIES 261-74 (1982); Ruud Koopmans, The Dynamics of Protest
Waves: West Germany, 1965 to 1989, 58 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 637-58 (1993); Karen
Rasler, Concessions, Repression, and Political Protest in the Iranian Revolution, 61 AM.
SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 132-52 (1996); Marco Giugni & Dominique Wisler, Political
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but also constraining mob activity.3 13 Accordingly, it naturally follows that policing
activities directly impact the initiation and direction of riots. 3 4 In particular, a riot's
severity "depend[s] at least as much on the tactics of police and troops as it [does]
on the number of people in the streets or the amount of property seized and
destroyed. 315
An important determinant of a riotous outbreak is the operation of social
control.316 Social control includes official actions that "prevent, interrupt, deflect,
or inhibit" an episode of collective disorder.317 Two broad types of social controls
are (1) controls that minimize societal conditions, such as economic deprivations
and inter-ethnic conflicts that can predispose an area toward riot activity; and (2)
controls that are activated to address a particular outbreak of hostilities. The first
types of controls help prevent the occurrence of riots because they are directed at
social and economic conditions that can create a riot-prone environment. 318 These
controls address social tensions and conditions such as conflicts of interest, value
and cultural clashes, severe economic deprivation, and overcrowding due to
inadequate housing, all of which can lead to mob activity. 319 Accordingly, social
controls that address and ease these problems can weaken any potential for riotous
activity to form. For example, social controls that institutionalize respect for the
Coalitions, Face-to-Face Interactions, and the Public Sphere: An Examination of the
Determinants of Repression with Protest Event Data, CBSM WORKING PAPER SERIES 1(4)
(1998), available at http://www.nd.edu/-dmyers/cbsm/voll/berlin98a.pdf (last visited Jan.
27, 2004).
313. Useem, supra note 22, at 357. See also supra note 9.
314. Useem, supra note 22, at 357-58.
315. CHARLES TILLY, BIG STRUCTURES, LARGE PROCESSES, HUGE COMPARISONS 57
(1984). Professor Tilly argues that no satisfactory explanations for the urban riots of the
1960s emerged because observers focused solely on the actions and characteristics of the
rioters, forgoing further study of policing activity. Id. He states that "the events in question
typically began with contested actions of police," and that "the conflict consisted mainly of
interactions between armed authorities and civilians." Id. This mono-vision, he argues,
hindered systematic analysis. Id. at 59.
316. SMELSER, supra note 311, at 15-17. Professor Smelser identifies six determinants
of collective behavior: (1) structural conduciveness; (2) structural strain; (3) growth and
spread of a generalized belief; (4) precipitating factors; (5) mobilization of participants for
action; and (6) the operation of social control. Id. With respect to the sixth determinant, he
writes, "In certain respects this final determinant arches over all the others." Id. at 17.
317. Id. at 17.
318. Id.
319. For instance, Professor L.L. Bernard writes:
Mobs develop with special ease under social conditions in which
conflicting interests, ideals and controls are prevalent. The presence in
close proximity of two or more races with fairly distinct customs,
traditions and standards; of distinct social classes, such as capitalist and
labor, rich and poor; of radically distinct religious alignments, each sect
or religion holding firmly to its own tenets; of two rival gangs, each
intent upon dominating the situation; or of two or more political parties,
each with its patronage and graft to protect and candidates to elect, is
especially conducive to the appearance of the mob spirit and mob
action. Such conditions easily evoke race, class, religious or partisan
animosities and hatreds, which become chronic prejudices.
L.L. Bernard, Mob, in 10 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OFTHE SOCIAL SCIENCES 553.
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law and establish orderly means of expressing grievances may assist in alleviating
conditions that generate discontent.
320
The second type of social controls used in response to actual riotous activity
"determine how fast, how far, and in what directions the [riot] will develop." 321 For
instance, indecisiveness on the part of police authorities with respect to whether to
use force tends to encourage hostilities and may lead to the spread of disorder.322
Conversely, quick and decisive application of sanctions against mobs may reduce
hostilities.323 Departments that achieve success in dampening civil unrest have
"almost always responded quickly with sufficient manpower and deployed rapidly
into troubled areas." 324 "Delay in the use of force, and hesitation to accept
responsibility for its employment when the situation clearly demands it, will always
be interpreted as weakness, encourage further disorder and eventually necessitate
measures more severe than those which would suffice in the first instance." 325 For
example, in the Chicago Riot of 1919, official hesitation in calling for additional
help from the state militia when local police were clearly overwhelmed contributed
to a five-day period of lawlessness. 32In the wake of the riot, thirty-eight people
lay dead, hundreds were injured, and over a thousand left homeless. 327 Similarly,
during the Detroit Riot of 1943, local authorities vacillated before calling in federal
troops to aid police in quelling the disorder that claimed thirty-four lives, injured
nearly seven hundred individuals, and cost two million dollars in property
damage.328 Over twenty-four hours passed after the initial outbreak of hostilities
before Detroit officials finally took steps to attain sorely-needed help. 329
320. SMELSER, supra note 311, at 261.
321. Id. at 17.
322. Id. at 262 (affirming that vacillation tends to foster the spread of overt hostility).
Controlling a mob does not always require the use of force. For example, redirecting the
attention of a crowd by throwing people into a state of panic, getting individuals interested in
other objects, or engaging them in discussion or argumentation may break up a crowd.
Herbert Blumer, Collective Behavior, in NEW OUTLINE OF THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY
181-82 (Alfred McClung Lee ed., 1951).
323. SMELSER, supra note 311, at 262.
324. GIRGENTI REPORT, supra note 9, at 205 (quoting JULIUS JERIcO E7 AL., PREVENTION
AND CONTROL OF CIVIL DISTURBANCE: TIME FOR REviEw (U.S. Dep't of Justice ed., 1992).
325. SIR CHARLES W. GWYNN, IMPERIAL POLICING 15 (1934). Major-General Sir
Charles W. Gwynn goes on to write:
Subversive movements, or disorders of any nature, do not break out fully
organized [sic]. Leaders in the early stages are apt to be more
distinguished by their oratorical powers, and perhaps by capacity of
political organization [sic], than for military qualities. Given time,
leaders who are men of action will assert themselves, and a knowledge
of the best means of countering Government measures will be acquired.
Id.
326. SMELSER, supra note 311, at 264; Chicago Public Library, Death, Disturbances,
Disasters and Disorders in Chicago: 1919 Race Riots, at http://www.chipublib.org/004chi
cago/disasters/riotsrace.html (last modified May 2001) [hereinafter 1919 Race Riots].
327. 1919 Race Riots, supra note 326. Racial tensions in Chicago were exacerbated by
the influx of African Americans between 1910 and 1920. During this period, the black
population increased from 44,000 to more than 109,000. Chicago Race Riot of 1919, at
http://search.eb.com/blackhistory/micro/l121/87.html (last visited Oct 5, 2003).
328. SMELSER, supra note 311, at 264; PBS website, Detroit Race Riots 1943, at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbhiamex/eleanor /peopleevents/pandel0.html (last visited June 11,
2003) (on file with author). Prior to the 1943 riot, racial and social tensions in Detroit were
at an all-time high. Recruiters had lured poor southern blacks and whites to the city to work
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Another type-two control that is intertwined with the general principle
requiring the State to adopt an unequivocal position toward riot violence is the need
to implement an unambiguous arrest policy and strategy. 330 To make clear their
intent and ability to respond to violations of the law, police must affirmatively act
when crimes are committed. To refrain from acting effectively excuses lawbreakers
and encourages further criminal activity. 331 At a symposium on riot control,
commanders of twenty large law enforcement departments agreed that "[t]here
should be little tolerance for those who perpetrate riotous activity .... [A]nything
less will reap increased property loss and injury to citizens and police alike.
Delay in moving law enforcement officers to the riot site may also heavily
impact the direction and dimensions of a hostile outburst. An example of a riot in
which police delay was a large factor in its development occurred in 1949 in Quito,
Ecuador, when H.G. Wells' "War of the Worlds" was performed by a local radio
station. Terrified by the realistic depiction of Martians landing and taking over the
city, thousands of people fled their homes, many in their nightclothes. Police
were sent to a community nearby Quito where the space ship had presumably
landed and were absent when the angry mob discovered that the alien takeover was
purely fictional and wreaked its vengeance by burning the radio station, killing
fifteen people.
334
Likewise, actual or apparent bias in dispensing justice can further enflame a
riot.335 In specific, when authorities cease to make decisions in an impartial
manner, they "enter the conflict itself," and give confidence to the mob. An
example of this occurred in the Cicero, Illinois Riot of 1951, when a black man
attempted to move into the city of Cicero and the local police arrived to stop
him.337 A white crowd quickly gathered and, fueled by the implicit official
in the new war factories, and the numbers that arrived quickly strained housing,
transportation, education, and recreational facilities. Vivian M. Baulch & Patricia Zacharias,
The 1943 Detroit Race Riots, THE DETROIT NEws, available at http://www.
detnews.comlhistory/riot/riot.htm (last visited June 11, 2003) (on file with author).
329. Baulch & Zacharias, supra note 328.
330. GIRGENTi REPORT, supra note 9, at 222-23.
331. Id.
332. GIRGENTI REPORT, supra note 9, at 223 (quoting JERICO ET AL., supra note 324, at
21).
333. Don Moore, The Day the Martians Landed, available http://members.tripod.com/
donmoore/south/ecuador/martians.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2004). Eleven years earlier,
Orson Wells presented a dramatization of War of the Worlds on the CBS network,
representing that Martians had landed near Princeton, New Jersey. The program sent
millions of Americans across the country into a panic. Id.
334. 'Mars Raiders' Cause Quito Panic; Mob Burns Radio Plant, Kills 15, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 14, 1949, at 1, 7, reprinted in SELECTED READINGS IN SoCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 304-07
(Stewart Henderson Britt ed., 1950).
335. SMELSER, supra note 311, at 264-65.
336. Id. at 264.
337. William Gremley, Social Control in Cicero, 3 BRmsH J. OF SOCIOLOGY 322
(1952). Professor Gremley points out that the actions of the Cicero police reveal
a basic conflict of roles .... While on the one hand these officials have
a sworn responsibility to uphold legal rights, on the other, we can
assume that the Chief of Police believed he was expressing, in his
actions, the sentiments of the community and acting as a mediator or
even "protector" of community mores, thus crystallizing the state into
an instrument to enforce mores contrary to the law of the state. The
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acquiescence in the volatility of the situation, soon erupted into a riot.33 8 Similarly,
police officers encouraged hostilities during the East St. Louis, Illinois Riots of
1917 by "fle[eing] into the safety of cowardly seclusion or listlessly watch[ing] the
depredations of the mob, passively and in many instances actively sharing in the
work., 339 When the state militia arrived to support the local law enforcement, they
also contributed to the riot by "fraterniz[ing] with the mob, jok[ing] with them and
ma[king] no serious effort to restrain them."34 What is more, in the months
preceding the culmination of the rioting, city authorities fostered an atmosphere of
racism and violence, allowing attacks on African Americans to go unrestrained.34 '
Adding further to the anti-African American sentiment, the mayor promised his
white constituency to do all he could in his power to drive African Americans from
East St. Louis and to prevent them from moving to the city.342 The riot, which
lasted nearly a week, resulted in the deaths of hundreds of black citizens and forced
over six thousand African Americans to flee the City. 343
The general conclusions of these kinds of social science studies can be
employed as social framework information by parties and by courts to aid in
determining factual issues in a state-created danger case. 3" Principles emerging
from these studies clearly illustrate how the State can create dangers that threaten
riot victims as well as render them more vulnerable to harm. Official uncertainty,
delay,345 and bias can all place riot victims in worse positions than that in which
they would have been had the State not acted at all. Official errors like these in
implementing social controls constitute state action that may satisfy the state-
created danger theory because they directly impact the incidence and magnitude of
mob activity. The next section further develops this interdisciplinary approach to
mob violence and governmental liability by examining the response by the Los
Angeles Police Department ("LAPD") to the April 1992 riot and observing the
impact of the social controls taken by the LAPD on the riot's formation and
development.
reluctance of the Cicero police to act vigorously to prevent the violence
that followed also reflects this conflict of roles.
Id. at 328.
338. Id. at 323.
339. CHICAGO COMM'N ON RACE RELATIONS, THE NEGRO IN CHICAGO 77 (1922).
340. Id.
341. Marcus Garvey, Speech regarding the East St. Louis Riots (July 18, 1917), in PBS
website, Primary Sources: The Conspiracy of The East St. Louis Riots, at http://www.pbs.
org/wgbh/amex/garvey/filmmore/psriots.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2003).
342. Id. True to his promise, the mayor sent a dispatch to the governor of Louisiana,
advising all African Americans living in Louisiana to "remain away" from East St. Louis. Id.
343. PBS website, People & Events: The East St. Louis Riot, at http://www.pbs.org
/wgbh/amex/garvey/peopleevents/e..estlouis.html (last visited June 11, 2003). According to
historian Winston James, African Americans were "being murdered in the most wanton and
barbaric manner... ; children [were] being thrown back into flaming houses, people [were]
being boarded up in their houses before [they were] torched so that they couldn't escape."
Id.
344. See Walker & Manahan, supra note 292, at 570.
345. On its own, however, delay that leads to a complete absence of law enforcement
presence might not be actionable under the state-created danger theory because there is no
affirmative constitutional right to receive basic protective services. In other words, state
inaction falls within the limits of DeShaney. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of
Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989).
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C. State Capacity Problems Impacting Riots
In a meticulous study of social controls undertaken by the police in response to
the Los Angeles Riot of 1992, Professor Bert Useem posits that, to effectively
respond to collective disorder, the State must solve certain capacity problems
relating to strategy, command, and planning and preparation.?a State capacity
describes the ability of public safety agencies to carry out their purposes and
goals. 347 Concomitantly, capacity problems can prevent a state agency from
effectively providing its services. When responding to collective disorder, law
enforcement officials must resolve issues of capacity such as electing a strategy of
diplomacy or force and establishing the structure of command. 4 8 To best make
these sorts of determinations, planning and preparation are essential. Professor
Useem describes planning as "what to do" and preparation as "the ability to
execute." 349 Planning activities include settling issues involving goals, tactics,
equipment, structure, and assignments. 350  Mental readiness and active
mobilizations, which require the actual involvement of those expected to perform,
comprise preparation.
3 5 1
During the 1992 Los Angeles Riot, the LAPD's inability to effectively resolve
the capacity problems of strategy, command, and planning and preparation resulted
in civil disorder that raged for six days, ripping the city asunder. 352 These serious
problems afflicted the LAPD before the riot expanded and engulfed large areas of
the city. 35 3 The protest began on April 29, 1992, almost immediately after the
verdicts of acquittal were read in the trial of the four police officers accused of
beating Rodney King.354 Groups of angry people congregated in South Central Los
Angeles to protest the verdicts. At the intersection of Florence and Normandie
346. Useem, supra note 22, at 360. Although many scholars recognize the role of the
State in suppressing and constraining civil disorder, few studies explore that role, tending to
focus, instead, on the characteristics and circumstances of the rioters. See, e.g., id. at 357-58;
TILLY, supra note 315, at 57.
347. KENNETH FINEGOLD & THEDA SKOCPOL, STATE AND PARTY IN AMERICA'S NEW
DEAL 52-53 (1995).
348. Useem, supra note 22, at 360. Although Professor Useem does not argue that one
strategy is superior to the other, he does point out that force is likely to antagonize potential
rioters and thus undermine diplomatic efforts. If diplomacy fails, then time is necessary to
reconfigure strategy and activate force mode. Any delay in deploying police could prove
costly in stifling the riot. Id.
349. Id. at 361.
350. Id.
351. Id. at 361-62.
352. Id. at 360-61. "It was the LAPD's Vietnam." Interview by Jaxon Van Derbeken
with Charles Duke, Sergeant, LAPD, (Aug. 22, 1994), quoted in CANNON, supra note 1, at
263.
353. Useem, supra note 22, at 365-69.
354. THE WEBSTER REPORT, supra note 2, at 11. On March 3, 1991, an individual shot a
home video of four white LAPD officers viciously beating a black man, Rodney King. E.g.,
DENNIS E. GALE, UNDERSTANDING URBAN UNREST: FROM REVEREND KING TO RODNEY KING
4 (1996). The segment showed a non-resistant King lying on the side of the road, enduring a
seemingly endless barrage of baton-beatings and kicks delivered by the officers. Id. When
the jury in the beating case rendered acquittals for three of the officers and a mistrial set the
fourth officer free, many Americans were stunned with disbelief. Id. at 5.
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avenues, dubbed the flashpoint of the riots by numerous commentators,355 anger
swelled into violence and destruction. Demonstrators torched buildings, looted
stores, and attacked passing motorists with crowbars, bottles, and rocks.356 The
collective anger over the King decision quickly spilled over into other parts of the
city, and lawlessness gained the upper hand for the following six days and five
nights. 357 After-riot assessment of the tragedy confirmed that the 1992 Los Angeles
Riot was the worst urban riot in United States history, exceeding all others in death
and destruction.
358
In his study of the 1992 riot, Professor Useem deftly depicts the State's failure
to resolve these capacity problems. 359 Regarding the first capacity issue, following
the acquittals in the King beating case, the LAPD adopted a strategy of diplomacy,
placing officers from its Metropolitan Division ("Metro") on "soft patrol.''36°
Although Metro trains its officers for special assignments, including riot control,
hostage situations, and high-risk arrests,36 1 after the verdicts were announced, its
officers were garbed in regular patrol uniforms, instead of riot gear, and drove
around the city waving and conversing with residents. 362 Authorities did not shift
363toward a strategy of force until several hours after the riot commenced. By this
time, the riot's own momentum, coupled with police delay in switching from soft
patrol to a riot-ready configuration, had propelled mob activity beyond the
immediate reach and control of local law enforcement efforts.364 What is more,
despite orders that a tactical alert be issued when the verdicts were read, which
355. See GALE, supra note 354, at 5-6; CANNON, supra note 1, at 282; THE WEBSTER
REPORT, supra note 2, at 19.
356. GALE, supra note 354, at 5-6; THE WEBSTER REPORT, supra note 2, at 12. Four
hours after the verdicts were announced, Reginald Denny attempted to traverse the
intersection and was dragged from his truck and beaten, kicked, stomped, and nearly killed
by rioters. David Freed & Ted Rohrlich, Crisis Shows LAPD is Ill-Preparedfor Riots, L.A.
TIMES, May 1, 1992, at BI (beating begins at 6:30 P.M.). Laurie Becklund & Stephanie
Chavez, Beaten Driver a Searing Image of Mob Cruelty, L.A. TIMES, May 1, 1992, at B1
(verdicts announced at 3:15 P.M.)
357. E.g., GALE, supra note 354, at 5-7. For a blow-by-blow description of the riots, see
CANNON, supra note 1, at 263-346. See generally JAMEs D. DELK, FIRES AND FURIES: THE
Los ANGELES RIOTS OF 1992 (1995) (giving a detailed report of the riots in Los Angeles).
358. GALE, supra note 354, at 7.
359. It should be noted that Professor Useem concludes that "[p]lanning was not at fault
at Florence and Normandie" because there was a plan for such occurrence. Useem, supra
note 22, at 373. This article, however, argues that planning was a factor in the formation and
growth of the 1992 Los Angeles riot based on the findings in the Webster Report.
360. CANNON, supra note 1, at 272-73. This deployment of Metro was later described
as a "giant-assed mistake." Id. at 273.
361. See CANNON, supra note 1, at 268-69, 272.
362. See CANNON, supra note 1, at 273; Useem, supra note 22, at 365-66.
363. This change in strategy was further impeded by the failure to call a tactical alert
until nearly four hours after the verdicts were read. THE WEBSTER REPORT, supra note 2, at
24.
364. In a study of twenty-four disorders, the Kerner Commission observed that "in one-
half of the cases police withdrew from the initial encounter for fear that they might not be
able to maintain control. In these cases the violence spread rapidly." THE WEBSTER REPORT,
supra note 2, at 123 (citing REPORT OF THE NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS
20 (1968)). Accordingly, the Webster Commission cites a pivotal error made by law
enforcement in failing to return to the Florence and Normandie vicinity after retreating from
a confrontation with an angry crowd. Although officers were outnumbered during the initial
incident, the failure to return in force was a significant tactical blunder. Id. at 121.
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would have allowed commanders to keep officers beyond their shifts, no such alert
was broadcast until nearly four hours after the verdicts were read and six hours
after the jurors notified the judge that they would be returning a verdict.365 The
delays in recalling officers unquestionably impacted the department's capacity to
respond to the riots.
366
In the initial stages of the riot, LAPD response appeared hesitant and
uncertain.367 This official indecisiveness during the first six hours of the disorder
spurred riotous activity and "led to situations that spread, intensified, and careened
out of control. 3 68 Contrary to traditional riot response protocol as well as
sociological findings regarding optimal methods for combating riots, the actions of
the LAPD were anything but "quick and decisive."
369
Although hindsight offers an unfair vantage point when reviewing strategy
decisions, it bears pointing out that police response during the early hours of the
rioting was at odds with the weight of authority. Law enforcement officials agree
that "police must act quickly with strength in response to a potential disorder at the
onset."370 A "'wait and see' stance is not wise."37' The LAPD's tactical manual
shares the same philosophy:
The primary responsibility of the... Field Commander during the initial
stages of an unlawful assembly or riot is the rapid assembly of sufficient
forces to immediately confront the participants. In the case of an
unlawful assembly, a dispersal order is ignored, or in the case of riot,
law violators must be quickly overwhelmed and arrested.
372
Command variables also played a part in the escalation of the riot. Particularly,
the official decision to locate the field command post at Florence and Normandie
was severely lacking in many respects: telephone lines were too few and quickly
overloaded; emergency equipment clogged the site; communication within the
command post was inefficient; and needed office equipment, such as faxes,
computers, and copiers, was unavailable. 373 The congestion of information,
equipment, and personnel impeded the processing of incoming information as well
as the dispatch of law enforcement units.374
365. Id. at 119-21.
366. As then Chief of Police Daryl Gates acknowledged after the riots, "a citywide
tactical alert, put into effect as the verdicts were read, could have speeded our response
somewhat." CANNON, supra note 1, at 279.
367. THE WEBSTER REPORT, supra note 2, at 104-14.
368. Id. at 24.
369. See supra notes 321-24 and accompanying text.
370. THE WEBSTER REPORT, supra note 2, at 121.
371. Id. (quoting the Int'l Assoc. of Chiefs of Police Report, Areas of Concern in
Addressing Contemporary Civil Disorders 10 (July 1992).
372. Id. (quoting the LAPD tactical manual).
373. Useem, supra note 22, at 367; CANNON, supra note 1, at 311-12.
374. Useem, supra note 22, at 367; see also CANNON, supra note 1, at 312.
Compounding problems, the lieutenant who initially set up the field command post had all
911 emergency calls rerouted to the post. "Without a computer terminal and with virtually
no telephones, this decision reduced management of the response to a primitive paper and
pencil exercise." THE WEBSTER REPORT, supra note 2, at 121, quoted in CANNON, supra note
1, at 312.
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Consequently, swarms of police personnel clogged the command post, waiting
for assignments and watching the havoc unfold on the evening news. 375 Dispatch
delays lasted anywhere between forty-five minutes and three hours.3 76 "As a result,
during the critical first six hours of the disturbance, the [area around Florence and
Normandie] was stripped bare of police service."
377
In addition, a higher level of command was needed to dispel problems that
arose under unity of command. 37 8 Two command structures were present at the
field command post-that of the lieutenant who set up the command post and that
of the captain of Metro. Absent a higher authority to coordinate their activities, the
dual commands compounded the bedlam of the command post.
379
Command factors at a higher level further impaired the LAPD's ability to
function effectively in the face of large-scale urban disorder. In particular, the
city's Emergency Operations Center ("Center"), which serves as the LAPD
headquarters during a local emergency, "was overwhelmed by the events that took
place in the riots and by its inability to gather and process information." 380 The
immense volume of information resulting from the riots quickly overcame the
Center's communications and information network.3 8 Moreover, delays in
summoning staff as well as insufficient training provided to Center personnel
rendered ineffective the Center's operational ability during the early, critical stages
of the riot.
382
Inadequate riot preparation and planning created hurdles for law enforcement
as well and likely deeply impacted other capacity variables, such as command and
strategy. According to the Webster Commission, which was impaneled by the city
board of police commissioners to report on the LAPD's preparation and response to
the riot, civil disorder plans were virtually nonexistent at all the levels of local
goverment.383 The city's emergency plans were wanting in both broad strategies,
and actual tactics and assignments to be implemented in the event of a hostile
outburst. At the city hall level, no specific planning was done for the possibility of
375. See Useem, supra note 22, at 368; CANNON, supra note 1, at 326-27. The Webster
Commission described the command post as "a sort of 'black hole' into which police
officers from all over the City were poured, but out of which few were deployed on the first
night." THE WEBSTER REPORT, supra note 2, at 109. According to a sergeant, "Officers were
just standing there, doing nothing." CANNON, supra note 1, at 327.
376. Useem, supra note 22, at 36. Officers became frustrated and morale levels dipped.
The department "damn near had a mutiny .... [O]fficers were ready to go back to their cars
and just go out." Stephen Braun & Leslie Berger, Chaos and Frustration at Florence and
Normandie, L.A. TIMES, May 15, 1992, at Al, quoted in Useem, supra note 22, at 368.
377. THE WEBSTER REPORT, supra note 2, at 122.
378. Cf. Useem, supra note 22, at 367 (arguing that a higher level of command may
have been able to effectively organize the command post); THE WEBSTER REPORT, supra
note 2, at 109-10 (same). Many high-ranking officers were present at the command post, but
none seemed solely in command. Three hours after the post was established, a deputy chief
finally arrived, assumed command, and organized the post. Id. at 109.
379. See Useem, supra note 22, at 368; CANNON, supra note 1, at 317.
380. THE WEBSTER REPORT, supra note 2, at 106-07
381. ld. at 112.
382. Id. at 106. Adding to the obstacles faced by Center personnel, the LAPD stationed
its top commanders and their staff in the Center during the disorder. Space problems
notwithstanding, these senior officers often diverted the Center's commanding officer from
his duties and also used LAPD personnel assigned to the Center for non-Center projects. Id.
at 107.
383. Id. at 79-81.
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civil unrest after the verdicts in the King case. 384 At the law enforcement level, the
LAPD's tactical manual and riot plans "were fundamentally deficient because they
failed to provide for the essential elements of planning-identification and
prioritization of objectives, identification of resources, a statement of tasks and
assignments to complete the tasks."3 5 Training, too, was inadequate.38 6 General
civil disorder training throughout the ranks was largely theoretical and
inconsistent.387 Despite predictions by several LAPD leaders of civil disorder
following the King beating trials, specific training for the King case was also
"sporadic and of varying quality."388 For example, whereas Metro officers received
a week-long and intensive training in riot control procedures and tactics, 389 training
and preparation for officers assigned to the geographic bureaus and areas of the city
was often incomplete and erratic. 390 Moreover, leadership was absent during the
emergent stages of the riot. When the King beating case went to the jury, two-thirds
of the police captains were out of town attending a three-day seminar,391 and, after
the trial, the police chief left town to attend a political event.
The LAPD's "tentative response" to initial hostilities and incidents that
swelled into the devastating riot "enabled the violence, looting and destruction to
take hold and grow." 393 State failure to resolve capacity problems affected the
384. Id. at 80. For example, the section of the plan related to civil disorder merely
provides: "Control of a civil disturbance lies primarily with the Police Division. Plans for
civil disturbance control are included in Police Division operational plans. Other
[Emergency Operations Organization] divisions may be called upon to assist the Police
Division with logistical support as well as initial situation estimates." Id. at 79.
385. Id. at 80 (emphasis in THE WEBSTER REPORT). But see Useem, supra note 22, at
373 (stating that there was a plan for an outburst such as the one at the intersection of
Florence and Normandie, but that these plans were not executed due to other capacity
problems and political pressures and divisions within the LAPD).
386. THE WEBSTER REPORT, supra note 2, at 93-96.
387. id. at 94-95.
388. Id. at 95. Many commentators attribute the inconsistent preparation for the
possibility of rioting following the release of the verdicts to political rifts within the LAPD.
The chief of police's impending retirement combined with the infighting and loss of morale
following the King beating and the Christopher Commission report had split the once-united
LAPD into uncooperative and non-communicating factions. In addition, various command
changes made by the chief of police prior and close-in-time to the riots seriously impacted
the department's ability to perform. See, e.g., id. at 107-09; Useem, supra note 22, at 369-
73; CANNON, supra note 1, at 275-77.
389. CANNON, supra note 1, at 272.
390. See id. at 268-78. According to Assistant Chief Robert Vernon, "[tihere is clear
evidence that some [command officers] of bureaus and areas had not taken the steps of
preparation that had been ordered." ROBERT L. VERNON, L.A. JUSTCE: LESSONS FROM THE
FIRESTORM 165 (1993); see also THE WEBSTER REPORT, supra note 2, at 95-96.
391. CANNON, supra note 1, at 304.
392. ld. at 302; THE WEBSTER REPORT, supra note 2, at 109.
393. THE WEBSTER REPORT, supra note 2, at 12. The Webster Report observes that
"rapid and forceful responses [to the initial outbreak in hostilities] would significantly have
altered the public perceptions of the developing environment in the City" and would have
been "an important first step toward controlling the outburst of violence." Id. at 123; see also
Peter A. Morrison & Ira S. Lowry, A Riot of Color: The Demographic Setting, in THE Los
ANGELES RIOTS: LESSONS FOR THE URBAN FuTURE 43 (Mark Baldassare ed., 1994) ("We
think that the Los Angeles riot of April 1992 could have been prevented by competently
organized police action between the time of the initial disturbances and the general
conflagration."); Tierney, supra note 4, at 150 (noting that police "inability to act decisively
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occurrence and direction of the 1992 riots in Los Angeles. As stated by one officer
in a post-riot interview, 'There's no doubt in my mind that we could have saved the
city. ' '394 Better planning and preparation could have alleviated challenges to
command and strategy capacity. Better planning and preparation would have aided
the State in addressing the riot before the chaos enveloped vast areas of South
Central.
Social framework reports and experts like Professor Useem who can describe
the body of social science data on state action and its effect on crowd behavior can
assist a jury by explicating the consequences of the challenged policing activities
on riot formation and growth. In particular, considering that the "behavior of
controlling agencies at the scene of the hostile outburst itself' is often crucial to the
success of law enforcement in quelling a riot,395 these studies can show how certain
social control factors can influence the level of harm caused by a riot. Submitted as
evidence, these studies can help jurors understand the complex dynamic that exists
between state action and crowd reaction.
An expert may also review the allegations and other material in the specific
case and provide a contextual analysis of the official actions and mob violence at
issue. Evidence for such an analysis would include organizational civil disorder
policies and procedures, as well as testimony as to how they were actually
implemented. In his examination of the 1992 Los Angeles riot, Professor Useem
pointed to three problems related to strategy, command, and planning and
preparation, which confounded public safety officials and compounded
396hostilities. Potential obstacles to controlling other riots, however, could also
encompass issues pertaining to force structure, sustainability, or equipment.397
Although not every action taken by officials to address a riot or potential riot
should be actionable under the Due Process Clause, an expert can help fact finders
decide whether the state action in dispute created or increased the riot danger or at
least caused a plaintiff's exposure to the dangerous situation.
Other scholars are beginning to study the extent to which the behavior of law
enforcement impacts collective conflict. 39 8 Research in this area will be relevant,
and sometimes crucial, to riot victims raising due process claims under the state-
created danger theory because these studies will provide the necessary nexus
in the early hours was a factor in the growth of the disturbance"); Ernest Van Den Haag,
Causes, Alleged and Actual, of the LA. Riots, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1657, 1658 (1993)
("Unaccountably unprepared for the ensuing mayhem, the police tried to control it only after
it became uncontrollable.").
394. CANNON, supra note 1, at 303 (quoting LAPD Officer Greg Baltad in March 10,
1994 interview).
395. SMELSER, supra note 311, at 261.
396. Useem, supra note 22, at 365-69.
397. Id. at 373-74. Force structure lapses affect the number and kinds of units available
to confront the violence; sustainability reflects the "ability of an agency to perform over time
with sufficient intensity." Id.
398. For example, in a comparative analysis of policing and riots in San Francisco and
Boston during the riot years from 1967-1969 researchers documented police behaviors
before and during riots and identified behaviors that likely caused or escalated riot activity
during the target period. Kimberly M. Berg and Anthony D. Perez, Dep't of Sociology,
Notre Dame Research Workshop, The Contribution of Policing to Racial Rioting in the
1960s, available at http://www.nd.edul-dmyers/teanlktfinal.pdf (last visited June 11, 2003)
(on file with author). These researchers also catalogued attitudes toward police in both cities
and discovered that public opinion serves as a predictor for rioting. See id. at 15.
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between state action and mob behavior. Even more important, further studies
considering what types of official actions result in a riotous reaction and in what
social contexts this sort of reaction is most likely to occur will aid future decision
makers in planning and preparing to respond to hostile collective action.
D. Official Recognition of the State's Role in Riot Formation and Trajectory
In Estate of Rosenbaum v. City of New York,399 discussed earlier in Part II.D,
the district court acknowledged the legal link between state action and mob action
and determined that state action can encourage rioting and increase riot dangers to
individuals.40 0 In this case, the court found that the DeShaney restrictions on the
governmental duty to protect individuals from private violence did not extend to
the plaintiffs' argument that official action taken during the riots "exacerbated the
danger to the Hasidic community and rendered the community more vulnerable to
violence by private actors.
' 40 1
The director of criminal justice for the state of New York, in an assessment of
the official preparation and response to the disturbances in Crown Heights, also
noted the correlation between official action and mob activity. 402 In particular, the
report identified many of the same social control problems faced by the LAPD
during the 1992 riot. As with the Los Angeles riot, the control problems
experienced by Crown Heights law enforcement during the initial three days of the
collective disorder embraced a variety of capacity issues, including strategy,
command, and planning and preparation. In choosing a strategy to address the
rioting, officials opted for a policy of restraint and non-confrontation. 3 This plan,
however, lacked tactical strategy, such as containment and dispersal, and thus was
unsuccessful in ending the violence .40 4 Even so, despite clear evidence that
diplomacy was not only ineffective but also feeding further violence, officials
adhered to this strategy for three days.40 5 Among its extensive findings, the study
determined that the police should have realized that the policy of restraint, even if
initially justifiable, was not achieving the desired outcome 4 M and that the official
failure to modify this approach until the fourth day of the rioting "allowed the
disorder to continue unabated.',
40 7
399. 975 F. Supp. 206 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
400. See Id. at 216-18. For more details about this case, see supra notes 275-86 and
accompanying text.
401. Id. at 217.
402. GIRGENTI REPORT, supra note 9, 342-63. In the report, the director, along with his
staff and a slate of reviewers and investigators, examines the city's response to the riot and
makes recommendations for future preparations for responding to civil unrest. Volume II of
the study reviews the circumstances surrounding the criminal investigation and prosecution
of the Rosenbaum killing. See 2 RICHARD H. GIRGENTI, A REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR ON THE
DISTURBANCES IN CROWN HEIGHTS: A REVIEW OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE
DEATH OF YANKEL ROSENBAUM AND THE RESULTING PROSECUTION (1993).
403. GIRGENTI REPORT, supra note 9, at 206.
404. Id. at 207; see also id. at 235 (noting that "while police officers were ordered to
exercise restraint, there was no plan stating what to do if restraint failed").
405. See supra notes 283-84 and accompanying text.
406. GIRGENTI REPORT, supra note 9, at 235, 264.
407. Id. at 235. The report to the governor on the Crown Heights riots nicely
summarizes this point:
A police department must employ a well-thought-out plan and must
implement it if it is to respond to civil unrest effectively. The chaotic
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Law enforcement efforts were also hampered by flaws in the command
structure and top-down control as well as a general failure to follow the city's
disorder plan, which delayed the implementation of appropriate tactics to control
the riot and resulted in a diffuse command structure, ineffective management, and
confusion in the ranks.408 The command troubles included a collective failure by
top-ranking police officials to provide oversight of field operations and to intervene
when strategic and tactical changes were necessary and poor placement and
410
equipage of the command post, which was the "nerve center" of police response.
Oversight and intervention were also missing at the city hall level. In particular, the
city's chief executive, the mayor, did not act quickly or decisively in requiring the
- . i . 411
police to restore peace and order to Crown Heights.
In addition, notwithstanding the need for "rapid deployment of sufficient
412personnel" to keep unstable conditions from escalating into violence,
mobilization and deployment of police during the first night of the rioting was
slow. 41 3 The resulting shortage of officers impeded efforts to contain the spread of
414the disorder. Moreover, the conspicuous absence of law enforcement gave
415
confidence to rioters and exposed the inadequacy of the police response.
Specifically, after the catalytic car accident, when roving bands had formed and
were moving through the areas surrounding the crash site, destroying property and
assaulting individuals, 416 the officers present were not sufficient in number to deal
with these groups.4 17 Further exacerbating mob conditions, police in the affected
areas were primarily assigned to fixed posts and were unable to pursue the roaming
clusters of youths.4 8 Instead, widespread use of mobile patrols was necessary to
combat the groups roaming through the neighborhoods causing mayhem.
4 19
Analysis also reveals that, despite the obvious mayhem occurring on the
streets, police officers were anything but aggressive in making arrests throughout
the initial days of the disorder.420 Only forty-eight arrests were made during the
conditions created by a disturbance, compounded by the complexity and
uniqueness of the tasks that must be performed, preclude the
development of a plan after a disturbance begins. And without such a
plan, even the most extensive and well-received community
interventions will fall short of their potential to promote calm .... In
implementing its plan, the police must be prepared for all foreseeable
contingences. Moreover, they must be sensitive to changes in
circumstances and flexible enough to react accordingly. While an initial
policy of restraint might be appropriate, the police must be prepared to
change their strategy if restraint proves ineffective. That does not
appear to have been the case in Crown Heights.
Id. at 236.
408. Id. at 241-65, 349-55.
409. Id. at 350-52.
410. Id. at 355.
411. Id. at 361-63.
412. id. at 205.
413. Id. at 205-06.
414. Id. at 345.
415. Id. at 222.
416. Id. at 205.
417. Id. at 205, 216.
418. Id. at 216-17, 347-48.
419. Id. at 347-48.
420. Id. at 224.
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first three days of the disturbance-thirty of these arrests were made on Day Three
of the riot.421 Underlying the low arrest numbers were operational and tactical
problems related to the lack of a clear mission and strategy.422 Not until the fourth
day of the disorder did authorities take on a coherent plan to address and contain
the rioting, adding mobility and revised tactics to confront the mob and arresting
people for unlawful assembly, which likely prevented additional crimes from
occurring. 423 The change in strategy extinguished the riot.
424
The city, itself, accepted responsibility for its equivocal position toward the
riot violence in a statement made by then-Mayor Rudolph Giuliani regarding the
settlement of the Crown Heights lawsuit:
In the spirit of conciliation, the City of New York accepts responsibility
for the mistakes that were made in August 1991, and apologizes to the
residents of Crown Heights .... The City of New York hereby reaffirms
that in the future it will not allow several days of rioting without
adequate response. There is no excuse for allowing people to victimize
others based on their race, religion, ethnicity or for any other reason
without a strong and immediate response from City government.425
The most notable snags in addressing the disturbance, however, arose from
poor planning and preparation. The city's plans for unusual disorders, though
comprehensive, were deficient in setting forth a procedure for activating the use of
the plans.426 Moreover, the police department did not regularly review the plans,
and command personnel were unfamiliar with them.427 Worse still, executive level
officers received little practical and tactical training, and training sessions for front-
line responders were too short and the information about officer riot responsibilities
428was insufficient. At the City Hall level, no action plan existed defining the roles
of relevant city agencies and setting forth a system for coordinating their
responsibilities and efforts.429
421. Id.; see id. at 225 tbl. 8.3. During the first two nights of violence, at least 35
residences were vandalized, yet only 8 arrests were made for property offenses. Id. at 228.
Despite over 160 complaints of assault filed by police officers and civilians during the two
days following the automobile accident, only 16 arrests for assault were made. Id. Numerous
looting crimes were witnessed by police and civilian alike, and no official attempts were
made to intervene. Id. at 228-29.
422. Id. at 224. The riot situation itself added to the difficulties faced by officers in
making arrests. Id. at 225. Individual officers can do relatively little when confronting a
mob. Instead, officers must function as a unit. To this end, appropriate riot arrest tactics must
be transmitted to those in the field. During the disorder in Crown Heights, this was not done.
Id.
423. Id. at 229-31, 235-36.
424. Id. at 222.
425. Statement by Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani Regarding the Settlement of the Crown
Heights Lawsuit, Archives of the Mayor's Press Office (April 2, 1998), available at
http://nycha-spotlight.com/PDF/snitow-nyc.pdf (last visited June 11, 2003) (on file with
author). The city settled the claims in the Rosenbaum lawsuit for $1.1 million and paid an
additional $250,000 to plaintiffs' counsel. Prior to this settlement, the City settled with two
of the plaintiffs for a total of $200,000. Id.
426. GIRGENTI REPORT, supra note 9, at 342.
427. Id. at 342-43.
428. Id. at 343-45.
429. Id. at 360-61.
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As in the 1992 Los Angeles Riot, the collective failures on the part of city and
police officials during the disturbance in Crown Heights not only allowed riot
violence to occur, but actually increased the dangers to riot victims. Analyses of
these disturbances demonstrate that the size and scope of a riot is inextricably
linked to the actions of law enforcement in responding to a mob. Accordingly, in
circumstances like these, the state-created danger theory presents a viable avenue
for relief under the requirements of due process.
E. The Ramparts of the Duty to Protect from Mob Violence
Having established this connection between state action and mob activity,
further discussion is necessary to determine the extent of the legal duty arising
from this link. As argued above, on-the-spot social controls taken by the State to
address mob activity can have a profound effect on riot formation and trajectory.43
0
Broadly applied, this causal relationship between the State and a riot could lead to §
1983 state-created danger liability whenever hostility erupts in a collective
fashion.431 The State would be automatically responsible for any and all riot
violence and destruction. States, however, are guardians, not guarantors, of the
public peace.432
Moreover, courts are unlikely to venture forth into an area of liability so far-
ranging and all-encompassing. Proof positive of this point is the court's opinion in
Estate of Rosenbaum v. City of New York.433 Although the court readily concluded
that the plaintiffs' claims, predicated on the state-created danger doctrine, properly
set forth a substantive due process basis for relief,434 it granted the defendants'
motion for summary judgment on qualified public official immunity grounds.435
The court's holding on this point was twofold: (1) it found that the due process
right asserted was not clearly established during the applicable time period; 436 and
(2) it determined that, even if the right was clearly established at the time of the
1991 riot in Crown Heights, the defendants' actions in addressing the disturbance
430. See supra notes 321-43 and accompanying text.
431. As Professor David Strauss points out: "[S]tate action is always present in the
background ... [and] contributes to the condition in which all members of society. . . find
themselves." David A. Strauss, Due Process, Government Inaction, and Private Wrongs,
1989 Sup. CT. REv. 53, 67.
432. See supra notes 158, 163; DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs.,
489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989) (holding that the Due Process Clause "is phrased as a limitation on
the State's power to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security").
LAPD Chief of Police Daryl Gates aptly phrased the point as thus: "There are going to be
situations where people are going to be without assistance. That's just the facts of life."
Chief Daryl Gates, Comment at a Brentwood Political Event on the First Night of the Riots,
quoted in CANNON, supra note 1, at 303. Resort to the Equal Protection Clause is also
unavailing. The Court has interpreted this clause to prohibit the State's discriminatory denial
of "protective services to certain disfavored minorities." DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197 n.3.
Application of this clause extends only to governmental decisions made with a
"discriminatory purpose," that is, decisions made "'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' ...
adverse effects upon an identifiable group." Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279
(1979); see also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298 (1987).
433. 975 F. Supp. 206 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
434. See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
435. Rosenbaum, 975 F. Supp. at 222-23.
436. Id. at 218-21.
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were objectively reasonable.437 The first ruling was unsurprising, considering how
heavily the court relied on the 1993 Dwares case in finding the due process
violation.43 s Observing that the Second Circuit did not decide Dwares until two
years after the unrest in Crown Heights, the court concluded that city officials
could not have reasonably been aware that their conduct may have implicated the
plaintiffs' due process rights at the time that they acted.439 The second line of
reasoning, however, raises concerns that many courts are likely to have with
respect to second-guessing strategy decisions made in the field. Despite expert
findings that law enforcement authorities should have realized that the policy of
restraint was not working and that a change in strategy was needed, 440 the
Rosenbaum court found that "reasonably competent similarly situated public
officials could disagree as to the legality of [the defendants'] actions" and
refused to subject the defendants to liability based on an after-the-fact judgment
that a different strategy might have attained better results." 2 Writing more
generally, the court noted: "Lawsuits alleging that police should have acted one
way or another in response to a [crisis] situation 'pose[] a no-win situation for the
police and do[] nothing to encourage law enforcement or a respect for
constitutional rights.'""
3
Courts, aware that "[a]n individual who confronts an emergency necessarily
acts 'in agitation and with imperfect knowledge,"' 4" are likely to shy away from
imposing liability on state and local governmental actors whose critical decisions,
made under urgent circumstances, do not have their intended effect or produce
unforeseen results." 5 As in Rosenbaum, this concern may lead courts to effectively
relegate the recognized due process right to the realm of theory, never to be applied
in practice. In essence, although the State might be theoretically responsible for its
actions in causing or increasing riot danger, no liability would attach in practice
because of a court's unwillingness to second-guess decisions made by authorities
on the battlefield. Consequently, short of a willful denial of protection or of a
deliberate official decision to proceed in a manner so perverse so as to be
437. Id. at 221-23.
438. See id. at 217-21 (discussing Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94 (2d Cir.
1993)). For a more detailed exposition of the Second Circuit's opinion in Dwares, see supra
notes 270-74 and accompanying text.
439. Id. at 218-21. Although the court conceded that other circuits had begun to sketch
a rough outline of the state-created danger due process right prior to the Second Circuit's
opinion in Dwares, it concluded that the conduct at issue in Rosenbaum was sufficiently
unlike that in the pre-Dwares cases. Dwares and Rosenbaum concerned "allegations that a
premeditated police decision to withhold protection emboldened violent private actors and
made the plaintiff or plaintiffs more vulnerable to injury." Id. at 220.
440. See, e.g., GIRGENTI REPORT, supra note 9, at 235; supra notes 406-07 and
accompanying text.
441. Rosenbaum, 975 F. Supp. at 221.
442. Id. at 222.
443. Id. (quoting Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 311 (5th Cir. 1992)).
444. Id. (quoting Justice Cardozo in Wagner v. Int'l Ry. Co., 133 N.E. 437 (N.Y.
1921)).
445. See, e.g., A. & B. Auto Stores of James Street, Inc. v. City of Newark, 279 A.2d
693, 696 (N.J. 1971) (finding no substantive basis for liability "because ultimately plaintiffs
challenge administrative or legislative decisions of a discretionary character, and it would be
intolerable to burden those decisions with a dollar liability whenever a trier of the facts
disagrees with them").
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completely at odds with all possible strategic alternatives in the face of riotous
activity, liability would never lie.
Accordingly, if these sociological studies are to be useful and effective in the
legal sphere, the contours of the due process right to riot protection must be
charted. 446 Although this Article does not seek to offer a comprehensive study of
this issue, some broad brushstrokes on the subject will be tendered.
Two primary concerns implicated in the riot responsibility context are judicial
involvement in legislative resource allocation decisions and executive discretionary
decisions. The argument commonly advanced in the first area of concern is that
courts are not institutionally equipped to make budgetary determinations about the
appropriate level and distribution of law enforcement services.4 47 These decisions
are considered to be political decisions that are best left to the political branches
"where all the affected interests can appear before the decision-making body and
the 'multiple centers can engage in exchange and consider the claims of others.'"48
Moreover, traditional judicial standards provide no guidance in evaluating these
"polycentric" decisions. 449 The reasoning underlying the second area of concern
can be found in the Rosenbaum court's reluctance to second-guess authorities
making crucial decisions in crisis situations. 450 The judiciary is disinclined to
involve itself in the management of emergency law enforcement operations
requiring expertise in crowd control strategies and tactics.451 It is also unwilling to
subject decision-makers to liability for mistakes made in good faith and pursuant to
the responsibilities attendant to their official posts, for fear of deterring officials
from acting "with the decisiveness and the judgment required by the public
good.A
52
446. With this in mind, Justice White has remarked that "'[n]o problem so perplexes the
federal courts today as determining the outer bounds of section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of
1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 .... 'Jackson v. City of Joliet, 465 U.S. 1049, 1050 (1984) (White,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (quoting Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200,
1201 (7th Cir. 1983)). In particular, courts continue to grapple with the pesky problem of
establishing the boundaries of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process guarantee. See id. at
1050-51.
447. See, e.g., Armacost, supra note 174, at 1003-09; William A. Fletcher, The
Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J.
635, 645-49 (1982); Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv.
353, 394 (1978).
448. Armacost, supra note 174, at 1005 (quoting CLAYTON P. GILLETrE, LOCAL
GOVERNMENT LAW 396 (1994)).
449. Fletcher, supra note 447, at 645-49; see also Comment, The Aftermath of the Riot:
Balancing the Budget, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 649, 662 (1968) ("Even were one to assume that
the duty to preserve law and order can be transmuted into an individual legal right, the
competence of the courts to enunciate the proper standards of liability and to fashion
adequate remedies is doubtful.").
450. See supra notes 441-43 and accompanying text.
451. See supra notes 441-43 and accompanying text; Comment, supra note 449, at 676-
77.
452. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974); see Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 814 (1982) ("The[] social costs [of liability] include the expenses of litigation, the
diversion of official energy from pressing public issues, and the deterrence of able citizens
from acceptance of public office" as well as "the danger that fear of being sued will dampen
the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the
unflinching discharge of their duties.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
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With respect to these two concerns, state action impacting riots can be divided
into three stages: (1) state action taken that preconditions an area to be more riot-
prone; (2) state action taken to plan and prepare for riots in general and, when
possible, an impending riot in specific; and (3) state action taken in the field, during
a riot. Resource allocation concerns clearly attach to state action taken at stage one,
when legislatures and municipalities put into operation social controls that shape a
locality's propensity toward collective disorder,453 as well as make various
determinations regarding the allocation of resources, including the creation of law
enforcement institutions.454 Although these decisions undoubtedly impact riot
development and direction,455 they are political decisions and are arguably best left
to the legislative branches of government.456 In a similar manner, concerns about
discretion may reasonably be confined to stage three, at which point the potential
for error is strong and the probability of official negligence is likely to be very
high.457 Decisions made in the field in response to a host of variables perhaps
should receive a presumption of protection, rebuttable by a showing of willful
denial of protection or evidence of strategy and tactics in clear contravention of
established practice and procedures.
458
These concerns take on a different cast, however, at stage two, at which point
resource allocation decisions have already been made and need only to be
implemented. Whereas a decision as to whether to establish a police department
may be political in character, "[t]he operation of a going public service ... is not a
legislative function., 459 Moreover, all states have formed emergency management
453. See supra notes 318-20 and accompanying text.
454. See supra notes 163-66 and accompanying text. The belief that the federal
government could not constitutionally require local governments to provide law enforcement
services led to the defeat of the Sherman Amendment. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436
U.S. 658, 673 (1978). Contra City of Chicago v. Sturges, 222 U.S. 313, 323 (1911) ("The
state is the creator of subordinate municipal governments. It vests in them the police powers
essential to the preservation of law and order. It imposes upon them the duty of protecting
property situated within their limits from the violence of such public breaches of the peace
as are mobs and riots.").
455. See supra notes 318-20 and accompanying text.
456. See supra notes 447-48 and accompanying text.
457. See supra notes 450-52 and accompanying text.
458. See supra notes 450-52 and accompanying text. Some might argue that, even with
such a showing, judicial review should be confined to circumstances in which internal
departmental disciplinary procedures are lacking. Otherwise, concerns of dampening official
enthusiasm in carrying out official responsibilities outweigh any desire to control the acts of
public officers. See Comment, supra note 449, at 676-77 (discussing suits against fire
department officials for failure to provide fire protection).
459. Comment, supra note 449, at 670-71. See Doyle v. South Pittsburgh Water Co.,
199 A.2d 875, 878 (Pa. 1964). In Doyle, the court determined that the defendant water
company could not avail itself of municipal immunity because the task of maintaining the
water system at issue was not discretionary owing to the fact that the company had already
exercised its discretion in setting up the water system. Id. at 878. According to the court,
"Discretion having been exercised and the physical fact of that exercise having become afait
accompli, reasonable care in the maintenance and repair of the planted hydrants became
imperative." Id. But see Bradley v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 890 P.2d 1228 (Kan. Ct. App.
1995) (finding that state law requirement to have an approved emergency plan on file did not
preclude local government from having immunity under the state tort claims act); Litchhult
v. Reiss, 183 A.D.2d 1067 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (finding that weather notification
responsibility under the county's emergency preparedness plan falls within definition of
discretionary act). These cases, however, are easily distinguishable from Doyle as well as the
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agencies to contend with disasters, including civil disorder,46 and require state or
local governments to perform emergency management functions.461 Accordingly,
planning for and preparing to respond to an event of collective disorder are not
discretionary undertakings. These tasks largely involve ministerial acts that fall
within the purview of the judiciary.462 For instance, the Webster Report, in
describing the city of Los Angeles's civil disorder plans and the individuals
responsible for carrying out the planning, recognized official discretion in
delegating tasks and duties, but assumed that such tasks and duties pursuant to the
plans would be executed-from updating and revising current manuals to building
consensus among law enforcement agencies and political leaders.463 With respect to
the disturbance in Crown Heights, several NYPD documents set forth procedures to
guide law enforcement authorities in responding to collective hostile outbreaks. 464
While police commanders exercise discretion in deciding how to implement the
provisions, compliance with the requirements of these manuals and plans is
expected. 46 5 Nonetheless, a failure to complete even ministerial tasks would not
necessarily constitute a breach of the constitutional duty to protect from mob
466
violence, unless that failure created or increased riot dangers that led to injury.
argument accompanying this footnote. In Bradley, the court noted that governmental entities
were liable for emergency preparedness activities, but that the definition of such activities
did not include the requirement to keep an approved emergency plan on file. 890 P.2d at
1231-32. In Litchhult, the official responsibility set forth in the provision of the emergency
plan at issue was qualified by the phrase "as conditions warrant." 183 A.D.2d at 1069. From
this language, the court determined that this provision described a discretionary act. Id.
460. For quick access to information on each state's emergency management
organizations, see State Emergency Management Agencies, available at http://www.tne
ma.org/Misc/StateEMA.htm (last visited June 11, 2003).
461. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 31-9-10 (2003); ALASKA STAT. § 26.23.040 (Michie 2002);
ARz. REV. STAT. § 26-307 (1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-75-110 (Michie 2002); CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 8568 (2003); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 70.14 (2003). In addition, all of the states,
with the exception of Hawaii, have entered into interstate compacts for emergency
management and assistance. See e.g., ALA. CODE § 31-9-40; ALASKA STAT. § 26.23.136;
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 26-309; ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-49-402; CAL. GOV'T CODE § 178.5.
462. Day v. State ex rel. Utah Dep't of Pub. Safety, 882 P.2d 1150, 1157 (1994)
("Generally speaking, discretionary functions are those involving policy setting and decision
making, while ministerial acts are more operational, involving the carrying out of policies.");
see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 79-
82 (1965) (listing cases in which courts have found the police role to be solely ministerial).
While "much police work is highly discretionary, the courts over a long period have
classified police action as ministerial; that means a policy [sic] officer generally has only
qualified immunity, not absolute immunity, even when what he does is clearly
discretionary." KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 19.3 (3d ed. 1994).
463. See THE WEBSTER REPORT, supra note 2, at 77-98.
464. See GIRGENTI REPORT, supra note 9, at 159-77.
465. Id.
466. Cf. Bradley v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 890 P.2d 1228, 1229-32 (Kan. Ct. App.
1995). In Bradley, the plaintiff sued the city and county officials for allegedly negligently
failing to warn her of an approaching tornado, which damaged her home and injured her. Id.
at 1230. Her claim arose from the county's failure to have in place an approved emergency
plan, as was required by the Kansas Emergency Preparedness Act. Id. at 1231. The court,
however, determined that the lack of an approved emergency plan did not preclude a claim
of immunity by the government agents. Moreover, it also found that the defendants, upon
realizing that the tornado warning siren was not functioning, directed police vehicles to drive
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Consequently, the precise scope of the duty at this stage would depend on the
particular facts at issue in a given case, making social framework evidence, as well
as expert analysis, all the more valuable in establishing the elements of a
constitutional claim brought pursuant to the state-created danger doctrine.
Additionally, studies reveal that stage-two state action not only directly
impacts the development and severity of a riot, but also leaves an indelible imprint
on the ability of officials to make optimal decisions at stage three, when riotous
events are unfolding very quickly and the potential for official miscalculation is
great.467 For example, the costly strategic errors made in addressing the riots in
Crown Heights were inextricably intertwined with earlier failures made by the
NYPD and city officials in planning and preparing for civil disorder.468
Furthermore, even at stage three there lies the argument that, though an initial
official decision to adhere to a particular strategy or course of conduct is a
discretionary act, negligence in implementing the original tactical and discretionary
decision is a ministerial act.
46 9
Pursuant to this premise, not every riot situation presents a federal case.
Without question, resource allocation is more accurately a legislative or executive
concern, as opposed to a judicial one, and reasonable choices made "among
conflicting behavioral hypotheses" should shield a state official from any form of
legal accounting.470 These concerns, however, do not erect the same barriers to
court review of stage-two state actions; 47' official planning and preparation are vital
through the city streets sounding their sirens and found that one of the vehicles "passed
within a distance of two mobile homes of Bradley's location a total of four times with its
siren on." Id. at 1232. Therefore, in this case, stage-two failures do not appear to have
contributed to the danger faced by Bradley.
467. See supra Part IH.A-C.
468. See supra notes 425-29 and accompanying text.
469. See, e.g., Gibson v. City of Pasadena, 148 Cal. Rptr. 68, 73 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978)
(finding merit in plaintiff's contention that "the police officers' initial decision to pursue was
the discretionary act while the alleged negligent pursuit was a ministerial act in
implementation of the original discretionary act"); Johnson v. State, 447 P.2d 352, 362 (Cal.
1968) ("[A]lthough a basic policy decision (such as standards for parole) may be
discretionary and hence warrant governmental immunity, subsequent ministerial actions in
the implementation of that basic decision still must face case-by-case adjudication on the
question of negligence.").
470. MARSHALL S. SHAPO, THE DUTY TO ACT: TORT LAW, POWER, & PUBLIC POLICY
114 (1936).
471. A duty to individuals in the context of hostile urban outbursts also recognizes
governmental obligations stemming from control and dependence. Professor Beermann
criticizes the DeShaney opinion as being inconsistent with government's extensive
involvement responsibility in the modern welfare state, arguing that this involvement
"creates dependencies that give rise to further responsibility." Beermann, supra note 28, at
1089. Moreover, in furtherance of crime control and order maintenance, the state's goal is to
monopolize the coercive use of force. See, e.g., LES JOHNSTON, THE REBIRTH OF PRIVATE
POLICING 24 (1992) ("In the twentieth century . . . it has generally been assumed that
policing is an inherently public good, whose provision has to reside in the hands of a single,
monopoly supplier, the state."). This contrasts sharply with and significantly curtails the
inherently private right of self-defense. For arguments supporting the right of self-defense as
codified in the Second Amendment, see, for example, Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun
Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REv. 204
(1983); William Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to Arms, 43
DUKE L.J. 1236 (1994); Eugene Volokh, The Amazing Vanishing Second Amendment, 73
N.Y.U. L. REv. 831 (1998). But see Carl T. Bogus, Race, Riots, and Guns, 66 S. CAL. L.
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to controlling or dispersing a mob.472 Although officials should not be liable for
lacking knowledge gained only by virtue of hindsight, lack of foresight should have
entirely different consequences.
One of the fundamental substantive purposes of the Due Process Clause is to
protect "liberty in a social organization . . . against the evils which menace the
health, safety, morals and welfare of the people. 474 As poignantly expressed by the
second Justice Harlan:
[T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause
cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of the specific
guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution. This "liberty" is not a
series of isolated points pricked out in terms of the taking of property;
the freedom of speech, press, and religion; the right to keep and bear
arms; the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures; and so on. It
is a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom
from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints, ...
and which also recognizes, what a reasonable and sensitive judgment
must, that certain interests require particularly careful scrutiny of the
state needs asserted to justify their abridgment.
While the Fourteenth Amendment affords no protection against private conduct,
the Due Process Clause was unquestionably "intended to secure the individual from
the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government. 47
6
State involvement in private wrong brings to the forefront Fourteenth
Amendment concerns. 477 Courts cannot discount state contributions, unwitting or
REv. 1365, 1365 (1993) (commenting on the surge in California firearms sales following the
1992 Los Angeles riots and noting that the fear-induced nature of the purchases stemmed
from the inability of police to defend people from mob violence); David C. Williams, The
Unitary Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 822 (1998).
472. Furthermore, inadequate planning and preparation for making these decisions
arguably breaches the social contract. See, e.g., Manzo v. City of Plainfield, 258 A.2d 149,
152 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1969) (describing "the obligation of government to protect
life, liberty and property against the conduct of the indifferent, the careless and the evil-
minded" as "lying at the very foundation of the social compact"), af'd, 279 A.2d 706 (N.J.
1971). See also City of Chicago v. Sturges, 222 U.S. 313, 322 (1911) (upholding strict
liability mob violence statute as resting constitutionally "upon the duty of the State to protect
its citizens in the enjoyment and possession of their acquisitions," and declaring statute "but
a recognition of the obligation of the State to preserve social order and the property of the
citizen against the violence of a riot or a mob").
473. The Supreme Court long ago recognized the value of foresight:
It has in modern times become apparent that the physical health of the
community is more efficiently promoted by ... preventive means, than
by the skill which is applied to the cure of the disease after it has become
fully developed. So also the law, which is intended to prevent crime...
by regulations, police organization, and otherwise, which are adapted for
the protection of the lives and property of citizens,. . . is more efficient
than punishment of crimes after they have been committed.
In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 59 (1890).
474. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937).
475. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting from dismissal on
jurisdictional grounds).
476. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 527 (1884) (quoting Bank of Columbia v.
Okley, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235, 244 (1819)).
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not, to destruction meted out by angry mobs.4 7 8 "Courts must still decide when
power holders have defaulted on their social obligations in particular
circumstances."47 9 To this end, failures in fulfilling the dual responsibilities of
planning and preparation that directly and negatively impact the development and
progression of a riot, and thus the ability of officials to make decisions in the field,
are suitable for court review.
Although the State most surely is not in the business of underwriting riot losses
endured by its citizens, the State should account for any role held in the equation
leading to such losses. Law enforcement, which includes the tasks of peacekeeping,
personal security, and property protection, is considered to be a basic and essential
public function, both a governmental chore and prerogative. 48 0 This notion is
evident in the words of the United States Supreme Court stating that "the most
basic function of any government is to provide for the security of the individual and
of his property. ' 481 By meeting its responsibilities to make provisions in the event
of violent civil disorder, the State guards against constitutional claims of abuse or
default.
CONCLUSION
"Burn the comer down again! Ain't nothing's changed!"482
This Article sounds a clarion call for governmental accountability to its
citizens for riot violence pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. Although state limitation and retraction of riot statutes have
curtailed the protective policies that once animated the original state acts, the
guarantees of the Federal Due Process Clause present an alternate avenue for
achieving the same policy goals of maintaining peace and good order in society by
requiring the state to protect its citizens from mob violence when the state, through
its local governments or state or local officers, has created or increased the danger
477. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961) (stating that
"private conduct abridging individual rights does no violence to the Equal Protection Clause
unless to some significant extent the State in any of its manifestations has been found to
have become involved in it").
478. Cf., e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200-
02 (1989) (tacitly supporting the state-created danger theory of liability); Butera v. District
of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637, 650-53 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (embracing the state-created danger
theory of liability); Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1205-11 (3d Cit. 1996) (same);
Gregory v. City of Rogers, 974 F.2d 1006, 1010 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (same); White v.
Rochford, 592 F.2d 381, 383-86 (7th Cir. 1979) (same).
479. SHAPO, supra note 470, at 115. Professor Shapo urges that judicial caution in
reviewing policy decisions should not "melt into abstention." Id.
480. See, e.g., Heyman, supra note 28, at 512-30 (tracing the origins of the duty to
protect); Clifford D. Shearing, The Relation Between Public and Private Policing, in
MODERN POLICING 399, 403-09 (Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1992) (describing
policing as "a quintessentially public service"). For an insightful discussion of police
functions, both past and present, see generally Sklansky, supra note 109.
481. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 312 (1972) (quoting
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 539 (1966) (White, J., dissenting)); accord Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 237 (1983).
482. Sarah Tippit, Bush Sees Hope After LA. Riots, Some See No Change, REUTERS,
Apr. 29, 2002 (quoting the shouts of a motorist interrupting the ceremony at Florence and
Normandy commemorating the ten-year anniversary of the Rodney King riot).
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of that violence. To trigger these constitutional safeguards, studies establishing the
sociological link between state action and mob violence can provide guidance to
fact-finders in individual cases. Social science studies have long identified the State
as playing a leading role in the theater of riot violence: a riot's severity is as
dependent on police strategy and tactics as it is on the character and circumstances
of the people milling about in the streets.483 Social science research illustrating the
effects of certain policing activities on mob behavior in other riots can help fact-
finders understand and appreciate factual claims regarding whether state action
contributed to the rise and development of a specific riot. In addition, social science
experts can provide contextual analyses of the factual claims in a particular case.
Riots are not natural catastrophes. They are man-made and, accordingly,
avoidable or, at the very least, controllable. By setting forth a constitutional claim
for riot protection, this Article hopes to encourage state and local governments to
develop organizational and tactical strategies to address the ongoing, serious threat
of civil disorder. Official malfunction that results in mob violence has a disparate
impact on urban blacks and other racial and ethnic minority groups who populate
the inner-city neighborhoods where collective action is most likely to occur.
Poverty, chronic unemployment, broken families, teen pregnancies, and soaring
school dropout rates plague these communities and heighten the potential for
violence.4 84 Furthermore, the combined effects of foreign immigration and
economic restructuring, present in many United States cities, are causing inter-
ethnic hostilities.485 As one commentator has observed:
Every major city.., is a racial powder keg, ready to go off. I promise
you, in twenty years, I'm telling you, this country is headed toward
revolution if we don't do something about the inner city. If the poor
people of this country, black and white and brown, ever realize that
what unites them is greater than what divides them, we're in terrible
trouble.
48 6
If our cities are, in truth, primed and ready to ignite, then the State must be
prepared to extinguish the flames. Although things may fall apart, the center must
hold.487
483. TILLY, supra note 315, at 57.
484. Mark Baldassare, Introduction, in THE Los ANGELES RIOTS: LESSONS FOR THE
URBAN FUTURE 1, 2 (Mark Baldassare ed. 1994). In today's South Central Los Angeles, the
average income is about half that of the rest of the city. The number of businesses and jobs
in South Central are about forty percent of the city's average. Murders and other violent
crimes are at least double the rate of that elsewhere in Los Angeles. Doug Saunders, LA.
Story, the Sequel, THE GLOBE & MAIL, Apr. 20, 2002, at Fl (citing a study by economist
Paul Ong of the University of California at Los Angeles).
485. Baldassare, supra note 484, at 3.
486. Attorney David Berg quoted in DAVID K. SHPLER, A COUNTRY OF STRANGERS:
BLACKS AND WHITES IN AMERICA 13 (1997).
487. But see William Butler Yeats, The Second Coming, in THE COLLEGE ANTHOLOGY
OF BRmSH AND AMERICAN VERSE 486-87 (A. Kent Hieatt & William Park eds., 1964)
("Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold.").
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